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# JOURNAL

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
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
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
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
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
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
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OF THE

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VOL. LIII.

AUGUST, 1909.

No. 878.

[Authors alone are responsible for the contents of their respective Papers.]

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Sub-Lieutenant A. U. Willis, R.N.  
Captain N. J. Hopkins, R.E.  
Captain H.S.H. Prince Alexander of Teck, G.C.V.O., D.S.O.,  
Royal Horse Guards.  
Lieutenant E. V. Anderson, Royal Highlanders.  
Lieutenant E. C. B. Merriman, 6th Dragoons.  
Lieutenant H. J. M. Rundle, R.N.  
Sub-Lieutenant R. H. L. Alder, R.N.R.  
Captain A. S. M. Porter, 3rd Bn. Q.R. West Surrey Regiment.  
Lieutenant C. W. Von Roemer, R.F.R.A.

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Captain J. T. C. Broadbent, Indian Army.  
 Captain G. H. N. Jackson, D.S.O., Border Regiment  
 Major H. O. Parr, Indian Army.  
 Lieutenant L. E. Barnes, R.E.  
 Lieutenant O. Y. Hibbert, Royal West Kent Regiment.  
 Lieutenant G. H. King, R.F.A.  
 Lieutenant H. C. Stephen, Northumberland Fusiliers.  
 Lieutenant T. C. King, 14th King's Hussars.  
 Lieutenant D. H. Powell, Indian Army.  
 Lieut.-Colonel H. S. Langhorne, Army Ordnance Department.

## II. ADDITIONS TO THE MUSEUM.

6011. Officer's Helmet-Plate and Belt Buckle of the 16th Bedfordshire Regiment, worn subsequent to 1881.

—Given by Major-General C. J. Horna.

6013. General Christian De Wet's Heliograph.

—Given by Colonel H. De B. De Lisle, C.B., D.S.O.,  
 1st Royal Dragoons.

6014. Painting in Oils, executed in 1859, of Captain William Slayter Smith, who was born in 1793. He was appointed Ensign in the 2nd Garrison Battalion on 25th December, 1806, and was promoted Lieutenant in November, 1808, after having been appointed Adjutant of the Regiment in June of that year. He served in the Peninsula War as Lieutenant in the 13th Light Dragoons during the years 1810-1812, and was once severely wounded, and twice slightly. He was present in the rank of Lieutenant in the 10th Hussars at the Battle of Waterloo, and in June, 1822, was appointed Adjutant of the Yorkshire Hussars, which office he held until the year 1864. On the occasion of his death on the 18th July, 1865, the Earl of Harewood, commanding the Yorkshire Hussars at the time, issued the following Regimental Order on 20th July of that year: "The Commanding Officer has to announce to the Regiment, with very great regret, the death of their late Adjutant, Captain Slayter Smith, at Ripon, on the 18th instant. He feels that all will join him in the desire to pay respect and honour to the remains of one who has served so long and honourably in the Corps, and to whose ability and exertions they are in a great measure indebted for the high character borne by the Regiment at the present time. He has, therefore, decided that the funeral of the deceased Officer shall be conducted with Military Honours at Ripon on Tuesday, the 25th instant, at 3 p.m., and all Officers and Men, who conveniently can, are invited to attend."

6015. Helmet of the 15th Light Dragoons of the pattern worn about 1765. The regiment greatly distinguished itself at Emsdorf in 1760, under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick.

—Given by Major-General P. H. Sandilands.

6016. Officer's Helmet-Plate and Belt-Buckle of the Royal Wiltshire Militia.—Given by Lucius Fitzgerald, Esq., late

Lieutenant Royal Wilts Militia.

6017. Dutch Naval Officer's Sword of the end of the 18th century. Brass hilt with ivory grip.—Purchased.

#### FOURTH ESSAY.

*Honourably Mentioned.*

*Subject:—*

**"THE COMMAND OF THE SEA: WHAT IS IT?"**

*By Captain R. F. PHILLIMORE, M.V.O., R.N.*

*Motto:—*

**"Regions Cæsar Never Knew Thy Posterity Shall Sway."**

#### LIST OF WORKS REFERRED TO:—

- James' "Naval History."*  
"Naval Warfare."—*Colomb.*  
"The Influence of Sea Power upon History."—*Mahan.*  
"The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire."—*Mahan.*  
"The Royal Navy. A History."—*Sir W. Laird Clowes.*  
"England in the Seven Years' War."—*Julian C. Corbett.*  
*Rollin's "Universal History."*  
"La Guerre sur Mer."—*Gabriel Dariens.*  
"Naval Policy."—*By Barfleur.*  
"The Art of Naval Warfare."—*Sir Cyprian Bridge.*  
"The Share of the Fleet in the Defence of the Empire";  
"XIX. Century and After."—*Sir Cyprian Bridge.*  
"The Naval Annual. 1908."  
"Defence of Harbours by Fortification."—*Brigadier-General R. F. Johnson in the JOURNAL for September, 1908.*  
"History of the British Army."—*Hon. John Fortescue.*  
"General Gordon: A Personal Reminiscence."—*Viscount Esher.* "XIX. Century and After."  
"The Conduct of War."—*Lieut.-General Von der Goltz.*  
"Guerres Maritimes sous Le Republique et l'Empire."—*Jurien de la Graviere.*

NO wider scope could possibly have been chosen for an essay than that put forward this year by the Council of the Royal United Service Institution; the correct answer to the question bears an importance to the British Empire that it is impossible to exaggerate, since our very existence depends upon it.

In spite of the wide scope of the subject, it is not easy to break new ground, but an attempt can be made to deduce, from the general rules laid down by various authorities, the particular ones required to answer the question from the only standpoint with which we are concerned, that of the United Kingdom and His Majesty's Dominions beyond the Seas.

Of late years many master minds have discussed this and kindred sea matters, and every year sees an increase in the number of those following in the footsteps of Colomb in England and of Mahan in America; to the latter, indeed, must be awarded the proud distinction of having brought more grist to the ship-builders' mill than any one man since history was written; it would be almost impossible to calculate the millions offered on the altar of ship construction in the name of the elusive goddess of sea power, since Mahan wrote his epoch-making books.

To searchers after truth in the year of grace 1908, there are many sources of information open which were not possessed by Colomb or by Mahan when his earlier works were written, many public archives and private memoirs have since seen the light of day, and we are now allowed peeps behind the scenes, where they saw only the stage effect, and were forced to guess at the nature of the machinery that set it in motion; but the general result of newer publications is only to throw into broader relief the clear-cut lines of the master's design, to emphasize his rules, and to point the moral of his conclusions.

We all know that Command of the Sea permitted us to transport our troops safely to South Africa in the last war, enabled the North to beat the South in America, gave us Canada and (by its absence) lost us our American Colonies and Minorca; that it also allowed us to carry out the historic blockades of Brest and Toulon, and the scarcely less important ones of Rochefort, Ferrol and Cadiz. That it can only be obtained by defeating or blockading the enemy's fleet is also a commonplace of naval history.

But to find an answer to what constitutes the Command of the Sea, and how it is to be retained, we must wander far beyond questions of naval strategy and naval tactics; the domain of the diplomatist must also be invaded, and the cabinet of Ministers of State cannot be excluded from the survey.

Over and over again in our history the solid results achieved by our seamen and our soldiers have been reduced, or entirely lost, when the sword gave place to the pen, and the defeats of the enemy by sea and land have been more than avenged when the opponents met again in the Conference; think of Java, given up by Castlereagh, who neither knew nor cared where the richest island in the world was situated; of the Convention of Cintra; of the Peace of Amiens.

Some day, *pour encourager les autres*, a Plenipotentiary may share the fate of Byng; but even then the balance against the fighting services will not have been redressed.

All of which shows the necessity of a policy framed to preserve the great inheritance handed down to us, by realising the presence of communities of our kith and kin exterior to this little pair of islands, and by taking into account, and jealously preserving, the priceless asset of sea power.

It is true that Englishmen have long been aware of what our forebears termed the "Sovereignty of the Sea." In 1336 King Edward III. issued a proclamation:—"We, considering that our progenitors, Kings of England, were Lords of the English Sea on every side."

Again: "Whosoever Commands the Sea, commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world, commands the riches of the world, and, consequently, the world itself," so wrote Raleigh over 300 years ago.

Before that time we have Bacon, saying: "He that Commands the Sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of the war as he will; whereas those that be strongest by land are many times, nevertheless, in great straits."

Even Charles II. laid down the doctrine: "It is the custom of the English to Command the Sea."

We have talked and written of Command of the Sea for nearly 600 years, and yet the question can still be put: "What is it?"

In a paper by Brigadier-General R. F. Johnson, in the September number of the *JOURNAL*, the answer is given (quoted from some correspondence in the *Times*) as follows:—"The command in certain waters exists when within those waters no hostile fleet can count on the time requisite for a serious enterprise without a strong probability of having a superior force to deal with."

Mahan writes of "Military control of the intervening sea" affording "reasonably secure communication" between ports.

Von der Goltz explains it as follows:—

"The opposing forces being approximately equal, victory will in the end rest with the one that remains master of the sea. It will exhaust the financial power of the other by the destruction of its commerce and the stoppage of maritime traffic, and thus also undermine its military power."

Definitions of the expression "Command of the Sea" are as many and varied as the moods of the element in question, but that given by Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge in "The Art of Naval Warfare" has the merit of conciseness, clearness, and consistency; so let us adopt his "Control of Maritime Communications."

Having adopted a definition we are not very far on the road; for it is only when we begin to consider what are maritime communications of the Empire, and we are confronted with the image of that little spider of the British Isles in the midst of

<sup>1</sup> Von der Goltz, "The Conduct of War," p. 278.



the gigantic web of his own spinning, that we begin to realise the difficulty of the problem.

The phrase "Command of the Sea" has always been applied in the sense of local control, though circumstances may have set very wide bounds to the areas of the localities.

For instance, the oft quoted War of 1778 had its three main areas in Europe, America and India, and the command of the sea in one or two of them was quite compatible with inferiority in the third; in fact, further sub-division of the areas often revealed different conditions existing in the Channel to the Mediterranean, and French control of the West Indies co-existent with British dominion over the American Continental waters.

In spite of all local conditions and dissimilar positions, some connection always exists in war between widely separated seas, and the judgment of Mahan attributes the loss of Minorca to the large naval force which Britain was compelled to maintain in the Western hemisphere; similarly, the loss of the American Colonies was due to the necessity for our keeping the squadrons in European waters up to strength, when, as Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge epigrammatically says, "We saved a rock and lost a Continent."

What are our essential requirements for securing and keeping the Command of the Sea?

1. A good policy.
2. Preparation for war.
3. Wealth.

As the first and second of the above are governed by statecraft, and the third is largely due to individual effort, it is not surprising (given British idiosyncrasies and political limitations) that the last has alone been satisfactorily fulfilled by this country during the last 100 years; nevertheless, even though we have to work through the medium of clumsy departmental machinery, ever in danger of being brought to a standstill by the misapplied brake of party politics, it is most incumbent on us to see that the two former conditions are also complied with.

The first is partially dependent on other nations; as it takes two to make a quarrel, so it takes two to form a friendship, but realising that worthless friendships are neither valued nor sought after, we are led, almost insensibly, to the second requirement, preparation for war, the fulfilment of which rests entirely with ourselves; or, to put the matter in a stronger light, failure to comply with it is no one's fault but our own.

Preparation for war is again dependent, as to its scope and details, on the third condition: wealth.

The more these three conditions are examined, the more it will be found that they hang together, and that any two would fail in warfare without the third.

History teaches us that in the end it was Great Britain's money bags that weighed down the scale against Napoleon, for Pitt's Continental subsidies were as much deciding factors as Trafalgar or the Peninsular campaign.

Again, though the first and second conditions were fulfilled in the case of Japan in the last war against Russia, the lack of the third led to the signature of the Treaty of Portsmouth, when apparently the Japanese had beaten their enemy to his knees.

Happily, at present, we need not consider the wealth of the United Kingdom nor the increasing resources of the Greater Britain beyond the seas; but the various sub-divisions of policy afford wide scope for analysis, and in addition to preparation for war, the question of oversea invasion must be referred to, on account of the intimate connection existing between it and the Command of the Sea.

#### POLICY.

Policy in general can be sub-divided as below :—

- a. Public;
- b. Naval;
- c. Colonial; and
- d. Foreign Policy.

#### PUBLIC POLICY.

Though the second is the core of the whole matter, it depends very greatly on the first, for this reason :—

Naval policy, to be really effective, must be permanent, but to ensure permanency it must be based on scientific principles and be universally accepted, and in these democratic days, if a policy is to be supported by the bulk of intelligent public opinion, the necessity for it must be clearly understood; in other words, the naval schoolmaster must be abroad, for strange as it may sound, "the man in the street" has more power in keeping the Command of the Sea for us than "the man behind the gun."

Navy Leagues may hold drawing room meetings and try to stimulate interest among school boys by offering prizes for naval subjects, and their efforts are worthy of all praise, but what is required is a sustained educational effort, and this can only be carried out by the Education Department itself.

It is the bounden duty of the Government of this country to see that the necessity for a strong Navy is inculcated in all the elementary schools in the United Kingdom.

The doctrine of British sea power should be as universally accepted and acquiesced in as the various laws that regulate public health and decency, and there should be no great difficulty in substituting a concrete form for the vague floating outline of British Command of the Sea, which the public supposes to be always existent and to be part and parcel of the scheme of the universe.

The question of cost must not be shunned, but dealt with boldly as a safeguard against war, and the analogy with

insurance against the dangers in civil life, fire, accident, and death, clearly explained.

British commerce afloat annually is worth about £1,600,000,000  
Value of British shipping ... .. 100,000,000

£1,700,000,000

Thus Naval Estimates of £32,000,000 are less than 2 per cent. of the value of the shipping and commerce protected.

This cannot be too widely realised.

There is no reason why public departments should work isolated in water-tight compartments from each other, and it would be clearly for the benefit of the country in general and the Navy in particular if the First Lord of the Admiralty called his colleague, the President of the Board of Education, to his assistance.

The school boy would find familiarity with the ocean tracks of British steamships at least as interesting as geological formations, and the Navy Estimates would be discussed more intelligently in the House of Commons if Members were aware that their constituents understood the enormous value of our sea-borne trade and realised that the greater part of their daily food is brought to them from overseas.

The lesson that lack of preparation for war, far from being an economy, cost the French people their ransom of "Five Millions," is an essential one for the adult taxpayer to learn and remember.

But we must begin with the boys, teaching the romance as well as the dry facts of the ocean and, properly imparted, the history of sea power will be learnt with avidity; only let it be taught that Bideford is as famous for its naval heroes as Kidderminster for its carpets, and that the defeat of the Great Armada and the battle of Trafalgar were at least as important facts in our history as the First Reform Bill.

The human boy is the same in all classes of life, and they all will wish that they could have sailed with Drake and died with Grenville.

Finally, if it is necessary that the school boy should still be stuffed with statistics, at least let them be of a nature to make him realise our dependence on Command of the Sea; that we spend £179,000,000 in imported food; that four-fifths of our wheat is grown abroad, and similar all-important facts.<sup>1</sup>

Every nation but our own teaches patriotism in its schools; let us take a leaf out of their book and a rich return will be garnered for every penny spent in the naval education of the masses.

What is the alternative? Following an interruption of their commerce (which was their sole resource), arising from the loss of a naval engagement, "they imagined themselves to be

<sup>1</sup> Board of Agriculture Report for 1907.

on the brink of ruin, and abandoned themselves to despondency and despair."<sup>1</sup>

Would this not apply to modern England?

Yet it is a description of the Carthagenians at the time of the First Punic War.

Human nature has not altered much in the last 2,000 years; we know the fate of Carthage at the hands of the military Empire of Rome, and how laboriously the victors built and trained a Navy to accomplish that result.

*Absit Omen.*

#### NAVAL POLICY.

In the old toast, "Ships, Colonies and Commerce," we have the epitome of our naval policy—a sermon in a sentence—emphasizing the connection of the three great sources of the prosperity of Great Britain.

The future of the Empire is bound up in that of the King's Dominions beyond the Seas, and we must ever bear in mind the dictum of our arch-enemy Napoleon, on the occasion of the cession of Louisiana: "No Colonies without a Navy."

Colomb, writing of the affair at St. John de Ulloa, in 1567, says: "All the world seems to have thereafter become alive to two things: the enormous value of sea-borne commerce to the countries that carried it on, and the tremendous risks attending its prosecution in war, on the one hand, as well as the great advantages arising from its attack on the other."<sup>2</sup>

The elder Pitt was the greatest War Minister that this country ever had, and in the first despatch to an Ambassador abroad, written by his order, after he took office, the close relation between trade and naval strength is emphasized: "Trade and maritime force depend upon each other," and "the true resources of this country depend upon its commerce."<sup>3</sup>

In laying stress on the attack and defence of commerce, no fantastic theories of "Guerre de Course" are implied, the construction of no special "Chateau Renaults" are advocated for our Navy; but the definition adopted for "Command of the Sea" must be remembered.

"Control of Ocean Communications" is our text, and its correctness has to be proved.

In spite of the enormous losses suffered by our trade in the Great War, it is notorious that we finished richer than we began, our supremacy was unrivalled, and, thanks to the destruction of our enemies' shipping, we found ourselves the carriers of the world. (Between 1792 and 1800 alone the commerce of Great Britain increased by 65 per cent., the loss by capture being less than 2½ per cent. on the annual volume of trade.)

<sup>1</sup> Rollins' Universal History.

<sup>2</sup> "Naval Warfare," p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> "England in the Seven Years' War," Vol. I., p. 189.

Why this enormous increase? Because we controlled maritime communications through possessing the Command of the Sea. Incidentally to obtain that control we had defeated the fleets of the enemy, blockaded him in his own ports, and captured his outlying possessions.

There were times when locally the Command of the Sea was lost; even in Nelson's chase to the West Indies Villeneuve controlled maritime communication there for a brief 21 days, and captured the Diamond Rock and a convoy of 17 sail; but after Trafalgar it can truthfully be said that we controlled ocean communications.

Nevertheless, after Trafalgar, our shipping suffered heavy losses from the enemy's cruisers, and since those days it has enormously increased, and, with it, our risks.

It must be borne in mind that British shipping captured in the China Seas, or in the Pacific, is as much a blow to the trade of the Empire as if that capture took place in the English Channel. A blow may be received at an extremity of the human body which will affect the action of the heart.

The British Empire has interests in all the seas; it is therefore imperative that the White Ensign should be seen in all. Most of us will admit (some, perhaps, grudgingly) that this is desirable in peace, but the point is, that it is necessary for war.

It cannot be otherwise than a mistake to relinquish our world-wide policy (remember Bismarck's comment on the retrocession of the Ionian Islands), and the retreat is not covered by sneers at "police duties" and phrases about "ships being only built to fight."

Other Powers are only too anxious to occupy our vacated position; we have had a nasty experience of our American cousins performing "police duties" in Jamaica, and, as a German officer remarked to one of our's in China: "For every gunboat you withdraw from the Yang-Tse we will put one on the river."

Let us return without delay to our self-imposed task and resume the duties, so beautifully described in our naval prayer, of insuring the "security of such as pass on the seas upon their lawful occasions."

Distribution of force is not necessarily dispersion.

During the American Civil War, though the Federals had Command of the Sea in the actual theatre of operations, a few Confederate cruisers, far away from the Atlantic coast, committed havoc among the Northern Mercantile Marine; but how insignificant were the numbers they captured compared to the prizes awaiting the enemy in a war against Great Britain, when we consider that in our last war with America we lost a thousand merchant ships in eighteen months. Our South Atlantic and Pacific Squadrons have lately been abolished in order to concentrate more ships in the North Sea; but look at the trade that streams past Pernambuco and Sierra Leone, and the thousands of tons of British shipping in South American



waters. It is obvious that in war, if British cruisers are not off the River Plate the enemy's will be, but if the South Atlantic Squadron is in home waters when war breaks out, uninstructed public opinion will clamour for their retention, and they will never go south.

British interests in the Pacific also require protection now; the opening of the Panama Canal will bring unknown elements of danger into play, when demands for the replacement of the squadron will be more insistent than ever.

Armoured cruisers are not required for either of these squadrons, as it is practically certain that no enemy would be able to spare his own for attack on commerce, but they should contain sea-keeping craft of respectable gun power.

If we keep the definition of sea power constantly before us, the outline of our policy will gradually take shape and leave nothing but the details to fill in.

#### "CONTROL OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS."

What are the ocean communications that we wish to control? The unassuming British tramp steamer is found the wide world over, following certain recognised tracks, as her smart sisters, the Western Ocean liners, have their steam lanes across the Atlantic. The British Empire was built up and exists by commerce, and as the liner is the express, so the tramp steamer is the goods train of the ocean.

The steamers must be allowed to pursue their routes, the routes must be protected, maritime communications must be controlled—by men-of-war.

Now, men-of-war, as Mahan puts it, are "like land birds, unable to fly far from their shores." Resting places must therefore be found for them, depôts for coal and oil, provisions and ammunition, as the modern warship has many requirements.

These depôts must be guarded, lest others possess themselves of the accumulated stores.

The policy soon looms up; it is an old and tried plan, and the requirements for carrying it out are still at hand, though not so prepared as they were a short time since.

As General Gordon wrote 27 years ago to Lord Esher: "It is wonderful how our people do not take up the view of our forefathers. The latter took up their positions at all the salient stopping places of the great routes."

"Salient stopping places" is a very happy description of the many over-sea ports which, thanks less perhaps to the foresight of British Governments than to British individual initiative, we now find ourselves possessing, and which an able foreign naval writer, Gabriel Dariéus, speaks of as "a methodical grouping of stations always chosen at suitable points, by which the English Government has assumed to itself the Empire

1 "The Nineteenth Century and After," June, 1908.

of the Seas." So much for the French view of our lately dismantled foreign dockyards.

I make no apology for constantly quoting Mahan.

"If the war . . . extends to distant parts of the globe, there will be needed in each of those distant regions secure ports for the shipping, to serve as secondary, or contingent, bases of the local war.

"Between these secondary and the principal, or home, bases there must be reasonably secure communication, which will depend upon military control of the intervening sea.

"This control must be exercised by the Navy, which will enforce it either by clearing the sea in all directions of hostile cruisers, thus allowing the ships of its own nation to pass with reasonable security, or by accompanying in force (convoying) each train of supply ships necessary for the support of the distant operations. Whichever be adopted, the communications will doubtless be strengthened by the military holding of good harbours, properly spaced, yet not too numerous, along the routes."<sup>1</sup>

The recent decision on the part of both the Admiralty and War Office to reduce their establishments at Jamaica, with the Panama Canal in actual course of construction, is quite incapable of defence. If we liken the ocean tracks of British trade to water conveyed along a series of pipes and at the "salient stopping places" where routes converge we fit throttle valves, the increase or decrease of pressure, in other words, the flow of the oversea trade stream, is under our control.

Second to none in importance will be Cromwell's Great West Indian Conquest, where the whole trade that will pour through the Isthmus into the Pacific will converge.

Our only policy, if we are to keep Command of the Sea, is to hold in sufficient force both the salient stopping places and the seas between them.

The same authority that supplied us with the definition of Command of the Sea gives us also the caution that "a line of ocean communication is vulnerable throughout its whole length."

Before proceeding further, the great difference between land and sea communications should be noted.

We know in fighting ashore that cutting the enemy's communications is generally effected by a flank movement; that in the case of a savage or undisciplined foe the operation is usually attended with immediate results; and that, under any circumstances, a force *en l'air* is generally considered to be in a position of danger.

Though, as a rule, the analogy between sea and land warfare is very complete, in this matter of communications there is a radical difference, as Julian Corbett points out, in that on land the rival communications approach each other from more or less opposite directions, whereas "at sea they are usually parallel

<sup>1</sup> "Influence of Sea Power upon History," p. 515.

if not identical," and that therefore "we cannot defend our interests without attacking those of the enemy."

Later on the enormous importance of our long line of communications will have to be considered, always with the above difference in view.

Undoubtedly we can never have too many cruising ships, but the numbers for patrolling ocean routes need not be excessive. When some Continental monarchs travel by rail, most elaborate precautions are taken for their safety, troops being stationed all along the line at certain intervals; now neither England, nor any other country, would follow this plan and place cruisers along the whole length of the lines of communication.

To quote from "The Art of Naval Warfare":—"Most lines of communication, especially the longest, may be divided into three parts, viz., one which lends itself to interruption, another on which attempts at interruption would meet with some intrinsic difficulties, and a third on which those difficulties would be much more serious and any probable profit small."

Disposal of our ships in accordance with the above three divisions, with frequent cruiser patrols in the first area, longer beats in the second, and only an occasional vessel in the third, leads to considerable saving in the number of vessels; though, of course, it by no means follows that distance from the base may not compel us to keep a disproportionate number of reliefs for the supply of the least frequented patrol.

It must be clearly borne in mind that the battle fleet is the equivalent to Mr. Haldane's "Striking Force," and that its attached cruisers will never be available for patrolling, save where their presence on the scene, when scouting, automatically fulfils that duty.

Under the term "Battle Fleet" are included all the attached cruisers, the scouts, destroyers and fleet auxiliaries.

There are no two opinions as to the duty and method of employment of the "capital ships"; they must remain concentrated, with the enemy's fleet as their constant objective, leaving to the detached patrols of unarmoured cruisers the control of maritime communications. Occupying the common line of observation, the fleet would "compel the enemy either to accept the situation or to break it down by battle."

#### COLONIAL POLICY.

It is the fashion with a certain school of politicians to say that England is no longer in a position to assert herself in the world as formerly, that she can no longer expect to be unrivalled afloat, that she must be prepared to see her trade decline relatively to other nations, that she has had her day, etc.

Whereas in reality our opportunities were never greater, our position never more secure, and our wealth, under Provi-

dence, never less likely to depart, if only new methods of thought follow in logical sequence the new circumstances with which we are confronted. Masses of figures carry conviction to some, and are the cause of disbelief in others, so they are best left alone when facts can be made clear without their help.

The pessimists referred to above rest their belief (in cases where they genuinely hold one) on that most dangerous of supports—a half-truth.

It is true that the trade of England, speaking generally, has fallen off relatively to the rest of the world; that America and Germany are taking her place; and that if the British Empire was non-existent, the United Kingdom would not stand where it does; fortunately for us these Islands are becoming every year a smaller portion of that vast congerie of States, one-fifth of the earth's surface, which own the sway of King Edward VII.

Throw the dominions over seas into the scale, and the balance must incline heavily to our side; but without the sister nations we shall not long hold our own.

Some of us have been a long time learning the lesson, but it must be learnt if we are not to drop behind. The question does not begin or end with the Colonial Office; the Admiralty and War Office have each their own work in the matter, and that of the Admiralty is most important.

When we have a responsible Minister of the Crown, the present Secretary of State for War, hinting that perhaps England will not always be able to keep up the "Two-Power Standard," it surely points to absolute forgetfulness of Greater Britain, and cannot be accepted as "clear thinking" for one minute.

The communities omitted from his survey are among the most energetic and prosperous in existence, situated in various quarters of the globe, possessing extensive coast lines and increasing over-sea trade; to discuss a question of this nature without including the Colonies is to deal with the trunk of a body, ignoring the limbs.

In dealing with the question of Command of the Sea, it is impossible to avoid discussing empire-politics, and the appeal must be made to Greater Britain to assist the Mother country, the so-called "Weary Titan."

If the Titan has no satisfactory reason for being weary, but is really old and lazy, the more reason that the young bloods should jump into the boat of empire; under their vigorous stroke the old craft will easily forge ahead again, and keep the lead as of yore. Australia and New Zealand should understand, and show the Mother country that they do so, the vital importance Jamaica will be to their trade in the future.

The Cape is deeply interested (or should be) in Gibraltar, and should impress that interest on the Home Authorities.

No doubt Canada realises the value of Halifax and Esquimalt, and the Commonwealth and Dominion of the South Sea need no reminder about their own ports; but their glance

must be further afield, and must include the long, vulnerable lines of ocean communication with the Mother country.

Geographically speaking, Canada should be the body of that huge octopus, British sea power; but many years must elapse before this could be possible.

In the meantime it is to be hoped that the Canadians will remember that, with all respect to the immortal memory of Wolfe, it was Command of the Sea that gave Canada to the Empire.

The author of "Naval Policy" has laid it down that "when the weaker force leaves the principal theatre of war and threatens other trade centres, it is an admission of inferiority."

True; but in an Empire like ours, sentiment and strategy must ever walk hand in hand.

Undoubtedly, if Dewey's ships had reinforced the American fleet in the Antilles, instead of destroying the Spanish squadron in Manila Bay, the end of the war would have been hastened and the Philippines could equally have been the prize of an American victory off Cuba; but apply the same argument in the case of our being at war with Germany, and withdrawing the Australian squadron to help to patrol the North Sea!

No doubt the damage done by a single, raiding German cruiser on the Australian coast would be small, and would in no degree affect the final result of the war; but the damage to Imperial sentiment, caused by the Imperial strategy that left the coast and trade of the Southern Continent defenceless, would have suffered a mortal blow.

Again, the Admiralty policy of discountenancing local forces and insisting instead on Colonial contributions of men and money to the Imperial Navy is theoretically sound, and would indeed be quite admirable, if the bargain was not made with human being of like feelings and aspirations with ourselves.

Does anyone suppose that Canada would now be celebrating Paardeberg Day if the Canadians serving in South Africa had been divided among various British regiments?

Would the contingents from other Colonies in the Boer War have reached the numbers they did, had it been supposed that on their arrival they would sink their identity and be merged in British corps?

How can we expect Australians to enter enthusiastically into any naval project save one that insures their having their own ships, however small, officered and manned by their sons and maintained at the expense of the Commonwealth?

(NOTE.—Since the above was written the Admiralty have apparently agreed to a modified Australian scheme, but the correspondence betrays no anxiety on our part to hasten the birth of a sister Navy, and the phrase as to the distribution of the Imperial Navy "as the strategic necessities of the moment dictate," will probably be read by an Australian with his tongue in his cheek.)



The wonderful reception given to the American battle fleet in Australia is a lesson, if lesson is needed, of the need of British warships in the Pacific.

Once again let it be repeated that sentiment cannot be disregarded in dealing with an Empire like ours which, at all events at the present time, is only held together by sentimental ties; but sentiment apart, Australians may well be pardoned for doubting if a fleet of British battleships would ever be sent to the Antipodes so long as the Mother country has no army for home defence, and no amount of magazine articles by strategical amateurs will convince them that the "sea is all one," and that a strong naval force in the North Sea will protect them from Japan in the Pacific.

In securing control of ocean communications the policy of local Navies could be carried further with advantage, and in addition to Canada and Australia some of the Crown Colonies, notably the Straits Settlements and Hong Kong, should follow India's example and possess torpedo boat flotillas.

If the suggestion made further on (under the heading of "Bases") of employing the Royal Marines for garrisoning coaling stations were adopted, Singapore would be able, on its present budget, to substitute a battalion of 500 Marines for the infantry battalion of 1,000 men and the European garrison artillery, the money thus saved being devoted to the maintenance of a flotilla of torpedo boats, manned by Malays with European officers.

These craft would take a very important part in the defence of the harbours of Singapore and Penang (being always able to keep the sea under the conditions obtaining in those latitudes), and would supply the necessary protection in the mornings, when the prevalent mist renders the fortress guns useless.

At Hong Kong the boats would be manned by Chinamen, and in both places would be under the commander-in-chief on the station, though not liable to be employed beyond the territorial waters of the Colony.

Needless to say, the presence of these torpedo boats would not justify the Imperial Government in keeping no torpedo boat destroyers on the China Station.

#### FOREIGN POLICY.

The subject of Command of the Sea cannot be divorced from foreign policy any more than it can from Colonial; let us first consider the subject, so to speak, geographically.

We require access for peaceful trade through various straits of various breadths into various seas. Some of these straits we are fortunate enough to control, partly or entirely, but in most cases they are in foreign hands.

Among the last we class the Skagerrack, the Cattegat, the Sound and the Belts, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, Sunda Straits, etc.



We have partial control over the Straits of Gibraltar and the Straits of Malacca, and have opportunities through our possessions in the West Indies of exercising a certain very limited control over the entrances to the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea; this last must be borne in mind when the Panama Canal is completed.

We possess the Cape of Good Hope, Aden, the Falkland Islands (in proximity to Cape Horn); we have a leased port near the entrance of the Gulf of Pechili, and Hong Kong near the mouth of the Canton River.

Our policy should be so framed that in time of war access to these various seas should not be denied to us, which consequently involves being on friendly terms with the three Scandinavian kingdoms—with Holland, Turkey, and Morocco.

So far so good; but despite all conventions and Hague resolutions it may be taken for granted that in a life-and-death struggle between two powerful nations the finer points of International Law will be as flagrantly disregarded as they were in the case of the *Malacca*, *Knight Commander*, and other neutral ships in the Russo-Japanese war.

We must therefore be prepared for some startling developments—for the sinking of mail steamers in the Channel, capture of fishing boats, commissioning of privateers, and generally for all possible acts likely to militate against the superiority of a great naval power. These "illegal" operations are not likely to be confined to the sea, and our plans must foresee and provide against the transfer of neutral territory (with or against the wishes of its inhabitants) to a belligerent, and the harbours of neighbouring friendly Powers passing into the occupation of an active enemy. Since 1864 Denmark knows the value of English declarations and diplomatic subterfuges, and the Kiel Canal is a standing reminder to us of the retribution that overtakes shifty policy in the long run. It is to be hoped that we may not witness a strong European Power established in Tangier as the result of our recent reversal of policy in Morocco.

Von der Goltz is responsible for the phrase that "the first condition of success in war is policy."

In these days it is essential that your cause should appear to be a good one, if possible in the judgment of neutral nations; certainly in that of your own people. "Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just."

To put the matter in a nutshell: It is as important that the first moral attack should come from the enemy as it is that the first actual blow should be struck by yourself.

#### PREPARATION FOR WAR.

The Command of the Sea involves, therefore, a large number of cruising ships to control the long lines of ocean communications, in addition to those fit to lie in the line of battle.

What types of ships are required?

If any axiom exists in connection with the shipbuilding policy of the British Navy it is this: "No special types."

No coast-defence ships, no shallow-draught battle-ships, no commerce destroyers.

A world-wide policy requires sea-keeping ships:—

Ships for the line of battle;

Cruising ships;

Gun vessels;

Destroyers;

Torpedo boats;

Submarines, and before long, airships.

It is also apparent that Command of the Sea pre-supposes the domination of the gun.

Gun power for the strong, boiler power for the weak.

Every ship is necessarily a compromise, but excess of strength and coal capacity as opposed to excess of speed must be the attribute of the vessels which are to command the high-ways of the ocean. Battleships are covered by the general remark about speed, but the question of the cruisers demands more consideration.

Are armoured cruisers a success? Do they justify their enormous cost? Are they indispensable to the fleet?

The shipbuilding vote must necessarily be so large that it must be confined to vessels that are absolutely wanted. The battleship is indispensable; few will contend that the unarmoured, protected, cruising ship is not necessary in some shape or form; but what of the armoured cruiser?

Her cost is prohibitive, her duties problematical.

For instance:—The cost of the *Indomitable* is given as £1,735,357, or roughly, the price of seven *Talbots*, but ask any British Admiral (whose cry, like Nelson's, is ever for "More frigates") which he would prefer to have attached to his fleet, and I guarantee the seven *Talbots* would be the answer. The *Indomitable* is, of course, the extreme case, but the comparison might be fairly given as below:—

2 *Indomitables*, or 4 *Hampshires*, or 13 *Talbots*.

(Admitted that the *Talbots* are 13 years old, while the *Hampshires* are 4, and the *Indomitables* are new.)

Similar reasoning would suggest the substitution of modernised gunboats of the *Halcyon* or *Seagull* types—steaming, say, 23 knots—for the duties now performed by the 25 knot scouts.

The gunboats cost £60,000 to £75,000, against the £273,000 of the scouts, the latter only carrying 12-pounders to the former's 4.7-inch guns.

Again, offer your Admiral the alternative of 8 of these gunboats or 2 scouts, there would not be much doubt of the reply.

Cruisers were never more wanted than at present.

Take the composition of the present Channel Fleet and its attached:—

(First) Cruiser Squadron, unarmoured cruisers and destroyer flotilla :—

Present.	Alternative.
14 Battleships.	14 Battleships.
2 First-class Cruisers ( <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i> ).	2 First-class Cruisers ( <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i> ).
2 Third-class Cruisers.	2 Third-class Cruisers.
8 First-class Cruisers (Improved Counties).	15 <i>Talbots</i> .
1 <i>Good Hope</i> .	8 Torpedo Gunboats.
2 <i>Talbots</i> .	—
2 Scouts.	—
8	23

Here we have substituted 23 for 8. I know that it will be urged that the armoured cruisers are useful to brush aside the screen of light cruisers and push home a reconnaissance, but that only applies by day, for by night, if the destroyers fell back on the second-class cruisers, it is doubtful if the first-class cruisers of the enemy will attack them.

In the above comparison it will be noticed that the *Duke of Edinburghs* have been retained, while the "Improved Counties" have been exchanged for other cruisers; the former class are really "battleships in disguise"—to use the old description of the American frigates of 1812—and at all events are heavily armed ships of high speed, and are fairly well protected, while the "Improved Counties" have a miserable armament.

The latter cost nearly as much as the *Canopus*; we could have had 5 *Canopus* class or 17 *Talbots* in exchange for six of them—which would have been the best bargain?

The *Duke of Edinburghs* would appear to be the modern equivalent to the old "50-gun ship," and history shows us that the class in question almost disappeared under the searching test of fitness established by protracted hostilities.<sup>1</sup>

In war, as in all other trades, experience teaches what tools are necessary, and all others are discarded; so the question of the necessity for armoured cruisers is not an easy one to settle off-hand.

A prolonged state of war eliminates all "luxuries," but creature comforts are not so expensive as ships, and indulgence in unnecessary ship building is the costliest of extravagances.

Admiral Togo appears to have worked his armoured cruisers concentrated as a squadron, and I would hazard the belief that had he been able to have exchanged his 8 for 5 additional battleships, he would gladly have done so.

Colomb says, in "The Differentiation of Naval Force":—"For what is plain to be seen, I think, is, that for naval warfare not a great many types of ships are required. Whether there be or be not a line of battle, there must be some fighting formation which is under all circumstances better than any other

<sup>1</sup> James' "Naval History," Annual Abstract.

The fact that a form of battle is established compels a uniformity of type of ship, because form prescribes place and prevents ships seeking their match. Therefore, it becomes waste to produce excessively powerful ships to fight in a general action, while it is a danger to allow weak ships to take part in it. In the one case the excess of power may be, most probably will be, wasted against an inferior adversary; in the other case, ships of greatly inferior force may be hopelessly beaten by those of medium or average strength."

"Then, I think, we can see that there should be an immense fall in the strength of the strongest cruiser below that of the weakest battleship. It should seem also that this strongest cruiser has her place as the eyes of the fleet, even as set forth by James, Duke of York, in his instructions. Then would come another heavy fall in the strength of the light cruiser, of which the special function is guarding our own commerce and attacking that of the enemy. I do not see that anything is gained by great variety in type."

The present third-class cruisers of the *Jewel* class are useful ships, and while their gun-power is sufficient to sink a destroyer, it is weak enough to make their commanders remember that scouting and not fighting is their rôle.

I should prefer calling them "Advice Ships," which would emphasize their duty as "scouts" and renew an old naval term first used in 1692 before the battle off Cape La Hogue.<sup>2</sup>

Nothing can be said in favour of the "scouts," they are very expensive, and carry neither guns to fight nor coal to run away; in fact, it is rumoured that the officer in command of one of them asked what he should do after coming up with an enemy's destroyer, as his guns would never sink her.

Speaking broadly, excessive speed is only required in the "advice ships," as hitherto, the sea-keeping qualities of destroyers have been sacrificed for speed, the specification of only 27 knots for those recently ordered, is a distinct advance.

For making an attack with torpedoes high speed is never required in a destroyer, and when it is a question of her gun armament, her steadiness as a gun platform should be more taken into consideration.

Habitability must not be lost sight of; hulls that are merely steel shells, though admirable in theory, are fatal from the point of view of the health of the ships' companies. A world-wide Navy involves the construction of ships that must be as habitable in the tropics as in cold climates, and reckless abolition of wood conduces to a heavy sick list.

Destroyers without wood lining are unsuitable for winter work in the North Sea, and ships steaming through the Red Sea in July are apt to find their system of ventilation leaves much to be desired.

<sup>1</sup> "Naval Warfare," p. 100.

<sup>2</sup> James' "Naval History," Vol. III., Abstract.

The fact that so large a proportion of the best officers in the Navy put in so much of their sea service in home waters is responsible for many constructive mistakes; but while it is easier to point out the defect than to suggest the remedy, there is no denying that Portsmouth Harbour looms large in too many personal records of service.

To our sea-keeping forebears the numbers of sick in the weekly signal was the subject of keen analysis, and opinions were formed as to which captains kept their people most healthy. It was surmised that one ship was not kept dry between decks, that the hatchways of another were innocent of manropes, etc., little items in themselves, perhaps, but of great importance during the sustained strain of a long war.

Think of the sanitary orders issued by Lord St. Vincent and the marvellous health of our fleets during the long blockades of Toulon and Brest.

It was only the "habit of the sea" that insured such results, while the ships of other nations were decimated with scurvy.

The duties of the British fleet were always exacting, always spread over a large portion of the globe, and, on the whole, were done well. As a rule, defects in *matériel* have been more than compensated for by the zeal of the *personnel*.

Its duties in the future will be none the less arduous, and its operations more widespread than ever.

In addition to the battle squadrons, which will naturally be found where those of the enemy are located, there will be distant cruiser patrols enforcing the control of ocean communications.

The number of small craft required (as distinct from battle-ships and armoured cruisers) will be very large. History is absolute on this one point; the enormous increase in the number of small ships that has followed the outbreak of every war. Even a non-naval war like the Russian War of 1855-56 added 155 to our Navy List. Japan made use of every ship that could float, regardless of her age, and we shall have to do the same.

We must be prepared (using "we" as covering the duties of Great and Greater Britain in combination) to patrol very far afield; let it not be forgotten that in the last American war English cruisers were captured as near home as the Channel, and as far off as Tristan d'Acunha.

Taking the present Navy List, what ships have we available for distant cruising?

(For convenience in classification, it must be assumed that the South Atlantic and Pacific Stations will again come into existence.)

The former (headquarters, Falkland Islands) would require:—

- 1 *Edgar*,
- 2 *Astræas*,
- 2 *Apollos*.



A gunboat of the *Dwarf* class should be permanently stationed on the South American coast as well as on the West Coast of Africa.

The Pacific (headquarters, Esquimalt) would require:—

3 *Edgars*, or

2 *Powerfuls* (independent of the fishery patrol ship).

The Cape of Good Hope Station would require:—

2 *Edgars*, in addition to the present 3 ships now on the station.

For British trade in the East Indies, to patrol the long line from Perim to Acheen Head, at least two first-class cruisers would be required for war in addition to present force—say 2 *Diadems*—and the same force should be added (for war) to the Australian Station, where also the 4 armoured cruisers from China should be transferred *now*, their place being taken by 4 of the *Diadems*.

In the event of hostilities with any other Power than Japan, the armoured cruisers would be required elsewhere than in the China Seas, and they would be no use pitted against the Japanese Navy.

The *Diadems* impress the Chinamen very much with their great length and four funnels, they carry many men, and are ideal ships for the attack and defence of trade in the China Seas.

The aggressive policy of attack—whether applied to trade or to warships—must always be the one considered; when this is done defence will be more than half provided for.

#### NORTH AMERICA AND WEST INDIES.

Undoubtedly many more ships will be required here, but none are left to station; it is to be hoped that more will be forthcoming before the Panama Canal is completed.

#### WEST OF GIBRALTAR.

Here cruisers are more wanted for attack and defence of trade than anywhere else on the globe, but where they are to be taken from will depend on the nature of the enemy.

The only craft available would appear to be the cruisers attached to the Mediterranean Battle Squadron, and they could only be spared on the assumption that their fleet had left the Mediterranean.

Truly the lack of cruising ships is most lamentable.

Hitherto all references in preparation for war have been to the *matériel*; it now remains to discuss the *personnel*.

#### PERSONNEL.

First, to prevent possible misunderstanding, let it be remarked that I believe the members of our glorious Service were



never keener, never more industrious, and never more devoted to the Navy than at present; no exception can be taken to their individual zeal and energy, but when it comes to discussing the channels into which these qualities are turned, there would appear to be considerable room for criticism.

Nowhere is the "canker of a long peace" more apparent than in the large percentage of officers employed on shore duties. The numbers are really appalling:—

Captains—128 afloat and 74 ashore.

Commanders—252 afloat and 108 ashore.

N.B.—Those not employed are not included in the above, taken from the October Navy List.

Be it remembered that the above officers do not represent those who have deliberately sacrificed professional advancement to enjoy shore life; they are mostly young and energetic and are serving with every prospect of promotion. Nay, in some cases service at a desk at the Admiralty is known to afford a better guarantee of advancement than hard work afloat.

How can this be defended in a fighting Service, trained at enormous cost to manœuvre on an uncertain element?

How can office work fit a young commander to grope his way in a North Sea fog to a previously unknown destination, or even train him in that self-reliance by which many an unknown officer commanding a gunboat on a foreign station has earned for his Service the proud distinction of being "the best diplomatists in Europe"?

How can crunching the gravel on the barrack parade ground teach the young lieutenant to command his quarters afloat, to "spot" the fall of shot from aloft, to know a trawler from a drift net fishing boat, or to instinctively measure the "advance" of his ship under full helm at high speed?

If six months ashore was the limit there would be no objection. Six months in the Intelligence Department would be a good experience for any officer, and the various war, navigation, gunnery and torpedo courses are most useful, especially the first named, whose educational value cannot be rated too highly.

The naval Service will always require to keep a certain percentage of highly-gifted officers ashore to ponder on questions of strategy and to discuss designs of war ships and weapons; but the number should be very small indeed, and sea officers should as a rule be kept jealously to their work afloat — the only place where they can learn their highly-complicated trade.

The services of the officers of the Royal Marines should be more utilised in what are in reality "side shows" in the great theatre of the sea service; for instance, the physical training of the Navy has been well started and is excellently carried out by sea officers, but it cannot be right that lieutenants should be doing shore work and the Marines would do it equally well and without the unavoidable loss of sea-efficiency.

Keep the officers and the men afloat.

No expression is more in vogue with the reporters in the daily press than the "complexity of a modern battleship," and yet we attempt to train men to handle and fight them in barracks, divorced from the commonest objects of sea-life, doing the gunnery drills in make-believe ships' batteries, and under a novel discipline.

The essence of naval discipline is, that the officers are in close touch with the men and carry out all work with them; in the Army this part is played by the non-commissioned officers: now the

Officers in the naval barracks cannot possibly know their men or be interested in them, the men cannot be expected to take that pride in the barracks that they would in their own ship—from which it follows that two great features that make for efficiency afloat are lacking in these shore establishments.

The Home Fleet life is better than that in the barracks, but that is all.

Mahan, in a crisp, easily-remembered sentence, summarises the situation: "Efficiency sapped by the easy life of port." Jurien de La Graviere says: "The pavement of the great ports is fatal to discipline."

The system of nucleus crews in the Home Fleet is good for the care of the *matériel*, but not for the *personnel*, and worse than even the manning with nucleus crews is the lately instituted scheme of ships in the Special Reserve, caretakers and shipkeepers for which should be entirely composed of pensioners. It is impossible that Active Service ratings can perform this work without deteriorating.

It must never be forgotten that in war the man, not the machine, is the winning factor, and that an out-of-date cruiser on a foreign station, if she is all that is contained in that sentence so eloquent to a naval officer—"an efficient man-of-war"—is a better school than the most modern battleship, partially manned, in a dockyard basin.

How does the great French naval historian sum up the lessons of the old war?

"Let us clearly understand that the English owed their triumph neither to the number of their ships, their plentiful sea-faring population, the strength of their Board of Admiralty, nor to the clever tactics of their great admirals. They defeated us because their ships' companies were better trained, their fleets better disciplined than our own."<sup>1</sup>

#### BASES.

"Flying bases" bear an alluring title, and at the first blush appear to possess many of the advantages, without the

<sup>1</sup> "Guerres Maritimes sous la Republique et Empire," p. 223.

contingent expenses of the fixed depôts; but the torpedo boat menace puts a somewhat different complexion on the matter.

If it were merely a question of receiving coal and other stores, nothing could be simpler or cheaper than anchoring with your colliers or store ships in some previously arranged place, under such sheltered conditions as the topography of the coast would admit of, and there replenishing your stock, while your small craft scouted in the offing.

The approach of darkness would, however, be the commencement of a most anxious period, and would not improbably involve your getting under way before the object of the visit was carried out.

Modern warfare is so harassing and exacting that some protection should always be forthcoming at night, for ships anchoring to give rest to their men or to replenish their stores.

If moles and breakwaters do not exist they must be improvised, defence booms must be rigged to protect the anchorage, guns and searchlights landed for the defence of the boom; so it is not long before the "flying base" becomes a "temporary" one, even if symptoms of permanency in the shape of huts, storehouses and look-out posts do not make their appearance.

So the permanent base only will be discussed.

Bases must be fortified and garrisoned; they should be able to hold out, with their communications cut off, for the first three months after war begins, and it is suggested that a portion and, in some cases, all of the garrison, should be furnished by the corps of Royal Marines.

This suggestion naturally involves an increase in the corps, the "Sheet Anchor of the Navy," and would appear to possess certain advantages.

Frequent exchanges could then be made between the Marines serving afloat on a station and those ashore, the ships would always be able to complete their complements after an action, the wounded Marines would be landed, and on recovery would join their comrades on shore duty.

The fortress guns, or the most important of them, would be served by men who were familiar with the different types of ships: a very important point in these days of universal grey paint and of long-range firing.

The plan would give appointments for the Senior Marine Officers, which are badly required.

It would substitute seasoned men for youths in the case of the infantry of the line (and many of the bases to be garrisoned are in the tropics), and free some infantry battalions for other work.

The strength of the Marine Forces for garrisons abroad is given below :—

Gibraltar	500
Jamaica	500
Malta	500
Singapore	500
Hong Kong	500
Bermuda	500
Halifax	300
Vancouver	300
Sydney	300
Simons Bay	300
Wei-hai-wei	300
Falkland Islands	150
St. Lucia	150
Trincomalee	150

Total ... .. 4,950

It is assumed that this would involve an increase in the corps of 10,000 men.

In the case of first-class fortresses like Malta and Gibraltar only a small portion of the garrison would be Marines, but they might compose the whole garrison in the smaller bases, with the addition of, perhaps, some local forces, and be commanded by Marine general officers.

Mark what a bond of Imperial unity would thus be forged by the increase in the Marine Corps!

The 600 men at Halifax and Vancouver would be Canadians, serving their turn afloat in the North American and Pacific Squadrons.

Similarly Australia's Marines would garrison Sydney and serve in the Australian Squadron.

South Africa would furnish the garrison for Simon's Bay, and some of the detachments for the ships on the Cape Station.

There would be nothing to prevent an Australian Marine from volunteering for five years in the Mediterranean (half afloat and half in garrison at Gibraltar or Malta), or the Canadian from doing five years in the Channel Fleet or in China, it being understood that half of the period was to be spent ashore.

Officers and non-commissioned officers would be promoted on the same roster and the sea-regiment would be more widely sought after by recruits than ever.

New Zealand is not included in the scheme, as having no Royal dockyard, but the Dominion would be sure not to let that stand in the way.

It would be easy to enlarge on the advantages from a naval point of view of having our bases (at home as well as abroad) garrisoned by the Royal Marines; but any naval officer can enumerate them for himself.

Let me only remark that the change would be for the advantage for the sea service, and would undoubtedly contribute to the Command of the Sea.

The above would involve an increase in the Naval Estimates and a corresponding decrease in the Army Votes, but inter-departmental jealousy should not be allowed to stand in the way when the interests of the Empire are involved, though it is to be feared that such is often the case.

Lastly, the Governor and Captain-General of Jamaica should always be an admiral or a general of Marines.

We must look ahead and realise the coming importance of that great Island, and free our minds from cant in considering the political situation there.

At every step the close connection existing between every day politics and Command of the Sea is brought to our notice.

Thus, we read in the newspapers that in September of this year the Government of Jamaica refused to enter into a commercial agreement with Canada, preferring to deal with the United States. Yet Jamaica in the future will rank second only to Gibraltar in importance for the attack and defence of commerce, and though war between English-speaking nations has been characterised as "criminal," there is no use in disregarding the patent fact that the United States is a potential enemy, however much we may hope we may always be friends.

The Royal Corps of Naval Constructors should also be officered on an Imperial basis, and Colonials trained in the home dockyards, before taking charge in their own.

#### INVASION AND COMMAND OF THE SEA.

Let us begin with two cases of oversea invasion of England.

About 300 A.D. an inferior Continental fleet, under Constantius, slipped by the strong British fleet, under the command of Allectus—thanks to a thick fog in mid-Channel—and landed their men; yet Britain held Command of the Sea at the time.

Again, at a most critical time, the men of the British fleet had dispersed to their homes, when William of Normandy crossed over in 1066; so his landing was unopposed.

The practice of "week-end leave" is part of the regular routine of all ships in home ports now, not even half are kept ready manned.

History has a knack of repeating itself; fogs remain with us and are beyond our control; but what of the second instance?

Should it not, in the words of our Gallic neighbours, "give us furiously to think"?

We must remember that German writers do not subscribe to the doctrine that invasion is only possible when the Command of the Sea has first been obtained, and though we may consider



the venture a risky one, the stakes played for are sometimes high, and the sack of London would pay the expenses of most expeditions and leave something to the good.

After all, the Germans can quote many exceptions to the rule, as instances abound in which invasion has taken place, despite the fact that a large naval force of the enemy was within easy distance, and to this day the device of "Gibraltar" borne by the Royal Marines is a standing reminder of how Admiral Rooke flouted the menace of the "Fleet in Being."

In some cases, as in the Crimean War, the Russian fleet was overawed by numbers, as no action had taken place; in others, such as the Japanese landing in Shantung, in 1895, the Chinese fleet had been very roughly handled shortly before, but was still quite capable of doing great damage to the transports and their convoy.

To come to more recent times, the Japanese threw troops into Corea in February, 1904, despite the presence of a superior force at Port Arthur, and, with increased daring, landed their Second Army in May with the Russian fleet within the easy striking distance of 60 miles from the place of disembarkation.

The Admiralty have guaranteed that they can provide against a raid of more than 10,000 men, but, as a writer in the *Morning Post* has recently pointed out, two or three small raids might be carried out simultaneously. The typical instance of Napoleon in Egypt and the Battle of the Nile is all very well, but after all the Mamelukes were defeated and Napoleon took Cairo.

Are our own theorists content to assume an English defeat and the capture of London?

Paradoxical though it may sound, one of the requirements of the Empire, if we are to retain the Command of the Sea, is the possession of an Army for home defence, not that ocean communications can be controlled by bayonets, but because a Coastguard Navy is, from its very nature, unable to protect them, and at present "our military impotency remains" "a strategical millstone tied about the neck of the Admiralty."

The present situation, in which the two most powerful fleets that we possess are always kept within 48 hours' steaming of our own shores, is not only humiliating to us as a great Power, but may put the Navy in the position of a man fighting with one hand behind his back, by enormously increasing the area to be watched.

For the strategy of Drake still holds good, that our Navy, the country's first line of defence, should be off the enemy's coast watching his ports and not in proximity to our own. So

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<sup>1</sup> Lieut.-Colonel A. W. A. Pollock in *The Morning Post*, 6th October, 1908.



the fact of not possessing an army not only insures disaster when a hostile force has actually landed, but greatly increases the odds in favour of such landing taking place.

No doubt local torpedo boat flotillas would have a deterrent effect by night, but the cruisers escorting the enemy's transports would make short work of them by day, and nothing can really take the place of a defending army, when once the fleet has been given the slip.

Taking these facts into consideration, it will be admitted that military matters cannot be excluded from our purview when discussing naval preparation for war, and that there is no anomaly in a home army being required to insure the Command of the Sea.

#### CONCLUSION.

It would now be as well to summarise our previous arguments and conclusions.

Command of the Sea is control of ocean communications.

It is vital to the existence of the British Empire.

It can only be maintained by :—

- a. Good policy.
- b. Preparation for war.
- c. Wealth.

To go down to bed-rock for a good general policy we must begin with the youth of the nation, and naval education of the masses has now become essential to sea power.

Our naval policy must follow the old lines of holding the salient stopping places now in our possession, of insuring their communications with home and with each other, of protecting our trade.

These bases should be garrisoned by the Royal Marines.

Jamaica should be strongly held, being now more important than ever.

A home army is required to free the Navy for its proper duty.

While the commerce-protecting cruisers should patrol far afield, the concentrated battle fleet should occupy the common line of communication in order to force the enemy to fight.

A large increase in the number of cruisers is required.

Harbour service is bad for the Navy.

The White Ensign should fly, as formerly, in all parts of the world.

The Dominions beyond the Seas will soon take their share of the burden, though whether with or without a share in control it is beyond the scope of this paper to enquire; but certainly Colonial representation on the Board of Admiralty will be necessary in the near future.

Our foreign policy should be run on the broad old English lines in defence of justice and freedom, for which we fought the Conqueror of Europe 100 years ago.

We should be friends with the nations controlling "the narrow seas," who are in a position to throttle our trade.

Old allies, like Morocco, should not be treated as pawns on the chess-board of high politics; England's good name should be respected, even if countries are not possessed of fleets and armies. Tangier and Tetuan were useful to us in Nelson's days and will be again; even in peace time Gibraltar gets beef from the former place.

Racial affinities cannot be overlooked, and natural alliances are firmer than those of convenience; blood and policy alike recommend friendship with the Scandinavian States, we have nothing to fear from each other, and may be able to render mutual assistance; moreover, it is highly improbable that the fleet commanded by Sir Charles Napier 50 years ago will be the last of our ships to visit the Baltic on a warlike mission.

But in reality the future of our Navy, and therefore of our Race, depends on the assistance of our kinsmen overseas; there is no fear that Britannia will fail in holding her trident if her aged arms are supported by her children.

At present all is well; the symbol of sea power can still be carried proudly aloft; but though the strength of the morning can be maintained till noon, the evening comes, when, like Moses of old, the arms must be "stayed up."

Ere the evening falls, assistance will be forthcoming.

Navies, like individuals, must walk before they can run, and it would be safe to prophesy that great countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand will soon cease to be content with local defence forces, just as the ambitious among their sons will naturally wish for higher commands in a larger sphere.

So, in natural course of evolution, we shall presently find a Canadian cruiser in the Channel Fleet, or in the Pacific, with Australian and New Zealand additions to the China command (the *Protector* was there in 1900-1901), and perhaps a ship from the Cape joining the East Indian Squadron in performing Imperial patrol duty in the Gulf of Aden.

After the single ship will come the squadron, till we shall arrive at the fleets of the Sister Nations enforcing the Pax Britannica the wide world over, and—who can tell—perhaps a Canadian of French descent occupying St. Vincent's chair in the Board Room of the Admiralty.

## THE EXECUTION AND BURIAL OF KING CHARLES I.

By the Rev. Canon EDGAR SHEPPARD, C.V.O., D.D.  
(Sub-Dean of His Majesty's Chapels Royal).

On Wednesday, 17th February, 1909.

Lieut.-Colonel A. LEETHAM in the Chair.

THE portrait before you is, as you see, one of the many portraits of King Charles I. The original of this one is at the present time in the Royal Palace at Hampton Court.

In the lecture which I had the honour (by invitation) to deliver here last year, I chose for my subject, as many of you I feel sure will remember, "The Old Royal Palace of Whitehall," with a special and somewhat lengthy review of many of the events connected with it, and at the end of my lecture I dealt with the site of the execution of Charles I.

In my lecture to-day I am going to continue this all-absorbing subject, and give you as full an account as I can, not of the site of His Majesty's execution, but of the actual execution itself, which is without doubt the most important event in the history of Whitehall, and one of the greatest tragedies in England, and I shall hope to put before you, towards the end of my lecture, not only full details respecting His Majesty's burial, but also one or two facts connected with the opening of His Majesty's coffin in the year 1813, which are not generally known.

I must begin by telling you, what many of you already know, that the day before his trial the King was brought in a sedan chair from St. James's Palace to Whitehall, where he remained during the time that his trial lasted. "His patience or insensibility," so Harris, an old historian, puts it, "was very great."

Bradshaw, the President, it seems, "gave sentence upon His Majesty to take his head, all the Court, to the number of 67, owning to it by standing up," so says Coke, in his "Court of England."

When the trial was over, the King was conveyed back to St. James's. There he passed the remaining days of his life.

On 30th January, 1649, the fatal day—the day of his execution—Charles was brought under escort through the Park and Whitehall, some say at eight o'clock, others say at ten

o'clock in the morning. He was dressed in a long black coat and grey stockings, and as a waistcoat is said to have worn a rich red striped silk. He had been placed under the charge of Bishop Juxon and Colonel Tomlinson, who, one on either side of him, accompanied him bare-headed, His Majesty walking very fast, according to Harris, and bidding them go faster, adding that he now went before them to strive for a heavenly crown with less solicitude than he had often encouraged his soldiers to fight for an earthly diadem!

Sir Thomas Herbert, in his *Memoirs*, published in the year 1702, informs us that "upon the King's right hand went the Bishop, while Colonel Tomlinson was on his left, with both of whom His Majesty had some discourse by the way. In this manner went the King through the Park."

Upon arriving at the spot where the Scotch Office now stands the King mounted the stairs which led up across the upper story of the Holbein Gate, and thence sought his usual bedchamber. It should here be mentioned by way of a note that the warrant for the execution was not signed till within a few minutes before the King was led to the scaffold. D'Israeli, in his "*Life and Reign of Charles I.*," further tells us that Cromwell stepped to a table and wrote what he had proposed to Colonel Huncks when he (Huncks) refused to sign the warrant.

Colonel Hacker, it seems, who supplied his place, signed it, and with the ink hardly dry carried the warrant in his hand and called for the King.

[I here give you a copy of the warrant to Colonel Francis Hacker for the beheading of King Charles I.]

Upon reaching his bedchamber, where he remained till Hacker summoned him to the scaffold, His Majesty at once commenced his devotions, and it seems that while thus engaged certain ecclesiastics of the Puritan party came to his room and offered to pray with him; but he refused this offer, saying "they had so often prayed *against* him, that he would not have them pray *with* him in his extremity." He, however, asked them to remember him in their prayers.

We learn that upon rising from his knees Charles said: "Now let the rogues come; I have forgiven them, and am prepared for all I am to undergo." Colonel Hacker came soon after to the bedchamber door and gave his last signal. The Bishop and Mr. Herbert (both of whom were weeping) fell upon their knees, and the King, according to Sir Thomas Herbert, gave them his hand to kiss, and helped the Bishop to get up, for he was old and infirm.

As Colonel Hacker was still attending at the chamber door the King took notice of it and said: "Open the door," and bade Hacker go, adding that he himself would follow. A guard was made all along the galleries and the Banqueting House. "Behind the soldiers," says Herbert, "were crowded abundance of men and women, though with some peril to their own persons, to behold," he adds, "the saddest sight that

England ever saw. And as His Majesty passed by with a cheerful look," Herbert continues, "they prayed aloud for him, the soldiers not rebuking any of them, but by their silence and dejected faces seeming afflicted rather than insulting."

[The picture now before you, called "The Execution of Charles I. in front of Whitehall," by Mr. Ernest Crofts, gives His Majesty's arrival on the scaffold.]

"The King strode the floor of death," as Fuller puts it, "with a cheerful countenance," and when at the scaffold is thought (says Heath) to have excelled himself, and to have died much greater than he had lived. He was attended by the Bishop, and also by Harrington and Herbert, Gentlemen of his Bedchamber.

[I here give you another view of the King's arrival on the scaffold, which I have had copied from a print in an old Prayer Book in my own possession, dated 1676.]

Upon reaching the scaffold the King donned a white satin cap, and meanwhile asked one of his executioners (there were two of them) whether his hair was in the way. Thereupon he was asked to brush it back with his own hand, and he did so with the assistance of the Bishop, to whom he said: "I have a good cause and a gracious God on my side."

"There is but one stage more," said the Bishop, in reply, "it will carry you from earth to heaven, and there you will find a great deal of cordial joy and comfort."

"I go," said the King, "from a corruptible to an uncorruptible crown, where no disturbance can be—no disturbance in the world!" Charles then again asked the executioner: "Is my hair well?" Then, taking off his long black cloak and giving his "George" to the Bishop, made use of the expression "Remember," which we shall refer to later on. I should here mention, by way of a note, and to quote the words of Sir Ralph Payne Gallwey, that a "George," in the sense in which it is here used, is the jewelled pendant of St. George and the Dragon which is worn by Knights of the Garter. The Sovereign is, of course, head of the Order, and Charles I. was wearing his George when he ascended the scaffold to be executed. The question afterwards arose as to what had become of it, and it has since been given up as lost. Sir Ralph Payne Gallwey, however, makes out a very good case in his new volume for identifying the missing "George" with one that is now in King Edward's possession at Windsor. When the King had handed his "George" and turned once more to the executioner, he addressed him thus: "I shall say but short prayers and then thrust out my hands." This sentence he repeated twice, then, referring to the block, he added: "You must set it fast." He was told that it *was* fast. Whereupon he remarked that it might have been higher, and received, as a reply, that it was impossible. "Take care"—the King added to a passer-by at the time—"take care they do not put me to pain. Take heed of the axe; hurt not the axe which may hurt me."



[This picture before you is called, as you see, "A View of the Place and Manner of the Execution of King Charles I.," and, as you also see, there is a copy of the warrant to Colonel Francis Hacker for beheading His Majesty, which I have already shown to you.]

His Majesty then took off his doublet, put on his cloak again, and afterwards made a speech, which seemed much broken and confused in many places, in which he asserted his own innocence.

Having made a declaration of his faith at the request of the Bishop, King Charles knelt down, and was about to lay his head upon the block, when one of the executioners stooped down to put His Majesty's hair under his cap, so that it should not impede the force of the blow. The King misunderstood this act of the headsman's, and thinking that the fatal blow was about to be delivered, asked the man to await the sign, whereupon there ensued another short pause, during which the King spoke a few words, and *then* stretched out his hand, and the Royal head was instantly severed from the body, upon which (in sight of the great crowd that had gathered about the scene) the second executioner lifted up the King's head and exclaimed: "Behold the head of a traitor."

The scene upon the scaffold is thus described in the journal of the Earl of Leicester in the Sydney papers:—

"The King," he says, "being come upon the scaffold, looked very earnestly upon the block, and asked Colonel Hacker if there were no higher, and then, having made a profession of his faith, laid his head down, and the executioner, at one blow, severed it from his body, which the second executioner held up and showed to the spectators. The executioners," the journal continues, "were two, and, disguised in sailors' clothes with vizards and perukes, unknown."

[This picture before you gives the death of King Charles I., and is from an old print belonging to this Institution.]

Charles died (says Rapin) "with great constancy, without showing the least sign of weakness or amazement," while thus (says Sir Richard Warwick), "this saint and martyr rested from his labours and follows the lamb."

Immediately after the execution, the crowd was dispersed by cavalry, and it was thought advisable that the scaffold and everything connected with it should be cleared away as soon as possible. The Bishop and Mr. Herbert went with the body to the backstairs, where it was embalmed by one Topham (private Surgeon to Fairfax), who had previously sewed on the King's head to the body again.

After his execution (according to Clarendon in his "History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England") we learn that King Charles' body was, as we have already stated, carried immediately after his execution into a room at Whitehall, where (after the process of embalment had been carried out) he was



exposed for many days to the public view, that all men might know that he was not alive.

The body was then carried to St. James's, where again it remained for several days.

"Where to bury the King was the last duty remaining," says Wood in his "*Athenæ Oxonienses*." By some historians it is said that the King spoke something to Bishop Juxon concerning his burial. Mr. Herbert, however, who was Groom of the Bedchamber, and a faithful companion of the King, was frequently in company with the Bishop, both before and after His Majesty's death, and he affirmed that the Bishop never mentioned anything to *him* of the King's naming any place, where he would wish to be buried. Be that as it may, it was eventually decided to bury His Majesty's body in the Royal Chapel of St. George, within the Castle of Windsor, both because His Majesty was Sovereign of the Order of the Garter, and also because several kings had been interred there, among them Henry VI., Edward IV., and Henry VIII.

Mr. Herbert having made application to the Committee of Parliament, an order was given to him (bearing date 6th February, 1648), authorising him and Mr. Anthony Mildmay to bury the King's body there, provided that the whole expense should not exceed £500. Accordingly the corpse was carried to Windsor, from St. James's Palace (on 7th February) in a hearse covered with black velvet, drawn by six horses, covered with black cloth, in which there were about a dozen gentlemen.

On arrival, Mr. Herbert showed to Colonel Whitchot, the Governor of the Castle, the Committee's order for permitting Mr. Herbert and Mr. Mildmay to bury His Majesty in any place within the walls of Windsor Castle, that they should think fit.

When they had done this, they carried the body (in the first place) into the Dean's house to the room now called the dining room, which was hung with black, and it was placed on the table which is still there in the middle of the room, and then later on they carried it thence to His Majesty's usual bedchamber in the Castle, where for the time they deposited it. When this had been done they then went to St. George's Chapel to find, as Wood describes it, "the most fit and honourable place for the Royal body to rest in."

At first they thought that the Tomb House (built by Cardinal Wolsey) would be the most fitting, but that place, though adjoining, was not *within* the Royal Chapel, so the idea was given up. They next pitched upon the vault where Edward IV. had been interred on the north side of the choir, near the Altar, as that King was one from whom Charles I. was lineally descended.

Orders were accordingly given to have that vault opened; but just as they were about to begin this work the Duke of Richmond, the Marquis of Hertford, and the Earl of Lindsay came upon the scene, and with them Bishop Juxon. Bishop of

London, who, by the bye, had had leave from Parliament to attend the King's body to his grave.

They visited the Tomb House and the vault just referred to, and the choir (together with Herbert and Mildmay), when one of those noble lords, according to Wood, "beating gently upon the pavement in the centre of the choir with his staff, perceived a hollow sound," and the stones and earth being removed, they discovered a descent into a vault where two coffins were laid near to one another, the one very large, of an antique form, and the other little. These they supposed to be—and indeed they were—the bodies of Henry VIII. and Jane Seymour, his third wife. The velvet palls that covered their coffins seemed fresh, though they had lain there for more than one hundred years.

It was finally agreed that the King's body should be interred in *this* vault, which was situated, as I have said, about the middle of the choir.

While the men were at their work in cutting in lead the King's name and the year of his death, for which orders had been given, the three noble lords went out and gave instructions to the sexton (Puddifant by name) to lock the door of the chapel and to allow no one under any pretext whatever to enter. It afterwards transpired, however, that a soldier had hidden himself in the building and (to quote Wood once again), "being greedy of prey, crept into the vault and cut so much of the velvet pall that covered the great body as he thought would hardly be missed, and bored a hole through the said coffin, fancying there was something well worth the venture."

The sexton later on, on opening the door of the chapel, discovered the man, who being searched was found to be in possession of a bone. The Governor having been informed gave this sexton a reward, and the Lords Commissioners and others present were thereupon convinced that a *real* body was in the said coffin, which some had previously doubted. The only words, and they were, as we have said, executed in lead, on the lid of the King's coffin were these: "King Charles, 1648."

When all the many preparations had been completed, the King's body was forthwith brought down from his bedchamber to St. George's Hall, and after a little delay slowly and solemnly carried in procession into the choir of St. George's Chapel by "gentlemen of quality" (as an old historian puts it), "dressed in mourning"; the noblemen, also in mourning, held up the pall, and the Governor and several gentlemen and officers and attendants came after.

[I now give you a copy of Mr. Ernest Croft's picture of the "Funeral of King Charles I.," and the arrival of the body at the west front of St. George's Chapel.]

The body was set down by the bearers near the place of burial, and the Bishop of London stood ready, with the Service book in his hand, to perform his last duty to the King, according to the order and form of the Burial of the Dead, as set forth in the Book of Common Prayer; but Colonel Whitcot, the

Governor of the Castle would not allow it. And this is borne out by Clarendon in his "History of the Rebellion," which we have already quoted, where we read that "the King's body was laid in the vault without any words or other ceremonies than the tears and the sighs of the few beholders."

When the coffin had been lowered the black velvet pall that had covered it was placed over it, and the earth was thrown in, which the Governor stayed to see perfectly done, and then took the keys of the chapel.

"Thus," said Wood, "went the white King to his grave in the 48th year of his age and the 22nd year and 10th month of his reign."

Here the coffin remained undisturbed till the year 1813, when, on 1st April, by order of the Prince Regent, it was opened for the purpose of identification, and it is interesting to note that when the mausoleum, which was built in the Tomb House, as it was then called, and Albert Chapel now, was completed, it was necessary to form a passage to it from under the choir of St. George's Chapel. In constructing this passage an aperture was made accidentally in one of the walls of the vault of Henry VIII, through which the workmen were enabled to see not only the two coffins which were supposed to contain the bodies of King Henry VIII. and Queen Jane Seymour, but they also could see a *third*, covered with a black velvet pall, which, from Mr. Herbert's narrative, might fairly be presumed to hold the remains of King Charles I.

On representing the circumstances to the Prince Regent, His Royal Highness perceived at once that a doubtful point in history might be cleared up by opening this vault, and accordingly orders were given for an examination to be made on the first convenient opportunity. "This was done," says Sir Henry Hallford, who was the King's chief physician, "on the 1st of April last," i.e., in 1813, the day after the funeral of the Duchess of Brunswick, in the presence of His Royal Highness himself, who was accompanied by the Duke of Cumberland, Count Munster, the Dean of Windsor, Benjamin Charles Stevenson, Esq., and Sir Henry Hallford.

On removing the pall a plain leaden coffin, with no appearance of ever having been enclosed in wood, and bearing in large legible characters on a scroll of lead encircling it, an inscription, "King Charles, 1648," immediately presented itself to the view. A square opening was then made in the upper part of the lid, of such dimensions as to admit a clear insight into its contents. These were found to be an internal wooden coffin (very much decayed), and the body, carefully wrapped up in cere-cloth, into the folds of which a quantity of unctuous or greasy matter, mixed with resin, as it seemed, had been melted, so as to exclude as effectually as possible the external air. The coffin was completely full, and Sir Henry Hallford tells us that "from the tenacity of the cere-cloth, great difficulty was experienced in detaching it successfully from the parts which it

enveloped." When this came off, a correct impression of the features, to which it had been applied, was observed in the unctuous substance. At length the whole face was disengaged from its covering. The complexion of the skin of it was dark and discoloured. The left eye, in the first moment of exposure, was open and full, though it vanished almost immediately, and the pointed beard, so characteristic of the period of the reign of King Charles, was perfect. The shape of the face was a long oval, and a part of the nose had completely disappeared. Many of the teeth remained, and the left ear, in consequence of the interposition of the unctuous matter between it and the cerecloth, was found entire.

When the head had been entirely disengaged from the attachments which confined it, it was found to be loose, and without any difficulty was taken out and held up to view. It was quite wet, and gave a greenish-red tinge both to paper and to linen which touched it. The back part of the scalp was entirely perfect and had a remarkably fresh appearance. The hair was thick at the back part of the head and was in appearance nearly black. The hair of the beard was a redder brown. On the back part of the head it was more than an inch in length. On holding up the head to examine the place of separation from the body, the muscles of the neck had evidently retracted themselves considerably, and, to quote Sir Henry Hallford again, "the fourth cervical vertebra was found to be cut through its substance *transversely*, leaving the surfaces of the divided portions perfectly smooth and even—an appearance which could have been produced only by a heavy blow inflicted with a very sharp instrument, which furnished the *last* proof wanting to identify King Charles I.

[I here place before you a photograph of a sketch, by an unknown artist, taken at the time when His Majesty's coffin was opened in 1813.]

After this examination of the head (which served every purpose in view), and without examining the body below the neck, it was immediately restored to its situation. The coffin was soldered up again and the vault closed.

On examining the vault with some attention it was found that the wall at the west end had at some period or other been partly pulled down and repaired again, not by regular masonry but by fragments of stones and bricks put rudely and hastily together without cement.

Having given you this account of the opening of the King's coffin in the year 1813 and of all that took place at the time, we must pass on now to describe the replacing of certain relics in this grave of Charles I.

On Tuesday, 11th December, 1888, 75 years afterwards, the Prince of Wales (our gracious King, Edward VII.), then on a visit to his mother, Queen Victoria, at Windsor Castle, sent for the then Dean of Windsor, Dr. Randall Davidson (now Archbishop of Canterbury) and showed him a small ebony

casket. His Royal Highness told the Dean that this casket (which, by the bye, measured  $4\frac{3}{4}$  inches in length,  $3\frac{3}{4}$  inches in width, and  $2\frac{1}{4}$  inches in depth) contained certain relics believed to be part of the body of King Charles I.

[Here give again portrait of Charles I.]

It would seem probable, though it is not mentioned in the published Memorandum, that Sir Henry Halford, in the year 1813, when the coffin was opened for inspection, removed on this occasion certain articles, viz.: (1) A portion of the cervical vertebra, cut transversely with some sharp instrument; (2) a portion of the beard of the King (of auburn colour, with a bit of linen sere-cloth attaching to it); (3) a tooth. These relics, it seems, had come into the possession of Sir Henry Halford's grandson, Sir Henry St. John Halford, and had been by him presented to the Prince of Wales, in a small ebony box, which contained inside the lid an inscription engraved on a plate. When the contents of this box were examined it was discovered that the portion of beard and the tooth (already referred to were wrapped up in a piece of stained writing paper addressed thus: "The Honble. and Most Reverend the Dean of Windsor," which would seem to show that Dean Legge (who was Dean at the time) had in 1813 known of this abstraction of the relics, and had furnished a piece of paper at the moment in which to wrap up the beard and the tooth.

The Prince of Wales told the Dean that it was *his* wish to replace these relics in the vault or grave from which they had been abstracted, and, Queen Victoria's consent having been obtained, it was arranged that the relics should be replaced by His Royal Highness on the following Thursday, 13th December.

On the evening of Tuesday, 11th December, the Prince of Wales came to the Deanery and handed to the Dean the ebony casket, in which His Royal Highness placed an *autograph memorandum* in the following terms: "These relics of King Charles I. are deposited by Albert Edward Prince of Wales in the vault containing the coffin of the King on 13th December, 1888."

In the meantime the Dean of Windsor had had a leaden casket prepared, 10 inches long, 4 inches high, and 5 inches wide, and on the lid of this leaden casket the following inscription was engraved: "The relics enclosed in this case were taken from the coffin of King Charles I. on 1st April, 1813, by Sir Henry Halford, Physician to King George III. They were (by his grandson, Sir Henry St. John Halford) given to His Royal Highness Albert Edward Prince of Wales. On 13th December, 1888, they were replaced by His Royal Highness in this vault—their original resting place."

This casket was again enclosed in a stout oaken case, fitting closely. The small ebony box containing the relics was carefully deposited by the Dean within the leaden casket, and the oaken case containing all was firmly closed with screws.



On Thursday evening, 13th December, at six o'clock, after the close of evening service, the Dean of Windsor, with the two Canons, who happened to be in residence at the time, superintended the removal of the pavement stones above the vault. This was done, with the utmost care and reverence, by Mr. A. T. Nutt, surveyor to the Dean and Canons, and three workmen, and occupied a very short time. The vault is in the centre of the choir of the chapel, and six of the small squares of black and white marble on the south side of the pavement in this portion of the choir were lifted, and then the mortar that lay between them and the brick arch of the vault was removed. About 20 bricks were then taken out with the greatest care, so that no debris should fall on the coffin beneath. By this means an aperture of about 18 inches square was produced immediately over the centre of King Charles's coffin, which was covered still with a black velvet pall. The form of the coffin beneath it, which was of the usual plain oblong shape, was distinct.

The Prince of Wales came alone to the chapel soon after 7 p.m., and in the presence of the Dean of Windsor, the two Canons, and the surveyor, His Royal Highness lowered down the box containing the relics through the aperture, and placed it carefully about the centre of King Charles's coffin.

When the Prince had retired, the workmen came back again into the chapel, the aperture into the vault was at once re-closed, and the marble pavement re-laid, no one entering the vault. The whole operation was completed by 9.30 p.m. From the beginning to the end of what was done, everything was *personally* superintended by the Dean and the two Canons present, all of whom remained by the side of the grave till all was completed.

Having given you these details of the execution and burial, let me, in conclusion, pass on to one of the *debatable* points in connection with this tragedy. And, first of all, one of the most interesting of these is the meaning to be attached to the word "*Remember*," which the King, when upon the scaffold, addressed to Bishop Juxon after he had handed to him his medallion of St. George.

With regard to the vexed question of the *meaning* of this injunction "*Remember*," it has been suggested that King Charles used the word in reference to Queen Henrietta, from the fact that this jewel contained a portrait of her. Miss Strickland, in her "*Lives of the Queens of England*," after stating that the King handed to the Bishop the medallion containing the miniature of Henrietta, says: "The warning word, which has caused many historical surmises, evidently referred to the fact that he only had parted with the portrait of his beloved wife at the last moment of his life."

In the 8th series of Notes and Queries, May, 1894, the following appears over the signature "William Norman":

"In a quaint little book," he says, "called '*Medulla Historiae Anglicanae*' (printed in London in 1694, the lives and

affairs of the Stuart Kings (1603-1688) occupy about one half of the work. With reference to the speech with which the King is said to have accompanied the 'George,' the following account is given: "Then the King asked the executioner: 'Is my hair well?' "And, taking off his cloake and 'George', he delivered his 'George' to the Bishop, saying 'Remember to send it'—that is, to the Prince. This seems to be a *new* suggestion," says Mr. Norman, "and is as if it were intended to remind the Bishop of some *last* message which the King wished to have carefully delivered to his son and heir—a very likely thing to have happened under the peculiar circumstances."

Mr. Gardiner, the distinguished historian, also thinks that the King addressed that *one word* to the Bishop probably to impress on him the importance of delivering the messages to the Prince and others with which he had already charged him.

Another much disputed point in connection with this tragedy is the *identity* of the two men who took part in King Charles's execution.

We know that they donned "vizards," wore false hair, and were dressed as sailors, and thus they were effectually disguised. Immediately after the Restoration the Government made an effort to discover these masked headsman; but we do not learn that they ever succeeded in doing so.

Some historians think that the blow was struck by a Captain Foxley, since the public executioner, Richard Brandon, had refused to perform the task.

We hear also that a certain *Henry Porter* was charged with the act. This man had been imprisoned in Dublin for two years, when Lord Ormonde and the Council of Ireland requested Secretary Bennet "to move His Majesty (Charles II.) that the said Henry Porter (standing charged, as he was, as being the person by whose hand the head of our late Sovereign King Charles I. was cut off) should be brought to trial in England."

Tradition again has attributed the deed to one *William Walker*, who died near Sheffield in 1700, after having at the Restoration retired from political life. The tradition, however, rests on no substantial foundations. Nor does the vague evidence of Colonel Hacker help us much. This Colonel Hacker had for a time in his possession the original warrant for the execution. He (so we learn from a communication in "Notes and Queries"), when he was asked who struck the blow, replied that he knew not, but that he had heard it was the "Major." He said, however, that he would endeavour to ascertain; but whether he ever did so, or who the said "Major" was, we are unable to state. But in spite of the foregoing evidence, which, indeed, amounts to little more than the idle gossip likely to spring up on such a subject, the probability is that the King was beheaded by the ordinary executioner, Richard Brandon.

From Ellis's "Original Letters" and from Wraxall's "Memoirs," we learn that Brandon *confessed* that he had received £30 within an hour after the blow was given for his

pains, which was all paid in half-crowns; and further, that he had an *orange*, stuck full of cloves, and a *handkerchief* which had come out of the King's pocket so soon as His Majesty was carried off from the scaffold, for which orange he was proffered 20s. by a gentleman in Whitehall, and though at the time he refused the same, yet he afterwards sold it for 10s. in Rosemary Lane.

Mr. Jesse, gathering his information from Cunningham's Handbook of London, gives us some interesting details concerning this man Richard Brandon. The following entry appears about him in the Burial Register of the Parish of St. Mary, Whitechapel. The entry runs as follows: "1649, June 21st, Richard Brandon, a man out of Rosemary Lane." To which the following significant note is added below: "This Richard Brandon is supposed to have cut off the head of Charles the First."

We pass on now to another doubtful point.

In regard to the block on which the King's head rested and the mode of execution, about which opinions have largely differed, a correspondent (giving the initials S.M.S.) sent the following some few years back to "Notes and Queries." He says: "A note worthy the attention and the investigation of any interested in the subject of the execution of Charles I. is given in Warburton's 'History of Prince Rupert and the Cavaliers' (Vol. III., p. 460), where it is stated that 'the block was so low the King was forced to lie on the ground.' I have seen two prints of the time," he continues, "in which the king is thus represented. This has not," he adds, "been generally noticed."

In the year 1890 a correspondence took place in the *Times* newspaper respecting this subject, viz., the method of execution adopted in the case of Charles I. The late Sir Reginald Palgrave (Mr. Palgrave as he then was) wrote as follows: "Did King Charles at the last moment kneel down and bend his head over the block, retaining in other respects an upright position? On the contrary, I venture to assert," he adds, "that to receive the headsman's blow, the King first knelt down and then stretched himself at full length upon the scaffold, and rested his back across a bar of wood, in height about six inches. It was the customary practice," he continues, "and the scaffold was prepared to afford the sufferer some comfort in that wretched position."

Mr. Palgrave then goes on to say that this is shown by the description in the State trials of the death of the Duke of Somerset in January, 1552, and of Lady Jane Grey, and he endeavours to show that the execution of Charles I. was carried out in conformity with what he calls the *Tudor* method, which compelled the sufferer to lie at full length upon the scaffold. At the same time, Mr. Palgrave admitted that he could derive no help from any contemporary account of the King's demeanour on the occasion, since all that we are told is that, "stooping down, he laid his neck upon the block."

To this letter of Mr. Palgrave's the late Lord Carnarvon, the fourth earl, on 12th May, 1890, wrote the following reply, which *also* appeared in the *Times*: "With your permission," he said, "I desire to offer a few observations on Mr. Palgrave's remarkable theory of the mode of execution adopted in the case of Charles I.—a theory based upon the doubtful use of the word 'lying' in two or three instances. I confess," says his lordship, "that without further guidance I cannot accept his view, that the historical 'block' was a low rail six inches high, and that the kneeling and dignified attitude of the martyr King in his last moments was the grovelling position which he (Mr. Palgrave) describes. In the Stuart and Georgian reigns, down to 1745," continues Lord Carnarvon, "I imagine the block to have been what the word indicates, and in the Tudor times, of which Mr. Palgrave speaks, more evidence is needed than any which has been given to show that the practice was different. There used to be preserved in the Tower," Lord Carnarvon goes on to say, "a hideous block of considerable size and height, on which it was said that the 'swan neck' of Anne Boleyn was laid, and on which many other noble victims perished. In the memorable case of Charles I., there is a curious account of the execution," he continues, "which, whether true or false, deserves to be cited. It is to be found in one of those interesting reports which the Venetian envoys (accredited to England) made to the Senate of Venice of all matters of note. In 1654 the Venetian Senate sent an embassy to this country, and in 1656 the then Ambassador, Giovanni Sagredo, laid before them a report of the Great Rebellion, its causes and results, and the character of the Protectorate. 'The scaffold,' the Ambassador says, 'was raised level with a window of the Palace and hung with black velvet; and (because they were afraid His Majesty might resist the execution of the sentence and might refuse to lay his neck on the block) two iron rings were fastened to the foot of the scaffold, through which a cord was passed, to be placed round His Majesty's neck, and so to compel him to extend his neck to the axe, should he refuse to bow to the fatal blow.' He added," concluded Lord Carnarvon, "that the King warned in time, agreed to yield to the law of necessity, and died 'with constancy.' This account, so far as it goes," says Lord Carnarvon, "neither impairs nor confirms Mr. Palgrave's theory."

On the day after this letter of Lord Carnarvon's had appeared in the *Times* came one on the same subject from Lord Rosebery, dated 13th May, 1890, and in this letter his lordship says: "I have a picture in Scotland of the execution painted by an eye-witness. He was a Dutchman who left England immediately afterwards, declaring that he could not live in a country which had killed its King. The painting represents the King in the attitude suggested by Mr. Palgrave. The head had just been cut off, and is being held up by an executioner who is in a mask resembling human features, not a black mask. In



each corner are medallions," continued his lordship, "one a portrait of Charles, one a portrait of Lord Fairfax holding an axe, one of the King walking to Whitehall, and one of the people dipping their handkerchiefs in his blood."

[I am now able, by the kindness and courtesy of Lord Rosebery, to place before you a copy of this print, already referred to, which his lordship has been good enough to allow me to have copied from his collection at Dalmeny.]

On 14th May, 1890, a certain Mr. Louis Fagan continued this correspondence, and wrote that "in a perfect diurnal of some passages in Parliament, and the daily proceedings of the Army, under His Excellency the Lord Fairfax, dated Tuesday, 30th January, 1648, page 2317, line 21, we read as follows: 'After which the King, stooping down, laid his necke upon the blocke, and after a little pause, stretching forth his hands, the executioner, at one blow, severed his head from his body.'"

It will be remembered that iron staples were mentioned just now which had been driven into the sides of the block in order to bind down the King in the event of his showing any resistance, and the suggestion has been made that from these staples, or the marks of them the block might be identified if it is still in existence.

Again, *à propos* of the block, an anonymous correspondent, "D.B.," in "Notes and Queries" (Third Series, Vol. XI., January, 1867) writes: "I was lately informed," he says, "on seeing a picture of a Lady Jane, that she was married first to Bishop Juxon, Chaplain of Charles I., and that on her death at Little Compton, near Chipping Norton, the block on which Charles I. had his head cut off was sold."

Some time ago a further correspondence took place in the *Morning Post*, but this time regarding the present whereabouts of the axe which was used when King Charles was beheaded.

A certain Mr. William Chapman stated that Giles Dekker was the executioner, that the axe was granted to him by Parliament, and that upon his death the instrument went to his son, who exhibited it at his tavern in Lambeth. This fact, having come to the King's ears, the axe was confiscated, and James II. became its custodian, who, when he fled the kingdom, took the axe with him to France.

Upon his death, Louis XIV. became the possessor of the instrument, and later on it fell into the hands of the Regent Orleans, who sold it to Ferdinand King of Naples. Finally the relic was deposited in the Museo Borbonico at Naples, where it still remains.

It would appear, however, from another correspondent that nothing is known whatever of the axe at the Museum in question, and that it could never have been deposited there; other correspondents also dispute Mr. Chapman's story, and we may, I think, conclude that if the instrument were at the Museum at Naples, proof of the fact would have been forthcoming.



I now conclude my lecture of to-day. I am sorry not to have been able to give you more illustrations bearing upon our subject, for they always lighten a lecture so considerably; but then, where is it possible to obtain such views? I have, however, done my best, and I hope you will consider that I have been fairly successful in my efforts.

What views you have seen have been taken from prints, except in three instances, belonging to the collection here. These have been most generously lent to me for reproduction by the Council of this Institution. Of the three special views referred to, two are from pictures by that well-known artist and Royal Academician, Mr. Ernest Crofts, and the third is from a picture in the possession of Lord Rosebery, and I wish to express my most grateful thanks not only to his lordship for his kindness in sending down to me from Scotland that picture, a copy of which you have seen, but also to Lord Winterstoke for his kindness in allowing a photograph to be taken of one of Mr. Crofts' pictures, "The Funeral of King Charles I. at Windsor," which has been given by his lordship to the Bristol Art Gallery.

I feel much indebted also to Mr. Ernest Crofts for permission to reproduce his two pictures here—the one already mentioned and a second one entitled "The Execution of King Charles I. in Front of Whitehall," and which, as I am led to understand, he still retains in his own possession.

You will allow me, I feel sure, before concluding, once again to assure the Council of this Institution how greatly I appreciate the honour which they have done me in asking me to undertake this delightfully pleasant duty this afternoon, and I should further wish to thank and express to Lieut.-Colonel Leetham my indebtedness to him for finding the time to preside on this occasion, and may I add also to you for the attention which you have given me.

Captain B. E. SARGEANT (12th Battalion The London Regiment):—I should very much like to ask Canon Sheppard if he can give an explanation of the disagreement which exists as to the date of the execution. One often comes across the date 1648 and also that of 1649, on old engravings and documents, and that is a question of very considerable importance when trying to identify the executioner. Richard Brandon, it is recorded, was paid £30 for the execution within an hour of the deed; he went home to Rosemary Lane and offered the money to his wife, who declined it, at the same time expressing her contempt for him at what he had done. It is, moreover, recorded that all Brandon's friends were very hostile towards him afterwards. He fell sick and gradually wasted away, dying on the 20th June, 1649. I do not think you mentioned the date of his death, sir, in your paper.

Canon SHEPPARD:—No, I did not; it is news to me.

Captain SARGEANT:—His death seems to have been entirely due to the matter of the execution of the King preying on his mind. He was buried in Whitechapel Churchyard, and on his tombstone the date of 20th June, 1649, was inscribed. The question of the disagreement of the

date in old documents is rather interesting in that connection, because it seems that Brandon's death was more or less directly the result of the execution, especially if it occurred only four months after the death of the King, which was in 1649.

Canon SHEPPARD :—That is very interesting. I have always been led to understand that 1649 is a mistake, and that the real date is 1648.

Captain SARGEANT :—Do you think that the 20th June, 1649, on Brandon's tombstone was a mistake, and meant for 20th June, 1648?

Canon SHEPPARD :—No doubt 1649 is right for Brandon's death, but I do not think there is any doubt that the execution took place in 1648. The fact that Brandon died on the 20th of June, 1649, would rather bear out the fact that the execution was in 1648. All the old historians, whose books I have looked up, give 1648. I am very grateful to you for telling me what I did not know.

Commander W. F. CABORNE, C.B. :—How is it that nearly all the historians record 1649 as the date of the death of King Charles I.? I have a facsimile of the warrant, which is dated 1648, but I have noticed many times in other histories that the date is recorded as 1649.

Captain SARGEANT :—I think 1649 is the more usual date. Lord Rosebery's picture of the execution, which Canon Sheppard showed to us, is dated 1649.

Canon SHEPPARD :—That is very curious indeed; it puts me up a greater tree than ever. I am afraid I cannot explain it. The few books that I have looked up give the date as 1648.

Mr. CHALLIS :—Is not the explanation with regard to the discrepancy in the date the fact that the official year commenced in March? so that the months from January to March might sometimes be put in one year and sometimes in another. Whether the date was 1648 or 1649 depends on the way that was reckoned.

GERMAN TENDENCIES WITH REGARD TO  
THE PREPARATION AND DEVELOPMENT  
OF AN ACTION.

By Captain F. CULMANN, of the French General Staff.

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Translated for the General Staff from *Choses d'Allemagne*, 1908.  
By kind permission of the Author.

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Continued from July JOURNAL, p. 931, and concluded.

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CHAPTER II.

THE BATTLE.

*Deployment and Preliminary Action.*

AS soon as an action has become imminent, the German columns break up, and brigades, regiments, and even battalions, making the utmost use of the roads and communications available, or marching across country, "are diverged obliquely to various points as the necessities of the battle may require, and to spare the men by keeping them in this formation as long as possible." This method is mentioned in the regulations as being "the best" way of taking up a fighting formation from the order of march. Its advantages are the rapidity of opening an effective fire and of advance upon the enemy, thus allowing him no time to reconnoitre his own position—essential conditions in every preconceived operation and in an encounter combat.

The rôle of the advanced guards of the columns ends as soon as the actual combat begins. "The rôle of an advanced guard as such comes to an end," says Griepenkerl, "at the moment when the commander of the detached force decides to carry on the fight with the whole of his troops. . . . The advanced guard is only a means of security during the march; it is therefore only justified when on the march, or, perhaps, as an exceptional case, when it can itself engage an enemy of inferior strength."<sup>1</sup>

The character of the opening stages of an engagement varies according to whether the enemy has any desire to assume the offensive, or whether he occupies a defensive entrenched

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<sup>1</sup> Tactical Exercises, 13th Letter.

position. All the German regulations distinguish between the two cases and lay down particular rules for each of them. But would it be possible to be certain beforehand which of the two attitudes the enemy is determined to adopt? Is the distinction merely theoretical or does it reply to actual conditions? The Germans incline to the latter view; they apparently consider—doubtless not without good reason—that the indications furnished by their cavalry and their service of spies, the general situation, the state of the enemy's *moral*, and immediate events will enable them to have the proper information in ample time to make a decision suitable to the circumstances. Did not the Japanese in Manchuria and Moltke in 1870 at St. Privat know that the enemy had taken up their position and entrenched it? Be this as it may, it is useful to show how, according to their regulations, the Germans expect to open the battle in different ways according to the supposed intention of the enemy.

#### 1. *The Encounter Combat.*<sup>1</sup>

The officer commanding must imbue himself with the following principles: "*On becoming engaged, that side will have the advantage which gains the start over its opponents in readiness for action and thus gains the benefit of the initiative. The artillery may be of material assistance to the officer commanding by the quickness with which their dispositions are made and by their power of rapid movement.*"

Any knowledge of the ground or of the enemy which can be obtained, has considerable influence in the selection of the time, the manner, and the locality suitable for the engagement. If the enemy is met with before sufficient information can be obtained, then the *general situation* determines whether an attack shall be made or not. If the commander decides to attack, he must act with promptitude.

"*The commander should not await the results of a more complete reconnaissance in order to decide. He should remember that the enemy is no better prepared to fight than he is.*"

The main point is to be beforehand with the enemy. For this reason the first essential is for the commander to rapidly make up his mind, without waiting for further information: for it must be remembered that if he delays for the sake of further information he is only subordinating his intentions to those of the enemy.

The object of the Germans is to strike hard to avoid a partial check and to subordinate the enemy's will at the first onset. This necessitates the disposal of powerful means, and to collect the latter requires time, even when troops are moving in numerous columns. The first stand-by of the Germans are

<sup>1</sup> See Infantry Training Regulations, Art. 351-361; Artillery Training Regulations, Art. 475-482, Machine Gun Training Regulations, Art. 242.

Extracts from the different regulations are printed together, but they are easily distinguished.

the batteries *en masse* which have been systematically brought up. The artillery is in fact the arm which can best rapidly form a powerful barrier behind which troops can be assembled: it can, moreover, perform this duty without ceasing to be at the disposal of the commander of the force and, consequently, without hindering his liberty of action. But the deployment of these batteries requires time: so, as superiority in numbers is the most certain gauge of superiority of fire—even with quick-firing guns protected with shields—the artillery brigades which first come into position will avoid opening fire, if they think they are too weak and will only act to protect the infantry. "The batteries will take every advantage of the ground and will leave the enemy in doubt as to the situation by taking up covered positions and by judicious distribution." They will not open fire "except on the order of the senior officer present with the advanced guard"; this will be in the generality of cases the officer commanding the column himself.

The advanced guard will fight on a wider front than that ordinarily allotted to a force of its size, so as to seriously engage the enemy. It will be disposed in groups more or less detached, which will occupy by preference those portions of the ground the possession of which will most protect the deployment of the main body. It will be assisted by detachments of machine guns which will be placed for preference on those positions which it is most necessary to prevent the enemy from capturing.

On account of the weakness of their advanced guards, the Germans commit themselves to a meagre deployment at the outset of the engagement. As they also dislike the idea of employing batteries and battalions of the main body one after another as they come up, they aim at delaying the fight. The fight, however, must inevitably continue for the possession of the contested positions in front, and this will allow the commander time to decide whether he is able to deploy before the enemy or not. The question is one of importance, for the answer determines the next step.

If it is in the affirmative, it will be advisable to attack as soon as possible, in order to take advantage of the situation, to impose one's will on the adversary and hinder the methodical deployment of his troops.

If the answer is negative, "it is then necessary to act with caution. In order not to be surrounded or to have to fight all the time against superior numbers, the commander must try and avoid a serious engagement until he has succeeded in deploying sufficient force. It may even be advisable to withdraw the advanced guard in order to save it from heavy losses, and to shorten the time of deployment and extension of the main body."<sup>1</sup>

In all cases contact will be made gradually. Though this may not mean a definite breaking off of the fight, it can be

<sup>1</sup> Infantry Training Regulations, Art. 360.



taken as certain evidence that the force does not consider itself strong enough to begin the engagement with the energy and violence which characterise German methods.

The artillery enjoys the principal rôle in the opening stage, for only its fire can protect the troops and gain time. The commander himself chooses its positions, fixes the number of batteries which are to engage the enemy, and gives the order for the opening of fire. These are new instructions and show how this arm has increased in importance in German estimation since the adoption of the quick-firing gun.

To sum up: the tendencies of the Germans in opening the engagement are, to strike quickly and to strike strongly. One idea opposes the other and only the artillery can effect a partial reconciliation between them. But the second tendency is the most marked, and so great favour does it find, that it has even surmounted their well-known objection to breaking off a fight.

## 2. *The Attack of a Defensive Position.*<sup>1</sup>

"The enemy who determines to act on the defensive, loses at that moment his liberty of action.

"The attacker then has the time he wants to undertake the necessary reconnaissances before carrying out a carefully thought-out plan of attack."

Not to hurry is the best basis of all the German movements. Reconnaissances should be complete and pushed as far to the front towards the enemy as possible; it should not be confined to the cavalry only, or to observation with field glasses. It should be completed by infantry mounted officers, by field artillery officers, and by the officers of the heavy artillery, who should work along the whole front and also on the flanks of the enemy's position.

As soon as the commander has cleared up the situation and gained a knowledge of the ground, he is in a position to judge what his chances of success are, if he makes an immediate attack. If it appears impracticable, he will profit by the daylight to reconnoitre, to mark the routes to be followed, and to select positions for the batteries. He will advance his troops under cover of darkness and will open fire at dawn the following morning. On the other hand, should he consider it possible to assume the offensive at once, the commander lays down in general lines the plan of attack; he indicates the positions which the artillery are to occupy and moves the infantry up to the *position of readiness*. This should be sheltered from view and fire, and should be at least 2 miles from the enemy.

The advance towards the position of readiness is made with weak advanced and flank guards, while officers commanding reconnoitre the lines of advance on horseback. As soon

<sup>1</sup> Artillery Training Regulations, Art. 483-487; Infantry Training Regulations, Art. 362-372; Machine Gun Training Regulations, Art. 243.

as the nearest portion of the enemy's line of defence can be ascertained, the line for deployment is divided amongst the different bodies of troops, and the reserve is fixed. In order to ensure co-operation, it may be advisable to regulate their advance by stages, especially in country where the range of vision is limited. By this means parts of the force which are favoured by the ground are prevented from reaching the dangerous zone prematurely, while others have been checked by forced detours or other delays. The mass of the artillery, with the exception of that portion which is at the disposal of the commander, is held ready to open fire: if possible, simultaneously and unexpectedly. They choose by preference as their objective those of the enemy's batteries which open fire on the infantry advance. The field batteries assisted by the heavy artillery facilitate the advance of the other arms, and enable the situation to be cleared up.

As a rule machine guns do not take part in the opening stage of the engagement: they are kept in rear and form a mobile reserve in the hands of the commander.

"As soon as the troops have arrived in the position of readiness the commander gives the order for attack. If he has not already done so, he allots areas to the larger units in which to extend, and points out the portion of the position to be attacked by them (allotment of sections of attack). A given unit may also be designated, with whose movements the other units are generally to conform, without, however, being thereby hampered in their effort to advance." In short, with an adversary on the defensive, the Germans profit by the time gained to proceed methodically and without unnecessary haste to the reconnaissance of the position, the deployment, and the advance to the position of readiness. If necessary they wait till night before advancing. Their chief and incessant care is to avoid a partial check and not to open the fight before their troops are all brought up. They utilise every means to open unexpectedly along the whole of the enemy's front a combined artillery and infantry fire, and a fire which at the same time is as strong as possible. They strive also by careful dispositions to annul the advantage which the defender has by having all his troops in hand. Whether in the encounter-combat or in the attack of a position, the Germans sacrifice everything to the principle of uniting their forces: thus they follow the plan of co-operation, in danger as well as in commercial and industrial undertakings. They strive at all costs to avoid unsuccessful enterprises which are so serious under modern fire conditions and so disastrous to the *moral* of young troops. On the other hand, instead of energetically engaging with their advanced guards, which they do without altogether in front of an enemy on the defensive, they employ precarious methods of obtaining information. Consequently they run the risk of being insufficiently informed as to the enemy in these days of smokeless powder and the universal employment of the ground as a

means of concealment. Further, they are in danger of seeing their conclusions falsified. For instance, is time a factor of advantage wholly to the attacker? In the case of weak detachments the answer is, No; because the latter can fall back rapidly. It may be so in the case of armies, for with larger bodies of troops the transmission of orders is a lengthy affair, and it requires time to break them up when they are assembled and to get them on the march in various columns.

### *The Frontal Attack.*

We find in the new Infantry Training Regulations: "The combination of a frontal and enveloping attack gives the greatest promise of success. In order to carry out the enveloping movement, it is essential to hold the enemy in front. The best way to do this is to attack with vigour" (Art. 392). But, unless decided superiority of numbers can be relied on, the simultaneous attack of the front and a flank appears most disadvantageous, whether from a strategical or from a tactical point of view,<sup>1</sup> because it demands an almost uniform division of troops which, if it does not lead to a reverse, will not permit victory to be as decisive as it might be. "In the case of two opposing concentrations which are almost identical, it is necessary first of all to choose a direction of attack which aims for the enemy's flank and at the same time does not uncover one's own communications. It is also necessary to avoid engaging that part of one's line which is opposite the enemy's front, for here one will be at a disadvantage from a tactical point of view . . . this portion of the line will form, as it were, a refused flank."<sup>2</sup> In addition to the general motives which compel an economy of force against the enemy's front, there are other reasons for which the German "doctrine" is responsible. They are due to the fact that the Germans employ, as we have seen, no strategic advanced guard, and come to a decision early: they are, therefore, bound to provide against the surprises, which are always possible in an insufficiently clear situation, by making their enveloping attack particularly strong.

The troops charged with the frontal attack will feel the effects of the extreme parsimony with which their numbers have been allotted. We find it referred to in Article 392 already quoted: "if the available forces do not suffice for a determined attack, or if for other reasons a frontal attack is out of the question, a skilful commander can, by fighting a containing action, or even by threatening the enemy, make an effective enveloping movement possible."

The methods by which an enemy may be "threatened" are, unfortunately, not given: they should be of a circumspect

<sup>1</sup> "The Conditions of Modern War." Bernhardt. Lecture at the Military Society of Berlin, 8th February, 1898.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

nature, to judge by the containing action, the principles of which are given in Articles 418, 419, and 420.

"A strong force of artillery will be employed at long ranges. By this means rapid decisive results will be best avoided"; also the infantry will be economised and their *moral* unimpaired if the contest be unequal.

"Infantry comes into action at long ranges, and is widely extended, whilst the rear lines are kept back."

"A strengthening of the front lines and the bringing forward of the troops in rear will only take place if the nature of the fight changes either by becoming a defensive action (the enemy attacking) or by the commander deciding to attack" (the enveloping movement beginning to make its effects felt). "False demonstrations should be made for the purpose of deceiving the enemy as to the real intention. Feint attacks may also be made."

In the holding attack the infantry will have fulfilled its mission when once it has got to within 1,000 yards. It will halt there and entrench itself; it will pay particular attention to the organisation of its strong defensive points so that they may be held, should the eventuality arise, against the whole strength of the enemy. For victory depends above all on the capacity of the holding attack for a protracted resistance.

Their tactical inferiority will cease as soon as the enveloping movement begins to make itself felt. Supported by their artillery they will then attack with the utmost energy, and will (equally with the turning force) aim at the overthrow of the enemy. In short, the frontal engagement will almost always be *at the beginning*, purely defensive.

By their procedure the Germans are undoubtedly in a position to protect their enveloping movement; they can also rapidly seize positions held by the enemy if the latter evacuate them. But they immobilise the enemy's first line only and have no effect on his reserves. Instead of holding the enemy at the beginning of the action, they immobilise themselves, and a mere screen will suffice to deceive them.

In France, in accordance with the Napoleonic tradition, the frontal engagement tends to be, at the outset, more active and vigorous, with a view to enabling the commander to "see." Carried out by strong forces, it continues the active, offensive reconnaissance, begun by the advanced guard, "holds" the enemy, wears him out, and makes every effort to *find*, or to *make*, the weak point in his dispositions, upon which the decisive attack will be launched.

#### *The General Progress of the Attack.*

The following lines describe the development of the offensive combat, noticing the peculiarities which the German method of carrying it out presents. They apply also to any attack and not only to the decisive attack, for beyond the Rhine

there are no special tactics for the blow which decides the combat. Chapter I., which deals with the preparation of the battle, points to this conclusion.<sup>1</sup> *There is only one problem in the offensive and there is only one solution to it: co-operation of the different arms: and from these arms the heavy artillery must not be omitted.*

As the infantry of the attack are unable to make a serious effort, before the artillery have established a certain superiority, the latter arm has the leading rôle at this stage, and it is by its action that the Germans open the fight with the intention of destroying, if possible, the hostile batteries. While the contending infantry forces are at a considerable distance apart, the first duty of the artillery is to establish superiority of fire over that of the enemy. *To secure this every available gun will be brought to bear* (Art. 468, Artillery Training Regulations). It will not seek for success by economising its forces or by the ingenious artifice of counter attacks.

Should the ground admit, covered positions will be sought for the artillery; and it will be entrenched notwithstanding its powerful shields. The German artillery is no longer deployed in long lines, as in the past, but in groups to secure concentric fire. As soon as possible the different portions of the artillery, from the battery to the brigade, are connected by a rapidly established telephone system.<sup>2</sup>

The first problem is to compel the enemy to accept the duel. To this end the infantry, supported by a liberal number of batteries, attack those positions the loss of which will sensibly affect the enemy. The attack is made in thin lines offering a bad target, while the remaining batteries are in a position of observation or of readiness. The enemy will thus be forced, as a result of the combined action of the two arms, either to abandon his advanced posts, or to intervene with his own guns.<sup>3</sup>

Begun in this way, the duel spreads rapidly and increases in violence. The field guns are supported by the field howitzer batteries and afterwards by the heavy quick-firing howitzers. These last are placed in the second line, if there is no room for them in the first, and fire heavy high-explosive shell from positions which are completely defiladed. This enormous mass of 160 pieces per army corps, worked through the telephone by a single artillery commander, strives for a decisive effect: by superiority in numbers; carefully arranged concentration of fire; by opening fire unexpectedly, and continuing with violent

<sup>1</sup> The German Regulations can be searched in vain for paragraphs dealing with the decisive attack, only the assault is dealt with by them.

<sup>2</sup> The employment of the telephone is the result of the war in Manchuria. The wires covered by an insulating material are merely laid on the ground.

<sup>3</sup> "Zur Frage der Schnell feuer—Feldgeschütze und Ihrer Taktischen Verwendung." General Von Hoffbauer, formerly Inspector-General of Artillery.



*rafales*; and, finally, by the concentration of frontal and cross fire. The batteries rarely change their position; the trajectories, and not the guns, are manœuvred. The infantry are thus relieved of the hostile batteries, which have their attention directed elsewhere, and push forward, making careful use of the ground, to as close a range as possible, about 1,000 yards in an open country.<sup>1</sup> Here they lie down and endeavour to obtain superiority of fire prior to a further advance. The essential principles of infantry fire are the same as those of the artillery, viz.: power and concentration. To obtain the former, the immediate deployment of dense firing lines is necessary; to obtain the latter, there is a tendency to employ enveloping tactics in the fight as well as in the battle. "Nowadays, with small-bore magazine rifles, and Q.F. guns, every tactical consideration must aim at obtaining supremacy of fire. Fight tactics have become, above all things, fire tactics, which mean the art of directing a superior volume of fire in the most suitable direction. It is upon this essential consideration that the advance, the deployment, and subsequent movements in action are all based" (Major Kuhl). To crush the enemy's front by a hail of bullets, to turn his shelter trenches, to make the utmost use of long-range rifles to enfilade and demoralise his lines, these are the objects constantly kept in view by the German infantry.

As the distance between the contending infantry decreases, the more important it becomes to bring a heavy artillery fire on the enemy's infantry (Art. 432, Artillery Training Regulations). To act opportunely and with effect, batteries will occupy a "semi-covered position" (*i.e.*, positions covered from view, but so near the crest that the guns may be laid for line by a layer standing at it or upon it), or the guns occupy the crest without any attempt at concealment. Guns are run up by drag ropes if the ground is easy and the distance to be covered is small. If not they are advanced at the trot after limbering up the guns and wagons. Changes in position are made under cover of a portion of the field batteries, which remain where they are, and under cover of the high angle fire of the howitzer batteries. As soon as they arrive in their new positions batteries will protect their front and flanks by thick parapets.

Protected in this way, practically, from the effects of shrapnel and shell fire, the batteries can devote themselves to the direct support of their own infantry and are not compelled to reply to the enemy's artillery which may engage them. The light and heavy howitzers also aid the advance of the infantry by directing their fire against villages, woods, and, most impor-

<sup>1</sup> Since the adoption of the "S" bullet, ranges are classified as follows:—

Long, beyond 1,200 metres instead of 1,000 metres.

Medium, up to 1,200 metres instead of up to 1,000 metres.

Short, up to 800 metres instead of up to 600 metres.

tant of all, the enemy's entrenchments. These they endeavour to destroy by accurate fire and to reach the troops occupying them with their high explosive shell, which, when bursting, send large splinters to the rear and on both sides.

The infantry in the meanwhile advance from position to position, striving at each to obtain fire superiority. "The attack," says the Regulations, "is a fire advance against the enemy," up to a distance which in peace manœuvres is taken to be about 170 yards. The advance is made in half-sections, groups (four files), or even by single men when the ground is much swept. Their rushes are covered by the fire of the remainder.

"Entrenching tools may be usefully employed in positions to which troops are temporarily confined in order to hold on to ground which has been gained. It must not, however, be forgotten that a gain of time is more valuable to the defender than to the attacker. Also the difficulty of getting a skirmishing line which has been well entrenched to quit the cover which it has laboriously constructed and resume the advance under hostile fire requires spade work to be circumspectly used in the attack." (Infantry Training Regulations, Art. 313.)

Powerfully supported by guns and howitzers the attack progresses slowly and only by strenuous efforts. It is accompanied by storms of bullets from the machine guns, and in the last phases by certain batteries whose duty is to strengthen the *moral* of the infantry by their presence rather than by their fire effect. The co-operation of the various arms is one of the principal tasks of the commander, who is kept in touch with the situation by means of his telephones.

In accordance with the tactics originated by Frederick the Great, rather than as a result of the war in Manchuria, the German heavy artillery early prepares the way for the assault by destroying anything which is likely to obstruct the infantry.<sup>1</sup> The fire preparation is at length complete, and the moment for the assault arrives.

The assault is only the "consecration of a victory already won by fire." The final overthrow of the enemy is completed with the bayonet.<sup>2</sup>

"The superiority of fire must be such that the attacker, having broken down the resistance of the defence, has, in the assault, only to gather ripe fruit. If the assault is carried out under other conditions, if it presumes to constitute itself the power of compulsion which forces the enemy to give way, it is more than probable, in view of the power of modern firearms, that it will fail, and that the attack will be crushed" (Dickhut).

<sup>1</sup> The introduction of heavy artillery in the field dates from long before the Russo-Japanese War. In 1759 Frederick the Great organised brigades of 10 heavy guns and attached them to the infantry. They were employed at Zorndorf, Torgau, Freiberg, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Infantry Training Regulations, Art. 324.

"Undoubtedly, in order to dislodge the defender, a hand-to-hand fight, with cold steel, will be necessary at the last; generally speaking fire alone will not suffice. But this last dash forward, with fixed bayonets, is not a second act in the fight, but merely serves to draw the cash for the bill presented to the enemy during the first part of the attack, where the victory was gained by fire. The same determination to win, which enables the assailant to push nearer and nearer, and to face the long and obstinate preparatory fighting, at last decides him to assault. But if the *moral* of the defender is still unbroken, he cannot be driven out of his position with cold steel, and indeed, no assault will take place" (Major Kuhl). The men will throw themselves down on the ground and instinctively continue the fire preparation which they recognise to be still incomplete.

### CHAPTER III.

#### NOTES ON THE DEFENSIVE BATTLE.

The Germans are by no means in favour of the defensive battle, although its (theoretic) superiority was extolled by Clausewitz and by Moltke. They rightly consider that the advantages accruing from the choice of ground, knowledge of the locality, the preliminary assembly of troops, which makes it possible to offer opposition, one way or another, for a certain time, are more than counteracted by moral considerations which (owing to permanent psychological conditions, entirely apart from the improvements introduced in weapons and armament) result in the subordination of the defender to the assailant. They also consider that the larger the force the more disadvantageous does the defensive type of operations become. Should an army be given a defensive mission—and there are such cases in war—it would best achieve its purpose by resolute offensive action. This tendency is clearly shown in the great German manœuvres.

"To push forward," writes Major Balck of the Great General Staff, "stirs up men's hearts and galvanises their resolution. The conviction of superior strength, *whether it be well founded or not*, never fails to act on the assailant to the detriment of his adversary." "The defender who wishes to gain a decisive victory, must use the methods of the attack as well as those of the defence" (Infantry Training Regulations, Art. 398). With the Germans, therefore, as with the French, the principle laid down is to wear out the adversary by fire on a carefully prepared front, and then to counter-attack.

As the chance of success increases with the strength of the general reserve, the forces to be disposed along the front must be sparingly allotted. This is managed by choosing a position with an extensive field of fire and at least one strong flank; by judiciously placed works and by a skilful division of the troops (Infantry Training Regulations, Art. 409).

The Germans place their General Reserve at the opening of the engagement in rear of the unsecured flank, with the preconceived idea of an enveloping movement, or, if both flanks are *en l'air*, "on that side from which, according to the probable direction of the enemy's attack and the nature of the country, it can best advance to the counter-attack." On the other flank they place a reserve sufficiently strong to repulse a hostile flank attack. As in the offensive, the manoeuvre is executed on exterior lines. Accordingly the general reserve is placed in rear and outside the flank; the interval varies according to the effectives employed and may be as much as a short day's march if the reserve is of the strength of an Army Corps. "A reserve placed immediately behind a wing can only form a defensive angle with it against an enveloping attack. The fire of the defender will thus be divergent, that is to say, little efficacious" (General Schlichting).

The cavalry, supported by the horse artillery and machine guns, is pushed out to meet the enemy, to reconnoitre and check him, and to give the defender information in time to make his dispositions. For this purpose "it should be sent out as far as the next stream or river if possible. It can then count the enemy at the bridges, and report his strength and the direction of his march" (Von Moltke). Its mission also will be to draw off the enemy and, by means of its horse artillery and without being seriously engaged, to make him deploy in a wrong direction. "The great mobility of the two arms permits them to break off an engagement easily and to renew the same procedure a little later on" (Rohne).

We have thus roughly sketched the defensive battle on its essential lines, and can now deal with the division of the troops along the front and the measures taken to protect it.

The methods about to be described apply equally to a force which fights a defensive action in an entrenched position to gain time—such a thing as a retreat is inadmissible in Germany—or to units whose mission is to protect the enveloping movement in a battle and are attacked by superior forces.

"Only one defensive position will be selected and this will be strengthened by all possible means." (Infantry Training Regulations, Art. 407.) There will, therefore, generally be no advanced line of infantry or artillery and no *advanced posts*, but only *detached posts* within effective rifle fire of the line of defence.

Griepenkerl explains and develops Article 407 as follows:—

"An advanced position should not be occupied if it is out of musketry range, for the defenders of this outpost run the risk of being cut up while retreating. The enemy follows close on their heels and will get up to our main position without suffering loss; or, if we wish to support our advanced position by reinforcements, we shall be drawn into an engagement on

ground other than that of the main position, which we have chosen as being the most advantageous for the fight.

"Farms, clumps of trees, hollow roads, railway embankments, etc., which are within effective rifle range and will aid the attack if unoccupied, should be considered as an integral part of the position itself and be strongly held"; more especially when they are placed at the foot of a slope and watch a dead angle.

These detached posts are strengthened not by men but by ammunition. They will be provided with machine guns, which are easily concealed, take up little space, and have a large volume of fire. Their employment will be especially advantageous if their retreat is favoured by the ground (Machine Gun Training Regulations, Article 246).

The line of defence will be divided into sections. "The extent of a section depends on the nature of the ground, which cannot be advantageous everywhere, especially in a long extent of front. A suitable disposition of the force must supplement it. With a good field of fire a section can be proportionately long owing to the rapidity of modern fire. Here there should be fewer rifles, but a larger supply of ammunition. If the field of fire is limited and the enemy can approach under cover to within short range, the section should be small and strongly occupied (Infantry Training Regulations, Articles 397, 400, and 402).

The artillery is divided into groups to facilitate enfilade and cross fire. Fire of this description can quickest overpower guns provided with shields, but which have not had time to entrench themselves.

Batteries look for covered positions and are placed in them at wide intervals, to lessen their vulnerability, to avoid prematurely disclosing their numbers, and above all to enable a change of position to be made. Changes of position become necessary when artillery in a threatened quarter has to be reinforced. Spare time is employed in improving approaches, taking ranges and clearing the field of fire. It is mentioned that small detachments of artillery may be placed *en caponnière*, to watch dead angles in front of a position. Until the enemy is signalled the batteries will remain assembled. The whole of the artillery will be seen, therefore, in lines of masses in position of readiness. The preparation for fire is pushed on as the situation clears itself.

In a similar way the infantry do not occupy their positions, which as a rule are from 660 to 880 yards in front of the artillery.

Patrols are sent out in front to prevent the enemy reconnoitring the position. Any available time is employed in constructing defensive works, a description of which is in the Regulations for Field Fortifications of 8th June, 1906.

These works may be of considerable size if a battle on a large scale is expected. Often many hours elapse before the assailants arrive, as the war in Manchuria proves. In 1870 Bazaine had a whole day before him to organise his left wing



at St. Privat, and it is known that Von Werder had decided on 11th January, three days in advance, to fight on the Lisaine.

The Germans dig deep sunk lines of trenches for preference. These are constructed for whole battalions and are provided with traverses, ammunition recesses, and covered-in shelters. Villages, farms and woods are placed in a state of defence, and wire entanglements are constructed.

Batteries, whether of guns or howitzers, provide themselves with cover protecting their front and flanks. They construct ammunition depôts, and observing posts for all officers (from brigade commanders to lieutenants) who direct the fire or command.

If the battle is prolonged, all works—the most difficult of which are constructed by the pioneers—are methodically strengthened.

But "if circumstances turn out differently to what was expected, commanders must not be influenced in their procedure by any entrenchments which may already have been constructed. On the other hand the consideration that works may never be utilised must not lead to their not being undertaken" (Infantry Training Regulations, Art. 311).

These preparations are completed finally by the establishment of a telephone system for the commander, for the troops themselves, and finally between the troops and the ammunition and supply columns.

When the cavalry have obtained information which shows sufficiently the direction of the enemy's march, the troops rapidly occupy their fighting positions. The field artillery supported by the heavy artillery open fire, taking as their first objective the enemy's batteries. The battle begins; . . . before long there will no attacker or defender.

\* \* \* \* \*

The attacker, after demonstrations on the part of the defender's cavalry, will come at once under the fire of one single main position, strongly held and substantially fortified. The preliminary phases of the engagement will be characterised by the vigorous and unforeseen deployment of troops which, till then, will have been carefully kept out of sight. Ability will be shown less in making feints, than in the sudden development of very strong forces in action.

To sum up, the tendencies are the same, in both offensive and defensive operations. The Germans rely upon their cavalry alone for information and security; they manœuvre according to a preconceived idea, and—convinced that the great point at the present time is to obtain superiority of fire—they consider that envelopment offers the simplest and most reliable method of bringing into line more rifles and guns than the adversary.

## RASPLATA.

### ("THE RECKONING.")

By *Commander VLADIMIR SEMENOFF, Imperial  
Russian Navy.*

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Translated, by permission of the Author, by L. A. B.

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Continued from July JOURNAL, p. 919.

## CHAPTER VI.

AFTER MAKAROFF'S DEATH—THE VICEROY'S FLAG IN "SEBASTOPOL"—THE THIRD JAPANESE ATTEMPT AT BLOCKING—THE FLIGHT OF ADMIRAL ALEXEIEFF FROM PORT ARTHUR—THE "GREAT EDICT OF RENUNCIATION."

THERE is an old tradition, dating from the early days of Christendom, according to which a perfervid follower of the faith took an axe and demolished the statue of Serapis, cutting it into small pieces. But the heavens did not launch forth thunderbolts, and the earth did not open up, to punish the miscreant, and the heathens were much frightened. Yes, they were frightened, and therefore many had themselves baptized. They did not do this because they no longer believed in their old gods—for one does not lose one's old faith quite so quickly—but because they felt that their old gods had deserted them.

I mention this tale, as it represents very well the depressed frame of mind of the squadron after Makaroff's death. If God permitted something so sad, it meant that He had deserted us. Against this frame of mind energetic measures became necessary. Simple natures, containing little that is complex, such as the majority of our sailors, are as susceptible to a few cheering words as they are to despair. This lightened our task. I don't know what went on in the other ships, but with us on board the *Diana* the officers had never before occupied themselves so much with the men as now. Everywhere in the batteries and on the lower deck, diagrams and details of the ships composing the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets were to be seen. We had prepared these ourselves, giving the displacement, armament and armour, etc., of the ships, and had them reproduced on board. Around these "Proclamations," as they were jokingly called, the men soon crowded. They discussed them with much eagerness, reckoned up in their heads and on their fingers

the numbers of the various classes, and formed in their minds the squadron which might be sent out to the Far East. We often heard very sensible remarks. The officers joined the men here and there, and gave them any necessary explanations.

There was one question, however, which was being discussed with still more eagerness than the reinforcements we might receive. That question was: Who was to replace the late Admiral Makaroff? I often went from one group to the other, listened, perhaps joined in occasionally, and explained this or that to the men. Every time I was astonished to see how well the men knew their principal leaders. They seemed to be familiar with all the personal qualities of our admirals. On the lower deck the same names were put forward as candidates for the position of Commander-in-Chief as in the officers' messes. They were admirals for whom I also should have voted unhesitatingly. In the first place came the names: "Dubassoff," "Tchooknin," "Rojestvensky." When the men were debating as to which had the greatest chances, one could often see from their remarks how rightly they judged all the circumstances.

"Sinovi<sup>1</sup> won't be sent out; he is too junior. That might offend the older ones. Dubassoff—that would be fine." "But isn't he too old?"—"He old? He's as hard as nails and keen at his work."—"They say Grigori<sup>2</sup> has the best chances."—"No, it will be Dubassoff. His age don't count."—"I think so too. He's the best man. All the same, it would be better if he were younger."—"Why, of course, Dubassoff."—"No, Sinovi."—"No, Grigori."

Sometimes these debates became very heated. The supporters of one or the other of the admirals were often near to deciding the argument with their fists. Then the boatswain or one of his mates interfered very energetically. "What are you shouting for? Do you think they can hear you at St. Petersburg?" This would re-establish peace.

I always listened to these debates with great interest. The war had now lasted two months. The first had passed in a kind of lethargy. The real war only began during the second. The second month, under the command of a popular admiral, had shaken up our people. He had aroused their interests and their co-operation in a splendid way. It was hardly to be believed that these were the same men, who throughout the first month had brooded through their days and had looked upon every effort to arouse them as a piece of persecution on the part of their superiors. "To listen to these men," the torpedo lieutenant once said to me, "one would think that since Makaroff's death the entire fleet rests on the three pillars—Dubassoff, Tchooknin, Rojestvensky."

<sup>1</sup> Sinovi (Zenobius) Petrovitch (son of Peter) Rojestvensky. Pronounce: "Rah-jest-nsky"; the accent on "jest," the "o" in the first syllable becomes a broad "ah," and the "ve" is practically swallowed.

<sup>2</sup> Grigori (Gregory) Paulovitch (son of Paul) Tchooknin.

"Well, and what do you say?"

"They are right."

On the morning of 15th April the Viceroy arrived in Port Arthur. His flag was hoisted on board the *Sebastopol*. She lay in the East Basin, alongside the north mole, opposite the Captain of the Port's house. We hardly noticed this incident.

The younger ones could not bridle their tongues, and said that it was all make-believe. "He won't go into action with us."

The first crushing impression of the catastrophe which had robbed us of our Admiral with nearly the whole of his staff gradually faded away. And now the wildest rumours about the appointment of a successor began to circulate in the squadron. Whence their origin, no one could say. Probably they arose in our own impatient imagination. Again and again we heard the three names—Dubassoff, Tchooknin, Rojestvensky.

At daybreak on 15th April the Japanese hove in sight. Of course, we did not move out. Towards 9 a.m. a bombardment commenced. Liao-ti-shan signal station reported that only the *Kasuga* and *Nishin* were firing. The Japanese had only recently bought these two cruisers and added them to their fleet. This was their first appearance off Port Arthur. Probably they merely wanted to try their guns. The battleships were cruising about to the southward of them, without taking any part in the bombardment. Somewhat nearer, and more to the eastward, almost facing the entrance to Port Arthur were the "greyhounds" and two armoured cruisers. On our side the fire was replied to by the *Peresviet* and *Pollava*. This time the Japanese fired carelessly. Most of their shots went short and fell into the southern part of the West Basin. Our losses were only two men wounded on Tiger's Tail Peninsula. About 12.30 the Japanese steamed away at high speed. Liao-ti-shan reported that they did so as one of their cruisers (*Kasuga* or *Nishin*) had struck a mine. Upon this all ships had fired aimlessly into the water. Probably they suspected an attack by submarines, just as we did on 13th April. Two days later, Chinese spies reported that the third-class cruiser *Miyaka* had foundered in Kerr Bay (east of Talien-wan), on our minefields.

These two items of news were not confirmed by the official Japanese reports from the seat of war. Our enemies always managed to keep their losses secret<sup>1</sup>; in direct contrast with us, who always quite candidly kept the world informed of the state of repairs on our damaged ships. I am therefore inclined to believe the above-mentioned reports, and that all the more as the Japanese afterwards admitted the foundering of the *Miyaka*. They only put the date one month later. They similarly admitted the damage to the *Kasuga*. They explained this by saying that she had rammed the *Yoshino* in a fog—the

<sup>1</sup> The Battleship *Yashima* struck a mine on 15th May, and sank the following day on her passage to Japan. It was not till October that rumours reached Europe, and even Japan, of this incident. It became only definitely known after Tsu-Shima.

latter ship having been sunk. On our side the destroyer *Silni* maintained that she had sunk the *Yoshino*. On 13th April the *Silni* formed a sub-division with the *Strashni*. In themselves these disputes are without any importance. It is, after all, immaterial why the *Yoshino* sank, how the *Kasuga* was damaged, or on what precise day the *Miyaka* went down. I only mention this to show how successful the Japanese were in preserving their war secrets, and how unsuccessful we were. With us the word "secret" is mere office jargon; with the Japanese it is a matter of conscience—a sacred duty towards their country. Of course, with us the cult of office secrecy was in full swing. Every order issued by superior authority, which differed only in a minute point from the usual form, and only possessed momentary importance, was "secret." The terms "secret," "most secret," "confidential," etc., were conspicuous on all reports, but especially on all orders. The result was that all these awful words lost their meaning completely. They might have been replaced by the words "important" or "interesting." Moreover, the number of secret documents was such that it was physically impossible for anyone to write them personally, or even to have them written by some confidential person. It therefore became necessary to employ clerks, or even copyists, who were then always ready to communicate interesting bits of news to their friends—of course, in strict confidence. Now, it occasionally happened that real secrets found their way into the pile of office secrets. How could one distinguish them? What was "secret" was always known to everyone except the one person who ought to have known it, and on whose silence one could have relied.

It once happened that one of the captains or commanders (I mean a particular person) asked a friend on the Admiral's staff: "Is it known when we sail?"

"I have no idea."

On board the ship the servant of this same officer went to his master on the same day and said that he ought to go to the washerwoman.

"Why?"

"I want to get your washing, sir, as we are going to sea."

"Going to sea? You are talking rot."

"No, sir, the Admiral's valet told me this morning that everything is to be on board by to-morrow evening."

Once upon a time—it was some years before the war—an admiral commanding a squadron was in great tribulation. He wanted to issue an order to his captains, which he was most anxious to keep secret. "It is really maddening," he said; "everything gets known here, and to those especially who ought not to know." "Don't mark it 'secret,'" advised one of those present, "then not a soul will look at it." This is exactly what happened. No one took any interest in this order.

I apologise for this digression, and return to my narrative.

About the middle of April we received the official intimation that Vice-Admiral Skridloff had been appointed Com-



mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Squadron. This appointment was received afloat without enthusiasm; but on the whole it was considered satisfactory. To judge by the remarks one heard, there was a general agreement to suspend judgment. The Admiral was not one of the candidates who had been considered; but—we shall see.

If Makaroff had not been delayed at Mukden by his consultation with the Viceroy, he would have been here on the fifteenth day from the date of his appointment, as calculated by some of us. Consequently, Skridloff might be expected between 30th April and 3rd May. This calculation was not confirmed. Solemn receptions, processions, special church services of intercession and for other purposes, dedications of holy images and banners—all these falsified our calculations. Faces at Port Arthur became more and more gloomy.

The Japanese had apparently disappeared from the face of the earth. Nearly three weeks passed without a sign of them. Meanwhile the squadron slumbered on in the basins of the inner harbour. Even the scheme of guard ships in the outer anchorage was abolished.

In fact, everything established by Makaroff disappeared. Precisely the same glorious state of affairs as had obtained before the war reappeared. The flag at the *Sebastopol's* main topmast head seemed to possess the peculiar power of paralysing all initiative, and of stifling every word except the well-beloved "Very good, sir."

The "most obedient servants" once more raised their heads and ruled the roost.

"Here we have the results of fool-hardiness," they said. (Not long ago, together with all the rest, they had cheered the Commander-in-Chief's flag in the *Novik* with enthusiasm.) "One must carefully distinguish between bravery and fool-hardiness. Very often it is true manliness to avoid danger. One must not hunt up danger only for the sake of cheap popularity. Our adventurous enterprises must now cease. In all Service concerns there must, above all, be deliberation and broad views. The Viceroy may yet have to justify himself before Russia for having been so weak as to hand over the command to the so-called 'Little Grandfather.' *He* would never have risked such a thing. You see what has been the upshot of it all. Now he will have to put everything to rights. All our hopes are centred on him. God grant that his work may succeed! Kuropatkin well knew what he said when he proposed the toast: 'The good genius of this country—Eugene Alexeieff.'"

This sort of thing they said aloud. They wanted to be heard, and, if possible, to be reported.

It was an ugly picture.

The maxim, "Be careful and risk nothing," once more had the upper hand. Under the hypnotic effect which the flag in the *Sebastopol* produced, a new maxim was added: "Never

do anything without orders or without previously asking permission."

Makaroff had said: "I rely upon every one of you, each in his own place, devoting his whole strength towards increasing our preparedness for war." This was so simple that everyone understood it. This principle had produced great results; it had left to every captain, to every officer down to the youngest and the lowest, the most complete liberty. Personal initiative occupied the first place, the whole Service was carried out on grand lines. We had got so far, that of our own accord we set ourselves tasks which were regularly completed in order. Now everything was upset.

Exercising at general quarters, combined with sub-calibre target practice, had become a regular habit in the *Diana*. When we were about to resume these again as formerly, the new régime showed itself clearly.

There was an order in existence that before every general exercise or large evolution the Admiral's permission had to be obtained. This order was always adhered to, but with Makaroff this asking permission had merely the character of a communication of one's intentions.

When a ship hoisted the daily signal: "Permission to carry out such and such an exercise," flag D (the affirmative) was "mastheaded" at once on board the *Petrovsk*, where it was always kept ready for instant hoisting.

Now things worked differently.

On the *Diana* making her signal, the *Sebastopol* hoisted the affirmative "at the dip," and kept it there.<sup>1</sup> Finally she hoisted the negative (meaning no). She then asked by semaphore: "Was your last signal made correctly? Did you really mean to carry out target practice?" When we replied in the affirmative, the signal was made for the captain to repair on board the flagship.

When he came back he was not very communicative. He only said that in future we were to comply carefully with the routine of work as drawn up and about to be issued by the chief of the staff. This sub-calibre practice had been noted as quite worthy of consideration, but in future this practice was to be regulated so as to enable all ships to participate in it equally, etc., etc.

We had to be prepared for a speedy reappearance of the Japanese off Port Arthur. Consequently, the outer anchorage was being swept by steam launches and pinnaces for mines which the enemy might have placed there.

In return, we laid out our mines at the places we did not mean to pass over ourselves. All this was done but lazily, without any sign of self-confidence or energy.

<sup>1</sup> In the Russian Navy the affirmative flag, or answering pennant, close up means: "I see your signal and understand it." At half-mast (at the dip): "I cannot make out your signal clearly, and cannot understand it. Is your signal hoisted correctly?"

The reader will ask: Were there no men of energy at Port Arthur who took matters in hand themselves and carried out the service in the way it ought to be carried out? Of course there were such men—as was well shown later on—but now they were all under the hypnotic influence I have mentioned. Whoever suggested something new was held to condemn the old ideas. But these old ideas had been sanctified by the Viceroy, who vigorously resented any doubt of his infallibility. He was no Makaroff, who asked every one for his candid opinion. Makaroff considered even violent criticism better than enforced silence, which regularly leads to inactive subordination or to passive resistance—there is not much difference between them. Makaroff could be very angry and scold fiercely, but he caught up eagerly any idea, no matter where it had originated, if there was any chance of its being successful. Times were indeed changed now that all was based on the myth of Minerva springing fully armed from the brains of Jupiter. What can the voice of the ordinary mortal do against Olympic thunder? There were some men amongst us who wanted to play the part of Prometheus, and how did they fare? There were many who thought thus. Are they to be judged severely? Their thoughts were the outcome of sad experiences. How could an honest or sincere voice, be it civilian or military, have made itself heard in the province of the Satrap of the Far East? It would have seemed quite natural to be ordered to flog the yellow sea for allowing its banks to smell so badly at low water that the great Viceroy was no longer able to sit out on the balcony of his palace. No Themistocles could arise and say: "Strike, but hear me." Here we only had men at the helm whose creed was to keep silence and to agree to everything.

A sad event happened on 21st April. In the neighbourhood of Liao-ti-shan a line of mines was being laid out by some harbour craft. As this was being done, one of the mines went off, and Lieutenant Pell and nineteen men lost their lives. I had known Pell from the time of the China campaign. During the Seymour expedition he was wounded in both legs. He was carried along for some time on a stretcher without any medical attendance. More than once he was in danger of falling into the hands of the Boxers, who gave no quarter. Still Pell recovered. He again saw active service, and was fated to so sad a death, and that, too, owing to the imperfections of a weapon of which he was a specialist. (Pell was a torpedo lieutenant.)

About this time I was very unexpectedly made member of a commission to examine the Japanese who had been taken prisoners on 26th March on board the steamer *Hayen-Maru*, and the papers found on them. It was rather strange that the executive officer of a man-of-war should be put on such a commission. To the non-seamen amongst my readers I must explain that the captain of a ship is, so to speak, the king, who only appears personally at highly critical moments. The second in command, or executive officer, acts in the name of the captain, on his orders or with his approval. He is the Prime Minister,

who bears the immediate responsibility for the internal organisation. One may say (leaving aside exceptional cases) that the captain is the pendulum which regulates the movement of the clock, the second in command the spring which produces the force required to work the mechanism. If the second in command is only a few hours out of the ship it has a bad effect on the life on board. This is inevitable; the second in command must practically be always on board. In the ward-room the fact of his going on shore is quite an event. One can often hear a remark such as: "That was before 'number one' went on shore the last time."

Personally, I had nothing to say against taking part in this commission's labours. To tell the truth, I was rather glad. It was, after all, quite tempting to be sometimes out of the ship on duty and to meet other people. It was rather the captain who took the matter to heart. "It would have been better if they had appointed me," was his view, and he went off at once to the Viceroy's naval office. There, however, he was told that it was known that I had some knowledge of the Japanese language and the Japanese and Chinese characters. That was why they had selected me. He had to be satisfied with this. At first I did not quite believe in these motives. It was certainly known to some in the squadron that once upon a time I had studied the Japanese language, as well as the Japanese-Chinese characters, for a year. At that time I had reached the point where I could freely read and translate Japanese newspapers. But that was six years ago. Since then, from want of practice, I had forgotten much. I nowise considered myself justified in playing the interpreter, especially in so important a case. But already at the first meeting I had, willy-nilly, to lay aside my modesty and to try and furbish up my knowledge as well as I could.

It turned out that in this whole enormous staff there was not one person who was a thorough master of the Japanese language and characters. We employed as interpreter a sub-lieutenant of the Naval Reserve, who had been called out, and who at other times was a student of Oriental languages at Vladivostok. It was hard to say which of us two knew least. Fortunately my colleague possessed a rare quality: he was free from professional conceit. We worked together in friendship and harmony, laughed heartily when we got hopelessly stuck, and then tried to get out again with our united forces.

How would such an examination have been carried out amongst the Japanese? On board every ship, in every regiment or battalion, even in every company, they had people who spoke and wrote Russian fluently. What a hail of cross-questioning in their own language would the members of our commission have been exposed to if they had been in the position of the Japanese whom they examined!

The commission met in the state reception rooms of the Casino, which were generally kept locked. On one occasion, when, after a meeting, I had to wait for my boat which was

to take me back on board, and which was late, I went on board the *Sebastopol* (lying alongside) and looked up my old friend and shipmate B—— (since dead), her second in command.

As always happens at a meeting after a long separation, we embraced, and mutually began a whole string of questions. Our conversation was interrupted every moment by the "guard call." Every time B—— had to rush off and meet at the gangway some admiral or general, either coming on board or going away.

"What a lot of 'big wigs' you seem to have coming on board here," I said, with astonishment.

B—— made a gesture of disgust. "Don't talk of it!" he burst out. "You imagine, perhaps, that I am the commander of this ship? The whole of my work is done by the first lieutenant. I only run backwards and forwards, escort to the gangway, receive at the gangway, receive, escort."

"What is the meaning of this?" I pointed at a crowd of workmen. Carpenters were putting up a number of cabins in the mess with wooden partitions along the bulkheads; they were hanging doors and fitting windows. Painters were pasting wall-papers on the bulkheads of these cabins. Other men were busy screwing in hooks, placing furniture, etc., etc.

"That is all for the Viceroy's staff. Up to now I don't even know how many there are and when this great immigration is to cease, notwithstanding all the trouble I give myself to find out."

"But when you go to sea—go into action? What then? On board our ship orders were given to remove all woodwork except what was absolutely indispensable. All furniture and ornamentations have been sent on shore, so as not to provide food for flames in any fire. Our bulkheads are made of steel, but the doors were made of wood, so the latter had to be replaced by canvas screens; and on board here you are actually building up cabins with inflammable material! What will this lead to?"

B—— became quite furious. "Are you mocking at us?" he flared up. "Where will this lead to? In these conditions we shall simply go to the devil."

I was bound to agree with him. The maxim: "Be careful and risk nothing" was again in force. Judgment had been passed on Makaroff's adventures. They would not be repeated. This was shown clearly in everything around us—in the Viceroy's orders, above all, in the attitude of the leading personages since Admiral Alexeieff had hoisted his flag in the *Sebastopol*, and generally in the talk of the "most obedient servants."

During the night of 30th April, Japanese destroyers appeared in the outer anchorage. They were certainly going to lay out mines. When they were lit up by our searchlights and fired on by our batteries, they beat a hasty retreat, but their task was probably accomplished.



On 3rd May, at 1 a.m., I was awakened by the sound of far-off guns.

Where can this be, and what can be the meaning of it, I thought, and strained my ears. Was it the right or the left flank which was firing? It would be unpleasant to leave one's warm bunk merely to satisfy one's curiosity, and to go up on the bridge in the wet and cold of a dark night. From our place in the West Basin we could under no circumstances take part in an action.

Suddenly the single guns changed into a continuous, rolling thunder. Even through my screened port I could see repeated flashes, sometimes light red, sometimes golden yellow. It was evident that everyone who could was firing. Sleep was now out of the question.

Little was to be seen from the *Diana's* bridge. The edges of Golden Hill, Lighthouse Hill, and Tiger's Tail Peninsula were like the side-slips of a stage. We were the "supers" waiting behind these for the moment when we were to step on the stage, and, like these, could only guess what was being enacted there.

The Japanese were trying for the third time, and with even more desperate pluck than before, to block the entrance to Port Arthur.

The enemy had doubtless heard from their spies that their previous attempts had miscarried, and similarly what measures we had taken against renewed attempts. They knew that they could no longer reach the entrance on a straight course, but would have to follow an artificially winding fairway. What did they do? Under the furious fire of our batteries and guardships they placed destroyers at the turning-points. These showed the "fire-ships" their path.

Eye-witnesses described that the pluck of these boats was simply fabulous. One of these destroyers was blown up by our mines, another was sunk by gun-fire, and probably many were damaged. But they accomplished their task.

The experiences of this war are still too recent and acquired at too great a cost to be made public.

When by and by archives are thrown open, then we shall hear all the details of this attack. For the present I must confine myself to the notes of my diary and the accounts of other eye-witnesses, not more reliable.

The "fire-ships" numbered twelve. Four of these sank, or could not face our fire and fled seawards. Eight held on.

The whole of these eight steamers sank at a distance from the entrance, but two got through all the turns in the fairway and reached the *Chailar*. Fortunately, they did not sink across the fairway; but that was neither their fault nor our merit—but mere chance. In any case, it must be admitted that Makaroff's system of defence against "fire-ships," as elaborated by him in detail and laid down in instructions, had been brilliantly vindicated once more. The coast batteries, guard and defence vessels, all worked splendidly.

The Viceroy was present at this affair on board the *Otvajny*. There was nothing for him to do but listen to the playing of the piece as set to orchestra by the gifted composer, our "Little Grandfather."

A certain class of men afterwards delighted in dilating on the manner in which Admiral Alexeieff had personally directed the repulse of the Japanese block-ships " . . . under the hail of projectiles from the machine guns of these steamers" (*Ruskaya Starina*, April, 1907, p. 71). They are the followers of the Admiral, who admire his talents, historians who attempt to embellish his reports, flowery though they already are. In the interest of truth, I must in the first place state that notwithstanding this hail of projectiles we sustained no losses whatever. If this hail really existed, it was assuredly directed against the nearest adversaries. These were the guard-ships at the booms, the guard-boats, and the batteries of Q.F. guns which had only recently been pushed forward as far as possible, and had been built close to the water's edge.

The *Otvajny* was lying abreast of the second line of defence, between Golden Hill and the entrance to the East Basin. She could not possibly have been exposed to any hail of projectiles. The Viceroy's precious life was never in danger. Outside the *Otvajny* lay the two outer obstructions, the breakwater of sunken vessels, the first line of defence—*Gilyak* and water batteries—and finally a solid boom with torpedo nets, which reached nearly to the bottom. This last obstruction really closed the actual mouth of the harbour.

Moreover, the *Otvajny* lay in the rear part of the entrance, not the outer part. It was hardly possible to observe the march of events from her, let alone to issue orders. That could perhaps at the most have been done from the *Gilyak*; but this vessel lay well forward. To go to her the Viceroy did not consider necessary.

Be this as it may, the entrance, thank God! remained free. The newly sunk "fire-ships" only strengthened the breakwater of submerged vessels which Makoroff had constructed. A further attempt at blocking was thus nearly hopeless.

On 24th February and on 27th March it had been calm, and the survivors of the crews on board the Japanese "blocking ships" had turned to account the general confusion (these forty or fifty men were indeed hardly worth troubling about) and had escaped to sea in small boats. There they were picked up by their cruisers and destroyers. We only picked up some corpses. We buried them with full military honours. (This action was thoroughly appreciated in Japan. Many Japanese realised then that we were, after all, not the Barbarians we had been described as.)

On 3rd May the conditions were quite different. A fresh south-easter was blowing, force 3 to 4. In the roads there was a choppy sea, and a swell outside. It was difficult enough to get out the small, mostly damaged boats and to man them. To pull up against wind and sea was simply impossible.

A portion of the Japanese succeeded in getting such of their boats as had remained intact into the water. They eventually had to beach them and surrender as prisoners. The remainder swam about on wreckage or kept themselves above water by clinging to the masts and funnels of the sunken vessels. These were crying out despairingly for help. I need not say that our steamboats hastened to save the drowning as soon as the action was over. A moment before they had been firing their torpedoes against the enemy; now, for the sake of this same enemy, they risked being dashed to pieces in the seas which were breaking over the sunken vessels.

I should not like to pass over in silence an interesting detail connected with this. The Japanese who were saved by our steamboats were evidently much sobered by their cold bath. On the other hand, those who had reached the shore threw themselves with shouts of "Banzai" half-naked, and quite unarmed as they were, on our men, who were running to their assistance. Naturally, our soldiers and bluejackets never thought of using their arms under such conditions. They threw away their pistols and took on the "mad Japanese" with their fists, laughing and joking. Some of these Japanese had to be secured with ropes; they were not to be subdued. Perhaps there was a good reason for this. When, prompted by curiosity, we went over the former "fire-ships" which had been sunk, we were astonished at the large number of half-empty brandy bottles we found on board. This discovery was all the more extraordinary as the Japanese are a most sober people. Their national beverage, *saké*, is not stronger than our ordinary beer, and is drunk out of tiny cups. This showed that not even Japanese nerves could face the truly hellish situation the "fire-ships" found themselves in when making for their goal. The Japanese were inebriated with patriotism and the joy of victory, but this had evidently to be supplemented with alcohol.

This discovery spread everywhere by unknown means with extraordinary rapidity. It helped considerably to raise the spirits of our crews. The majority of our men consider it to be as great a sin to drink spirits on the eve of battle as before going to Holy Communion. They often refuse to drink their Government spirit ration when they are having their dinners in sight of the enemy.

"That's not the way of doing things," said Petty Officer Tkatcheff, in his mess. "You should face God pure as a candle burning before a shrine. Think of your oath!"<sup>1</sup>

I confess we officers plucked up courage when we heard remarks such as these. We gained fresh hopes. Were we not bound to succeed if we all were like "candles before a shrine?"

At daybreak on 3rd May the Japanese squadron hove in sight. We prepared to be bombarded. The signal went up "to stand by to fight at anchor"—that, is, we were to reply in like

<sup>1</sup> All Russian soldiers and sailors are sworn in on entering the Service.

manner to their high-angle fire. No bombardment, however, took place.

The first confused but ominous rumours of the battle of the Yalu now reached Port Arthur. Our losses were reported to have amounted to two thousand men and twenty guns. We could not believe this. Had the Japanese really landed there, and had we kept so bad a lookout? Our guns in their hands? How could this be possible? Should we have to pull down the column of victory (at St. Petersburg), cast from captured Turkish guns?

On 5th May the whole Japanese squadron was again in sight from Port Arthur all day.

At 11.30 a.m. the Commander-in-Chief's flag was struck on board the *Sebastopol*, and a rear-admiral's flag took its place. Admiral Vityeft took command of the squadron. The Viceroy went off to Mukden. For some days already a special train had been waiting at New Hill. However, we had got quite accustomed to the sight, and thought the train was only there for any emergency. The Viceroy left so suddenly that many of our leading personages only heard of his departure after he had gone. Of course, His Excellency was not escorted solemnly to the train. It was even said that some of the gentlemen on Alexeieff's staff, who happened to be absent that morning, had not caught the "special," and had to follow on later.

I cannot say that this obvious flight made any strong impression on the squadron. Some of us were even quite pleased. But all saw in this an alarming symptom; one avoided discussing it aloud. All conversations in the mess were quickly spread amongst the men by the servants. But we were living in times when we were bound to pay close attention to the spirits of our people. The more detailed news from the north, from Turentchen—the heroic attack of the 11th Rifle Regiment, the high percentage of losses—some-what softened the effect of the first bad impressions. We were beaten, but had no need to be ashamed.

The historians I have already mentioned state: "On 5th May the Viceroy, in accordance with the Emperor's orders, handed over the command of the squadron to Rear-Admiral Vityeft and proceeded from Port Arthur to Mukden, accompanied by his staff." And again: "Events now followed one another in rapid succession. On 6th May it was already known that the Japanese had landed at Pitsevo, N.W. of the Elliot Islands, at the same spot where, in the war with China, they had landed some batteries of mortars." In consequence of this the Viceroy telegraphed to Vityeft, already on 6th May, whilst still on his journey, that is, at Van-fan-gou: "Destroyer attacks against the enemy's transports very advisable, and very important for the defence of the fortress. The enemy's transports are all now within the radius of action of our destroyers."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>*Ruskaya Starina*, April-May, 1907.

How disastrous for Russia that this excellent idea of preventing a Japanese landing had only occurred to the Viceroy when he was at Van-fan-gou, where he was out of range of the Japanese guns, and no longer able personally to lead a risky undertaking! We at Port Arthur knew, of course, that "events were following one another in rapid succession"; yet not so rapidly but that the Japanese intention of landing at Pitsevo only reached Port Arthur after the Viceroy had departed thence, "in accordance with the Emperor's orders." We knew very well that this order of the Emperor's was merely an approval of his suggestion. (Telegraph secrets are on oath, but they sometimes leak out.) The Japanese had been preparing quite openly since 28th April to land at Pitsevo, utilising the Elliot and Blonde Islands as bases. They placed booms across the narrow passages and mines in the wider ones—all in the direction of Port Arthur. By 4th May they had advanced with these protective measures within seven miles of Pitsevo. It was quite clear where they were going to land. In view of this situation the Viceroy asked "most humbly and respectfully" what he was to do. Was he to remain in Port Arthur, which might be cut off any moment, or proceed to Mukden? This was the most favourable moment for preventing the free development of the Japanese operations. The Viceroy was, in the first place, the Admiral, and should have been at the head of his fleet. His flight did not take place in consequence of the Emperor's orders, but with the Emperor's permission, which he had asked for. That is a very different thing.

On 6th May the Japanese effected their landing. The railway was destroyed. We offered no resistance.

A little later it was found that this had only been a flying column of the Japanese. Railway communication was re-established. Two more large trains with war material arrived from the north; in truth, they were lucky enough just to slip through. The Japanese squadron was daily in sight of Port Arthur. The Chinese reported that something like seventy vessels were lying off Pitsevo. The Japanese apparently were still in doubt whether to disembark definitely. They did not know whether they had actually blocked up Port Arthur at their last attempt, or whether our inactivity was only to be explained by our intention to await the most favourable moment and to fall upon them when their disembarkation was in full swing.

Suppressed indignation prevailed throughout the squadron, and grew from day to day. As a matter of fact, we still had available three undamaged battleships,<sup>1</sup> one armoured, three first-class, and one second class protected cruisers, four gunboats and over twenty destroyers. With this force we could unquestionably have undertaken something against the disembarkation which was taking place only 60 miles from us. In the officers' messes a plan to that effect was being eagerly dis-

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<sup>1</sup> The *Sebastopol's* damages had not prevented her from getting out on the 18th March and 10th April (that is, under Makaroff).



cussed. The spring weather frequently brought fogs. This might have been turned to account. We should have gone out as far as possible without being seen, destroyed the fleet of transports, and at once returned to Port Arthur. Of course, we should not have got off without fighting. The Japanese would have made every possible effort to prevent our safe return. We should have had to break out through the blockade of our own port. It was a matter of course that we should have suffered severely. But damages from gun-fire are always less serious than those from mines or torpedoes. We should have made good the former in greater part without dock or cofferdam. As soon as the *Tsesarevitch*, *Retvisan*, and *Pobieda* were repaired, we could therefore have been up to our full numbers once more. If the battle were to end in our being decisively defeated and our main forces annihilated, it would cost the Japanese dearly. They would have been forced to stay away for a considerable time and get their ships thoroughly repaired. Meanwhile their disembarked army would have been in a sorry plight. From the number of transports we estimated the force to consist of thirty thousand men. These would have been left without provisions or land transport. The Japanese would have been obliged to fall back on the Yalu to join hands with their army operating in these regions.

So as to calm the general excitement, the "higher circles" started the rumour that our inactivity was part of General Kuropatkin's plan of operations. It was even said that the General had asked the Viceroy not to interfere with the landing of the Japanese to the eastward of Port Arthur, as he feared a landing at Niutchwán. Of course, no one could doubt our being victorious on land. The statement of a great general was cited to the effect that he knew of twelve different methods of landing an army, but not one of re-embarking it after a repulse. It was maintained that it would be better not to risk our ships just now. The squadron must be saved up for the moment when the Japanese were not to be allowed to return. The well-known maxim of "be careful and risk nothing" somewhat discredited these rumours. Still, no other explanation was forthcoming.

We all knew that the day before his departure the Viceroy had held a conference with the principal commanders. Its decisions were kept secret. One point, however, soon became known: the arming of the new batteries on the land front with ships' guns. A little later an order to that effect appeared. Our excitement was to be calmed by the explanation that only the guns of the damaged battleships were to be used. Moreover, this was only to be a temporary measure, whilst the ships concerned were under repair. It was not quite easy to believe all this.

On the 7th or 8th of May (I don't know the exact date, as I did not note it down) a meeting of the principal naval and military commanders, under the presidency of Stoessel, took place on board the *Sebastopol*. When our captain returned on board he told us nothing about the meeting. (This is why

my diary does not contain the day and hour of this wretched event.) But on the morning of the 9th it all came out, as the orderly brought off the minutes of the proceedings, signed by all participants. This fateful document had not even been put into an envelope. Any and everybody, down to the writers and orderlies, could become acquainted with its contents. On the morning of the 9th it was brought on board the *Diana*. The captain being still asleep, I received the document. When I had opened it I had the misfortune to read what was afterwards known in the squadron as the "Great Edict of Renunciation by the Navy." The following is a verbatim quotation from my diary: "May 9.—I have accidentally read the minutes of the famous meeting. We have destroyed ourselves. What a disgrace! Thank God! two have not signed this infamy."

The minutes commenced with a statement to the effect that the squadron was momentarily in such a situation that active enterprises had no chance of success. On these grounds, therefore, all its means must be utilised for the defence of Port Arthur until better times came round again.

The spirits of all afloat were extremely depressed. They were not much better than on the day of Makaroff's death. Our last hopes vanished.

No doubt it was presumptuous, but I could not help it. I asked the captain for an explanation. How was it possible? How could anyone sign such a resolution? The captain was not in a very talkative mood. None the less, he did not hesitate to enlighten me. He said that the meeting was a mere matter of form. The Viceroy had ordered everything himself at a council of war the day before his departure. The minutes had only been drafted as a matter of form. The instructions left behind by the Viceroy were clear enough. They prescribed the programme of our future activity. *Adventures à la Makaroff* must cease, in all service matters, etc., etc. (see above).

"But why does it not appear anywhere that all this was simply *ordered* by the Viceroy? Why this comedy of the council of war? On these minutes of the proceedings the most important signature, the Viceroy's, is missing; his name is not even mentioned. Such as it now stands this paper will in the end be your 'charge sheet.'"

The captain's reply was not very clear. His contention was that when things were ordered, discussions were superfluous. A protest would anyhow not have produced any effect.

There were some who did not believe that the decision of the council of war had been laid down beforehand by the Viceroy. I can only say that all those who were present at these meetings had only one idea—how to guess aright "His Excellency's" views. That was the fault of the moral atmosphere created by Alexeieff. He who interpreted them aright was fortunate. He who tried his best but did not succeed was treated with indulgence. But if anyone dared to have an opinion of his own, it was best to put a cross before his name.<sup>1</sup> When the

<sup>1</sup> The usual abbreviation for the defunct.

fortress and the squadron had been taken so completely by surprise by the events of the first days of the war, all our leaders were in a state of uncertainty and fear. They were in fear, not as to the fate of the fortress or the squadron, but as to their own fate, which absolutely and solely depended on "his" views of these events and "his" manner of twisting things. One of the principal reasons for the enthusiasm with which Makaroff was received was that from that moment the various commanders had no more need to break their heads over the question: "What is the Viceroy thinking?"

From December, 1899, the moment at which Admiral Alexeieff arrived at Port Arthur, the defeat of our squadron was being prepared. Alexeieff turned our ships into floating barracks, and stifled in the crews every particle of enterprise, of initiative. The power which this man wielded was great, and subject to no control whatever. He used it to force upon men, who in action later on proved themselves to be both brave and able, the conviction that it was quite useless even to attempt to influence any of his decisions—nay, more: that to hold views differing from his was a crime.

This hypnotic state lasted for many years. The feeling of repression under which the squadron lived during the Viceroy's presence was so great that it eventually crept into our flesh and blood. We felt it for a long time, long after Admiral Alexeieff had fled, long after Port Arthur had been besieged and cut off from the rest of the world.

*(To be continued.)*

## THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA, 1808-14.

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VALUABLE NOTES FROM RECENTLY DISCOVERED DIARIES OF THE  
WAR, NOW BEING PUBLISHED IN "EL IMPARCIAL," OF  
MADRID.

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*Précis by Major-General J. C. DALTON, R.A.*

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### I.

THE well-known Spanish journal *El Imparcial* has been for some time publishing in its Monday issues (commencing 8th March, 1909) a series of highly interesting historical extracts from manuscript diaries referring to the War of Independence (1808-14), which have kindly been sent to me as they appeared by the compiler, Major D. Juan Arzadun, of the Spanish Artillery, an officer who has already made his mark as an eloquent writer on historical subjects.

The articles in question are prefaced by a scholarly and interesting preamble by the well-known writer and Academician, D. Jacinto Octavio Picón, who pays a deserved tribute to the Editor of the manuscripts and to the historical value of the contents.


D. Juan Arzadun has had the good fortune to discover the whereabouts of these precious documents, which have lain idle and unnoticed for 100 years in the archives of the noble family of the Dukes of Ahumada at Ronda. They consist of five volumes of documents collected by the distinguished Spanish General, D. Pedro Augustin Girón (nephew of Marshal Castaños, hero of Bailen), who played an important part in the War of Independence, his first experience of that war being on the 7th June, 1808, when he took part in the defence of the bridge of Alcolea and witnessed the infamous sack of Cordova by the French under Dupont. General Castaños conferred on his nephew the rank of Major-General, and entrusted him with the organisation of the infantry of the hastily improvised army with which within a few weeks Castaños had defeated the enemy and captured the entire French force at Bailen.<sup>1</sup> The honour of conveying the news to the local government at Seville fell to General Girón. During the

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<sup>1</sup> See account of this battle in "Journal of the Royal Artillery Institution," February, 1909. This was written before these MSS. were known of, and though it is not now proposed to dwell at length on the account of the battle, which is well described in Oman's "Peninsular War," anything new will be noted, especially as regards the preliminaries before the battle. A sketch map has been made to render the account more clear.—J.C.D.

whole war, General Girón preserved all important documents which came into his hands, including original plans of battles, parade states of the forces engaged, lists of casualties, orders for operations, etc., and innumerable facts which are invaluable to the historian as supplying gaps in the national archives. All are freely explained and annotated in proper sequence.

These manuscripts include packets of original letters from well-known generals such as Santocildes, España, Morillo, Castaños, etc., who in their private and friendly correspondence express frankly and often with professional severity their views as regards their quarrels, dissensions, and partialities. In the opinion of Major Arzadun, the bulk of these documents appeals chiefly to a special class of reader only; but there are moments when from these sheets of paper which have become yellow



from age, there emanate thrilling accounts of fights, enterprises, episodes, and adventures which bring to light intensely interesting facts hitherto unknown, and shed a splendour and halo around men and things of that epoch. Surely these should interest the general public? To this query D. Jacinto Picón has no hesitation in replying in the affirmative. Such records must inspire a proper spirit in the people of his country, consoling them for much that may have distressed them, checking any tendency to pessimism and affording encouraging food for



thought. They shed lustre, though tardily, on the names of many modest men who sacrificed themselves heroically; they show the important part played by the "juntas," local authorities, and organisations whose efforts remain so far unknown. They also show up many fallacies hitherto credited, which it is high time should be dissipated.

Space does not permit me to dwell as long as I should like to on the eloquent and instructive preamble of D. Jacinto Picón, so entirely temperate and carefully balanced; but I recommend my readers to read it for themselves in the issue of the *Imparcial* of the 8th March, 1909. The compiler of the manuscripts, Major Arzadun, attaches much value to them for the light they throw on the work of the army and on its admirable self-abnegation in its efforts to repel the invader.

## II.

D. Pedro Augustin Girón was eldest son of Lieut.-General Jerónimo, third Marques de las Amarillas, a worthy scion of a race of soldiers. He was early educated to war, as he served as A.D.C. to his father from the age of fifteen. At the age of twenty the King promoted him to captain in recognition of the services of the father, and his whole life was thenceforward devoted to the study of his profession in peace and war, including an expedition to the Balearic Islands, the defence of Galicia against the English, the campaign of 1801 in Portugal, defence of Cadiz against the attacks of the British fleets, and in the expedition to Portugal under the Marques del Socorro. On the 2nd of June, 1808, he was ordered to Cordova to oppose the advance of the French General Dupont, and, as stated above, Girón defended the bridge of Alcolea. His conduct may be judged from an intercepted despatch from Dupont to Napoleon: "The Spanish troops of the line who defended the bridge of Alcolea rivalled in valour and discipline the valiant legions of Your Majesty." Promoted three days later by his uncle, General Castaños, to major-general, he was responsible for the organisation of the infantry which took part in the glorious victory of Bailen (19th June, 1808), though he personally was not in the action. This brilliant episode, which promised so much, was, however, unfortunately succeeded by the overwhelming disasters of Ciudad Rodrigo, Almonacid, and Ocaña, which were redeemed to some extent by Girón at Aranjuez, where he checked the French General Sebastiani in his attempt to force the passage of the Tagus, and at Arroyo Molinos. Finally, after being entrusted with the reorganisation of three armies, his army of Galicia, in conjunction with that of the Duke of Wellington, drove the French across the Bidassoa, and the brave leader reaped the reward of his labours in the successes which followed, culminating in the decisive victory of Vittoria.

The letters and papers selected by Major Arzadun for the purpose of this series of articles bear clear evidence of Girón's

absolute disregard of self, his determination not to be discouraged by lack of food, clothing, and munitions of war, or by the disasters reported on all sides, and of his ardent patriotism. His righteous indignation at the incompetency of the Regency was fully shared by Wellington. Girón's remark, on hearing of the disgraceful surrender of 18,000 men under the Spanish leader Blake at Valencia, was: "Never mind, keep ever advancing, and we shall come out at the end with our own."

Though Girón could not bear to complain, he was driven to desperation by the ill-treatment accorded to the army he loved, and from his headquarters at Rueda he addressed, on the 4th November, 1812, the following eloquent remonstrance to the Regency: " . . . . I should deceive Your Highness did I pretend that reliance can be placed on an army administered in this manner. It is vain to assemble men and take steps to discipline them if from the first they are forced by hunger to quit their colours in order to seek, either in their homes or elsewhere, the nourishment which is indispensable to them, and which cannot be given them in the army. Force of will is arrested, owing to physical privations, at a line which human nature cannot pass.

"The allied army united to ours has enjoyed abundance during all this time, and our soldiers associated with the English on the field have been forced to endure hunger and misery whilst in full view of their allies' abundance and opulence. This aggravates the situation and wounds the spirit even more than the body.

"I should be wanting in my duty if I did not say frankly that if the nation thinks she can have an army which she neither clothes, pays or feeds, and which in consequence cannot be trained or disciplined or kept robust and content, she makes a fatal mistake, of which ample evidence will constantly be cropping up."

And the famous leader signed the above virile protest with his full name, prefixing the initial "C."—that of a lady—reminding one of the chivalry of the middle ages:—

"C. Pedro Augustin Girón."

All the archives of the Supreme Junta (which virtually assumed the functions of Regency in Seville) were lost when the French entered Seville. The President of the Junta, D. Francisco de Saavedra, had, however, regularly kept a diary, which by some mischance disappeared when he retired to the Isla de Leon. After careful enquiry, General Girón succeeded in recovering this valuable document, and from it are extracted the facts relating to the genesis of the memorable campaign in Andalusia, the great success of which was afterwards neutralised by unpardonable slackness and incompetency.

When on the 26th May, 1808, the people heard of the renunciation of his rights by the King, Carlos IV., at Bayonne, they at once proceeded to seize arms from the Maestranza at

Seville and proclaimed an insurrection, and on the following day congregated armed in the Plaza San Francisco, swore allegiance to Fernando VII. as King of Spain and the Indies, declared war against the Emperor of the French, deposed all the existing authorities, and reappointed from them and others a Junta composed of twenty-four persons.

This Junta is ridiculed because it assumed the title of Supreme; but this may be pardoned from the fact that Andalusia was, of all Spain, the only province as yet uninvaded and mistress of her own affairs, and she looked on it as her sacred duty to initiate the re-conquest of her country.

The cosmopolitan nature of the composition of the Junta is remarkable. As President it elected the illustrious Councillor of State, D. Francisco de Saavedra, whose services were well known and appreciated. The clergy were represented by the Archbishop, the Dean of the Cathedral, a Canon and two monks; the army by three field marshals; the nobility by three titles of Castile and two caballeros; the city by four members of the municipality; commerce by two merchants of high repute, and so on, the secretary being an officer of artillery. Soon, as was natural, the field-m Marshals had to go, called to higher duties, and in order to have a high official whom the Junta might consult on military matters, the brigadier-general of artillery, D. Vicente Maturana was elected, whose health did not admit of active work in the field, and he acted as adjutant-general to the Junta. It may seem strange at first sight that the Junta should have selected an invalid general as the sole military representative on a Council whose first duty consisted in organising an army; but in the opinion of Major Arzadun this was in reality an advantage, as it meant that it reduced to a minimum the influence and interference which an assembly of civilians might exert as regards the army, and left the General Commanding-in-Chief practically a free hand. Unfortunately, this most prudent line of conduct was abandoned later with disastrous consequences. One of the first acts of the "Junta Suprema" was to decree obligatory service, the only exemptions being "physical impossibility." All the veterans of the army and provincial militias were called in, and they elected as Commander-in-Chief the Marques del Socorro, Governor of Cadiz, but the messenger sent to Cadiz on the 28th May to announce the appointment returned on the 30th to Seville, reporting that the unfortunate general had fallen a victim to duty in the disturbances in Cadiz. The Junta lost no time, and that same night Castaños, then Governor of the Campo of San Roque, was offered the appointment, and his acceptance was known in Seville on the 31st. Matters could hardly have been more expeditiously arranged, even in the present days of railways and electric telegraphs.

The French General Dupont was expected to be through the passes of the Sierra Morena at the head of 16,000 (really 13,000) men by June, 1809, and though he was delayed in Carolina

owing to the unexpected hostile attitude of the people, he seemed resolved to hurry on to Cordova, so as to arrive in Seville on the 8th, according to Murat's orders.

In face of this imminent danger, besides accelerating the assembly of the veteran and other forces, the Junta reinforced D. Pedro de Echevarri, who commanded some detachments of troops in the Sierra, with the 3rd Division of provincial Grenadiers and a half battalion of Campo Mayor, which, on its retirement from Portugal, was now in Ronda. From the artillery park at Seville there were sent post haste eight guns under Captain Caceres, who later distinguished himself in the battle of Bailen.

According to the personal testimony of General Girón, the bridge of Alcolea was, on the evening of the 6th June, occupied by the 1,400 men above mentioned (under Echevarri) with two guns well placed, this force being strengthened by some improvised battalions of peasants under the command of D. Joaquin de la Chica, colonel of Grenadiers. The balance of the numerous but untrained civilian force was placed in position at "Cuesta de la Lancha," between the bridge and Cordova.

For want of time and means, the defensive works were limited to a bridge-head large enough to take 60 men on the parapet.

The defenders well knew that they could not expect, with such limited forces, to prevent the passage of the river, which at that time of the year was easily fordable almost anywhere; but any attempt to retire would have been misconstrued by the masses of people assembled there, who would treat it as cowardly.

At 4 a.m. on the 7th June the enemy opened fire from twelve guns for an hour and a half on the feeble defences. "Ours replied without intermission, and our troops endured the fire with the utmost *sang-froid*, although it was accurate and at short range." The first attack was gallantly repulsed by Campo Mayor's fifty men under Captain D. Rafael Lasale, who defended the bridge-head; but the attacking column being reinforced and persistent, a retirement was necessitated.

The two battalions of Grenadiers situated on the left of the bridge and the rest of Campo Mayor's men on the right succeeded in retarding the enemy from cover of adjacent houses, but, greatly outnumbered, "they retired in excellent order and saving their guns, which had remained in action till the last moment."

At 1,500 paces from the bridge the troops re-formed in order of battle in rear guard formation, but were ordered by Echevarri to first of all take up a position adjoining a house called "Monton de tierra," and later at the "Cuesta de la Lancha," which was accomplished in good order. Unfortunately the attitude of the irregular levies did not correspond with the enthusiasm of which they showed themselves possessed. On the other hand, the

firmness of the exiguous force of Regulars brought home to Dupont the dangers of his hazardous enterprise.

In the Council of War assembled by Echevarri on the occasion of the orderly retreat to Cuesta de la Lancha, Lieut.-Colonel D. Pedro A. Girón, of the Grenadiers, as the junior, had to speak first, and expressed himself as follows: "That considering the small number of veteran troops which they could oppose to the enemy, and to the uselessness of the peasant levies in the open, they should retire within the enceinte of Cordova, because behind the walls of a city every brave man is a soldier. He reminded his hearers of the recent defence of Buenos Ayres, and urged that with a vigorous and determined resistance they would give time to unite the forces under the command of General Castaños, which form the army of Andalusia, and that time was what they wanted to gain at all costs." Girón's opinion was shared by the other brigadiers, and Echevarri gave orders accordingly.

Unfortunately the close proximity of the enemy produced in the irregulars the usual effects of indiscipline, and led them to the conclusion that though their patriotism had assembled them there, it was never intended that they should be trusted, except when behind parapets.

The veteran corps pursued their retirement quietly, preceded by the guns, but on arriving at the gates of Cordova these were shut against them. The unfortunate Cordovese thought thus to avoid the horrors of the sack of which they were to become victims. In vain did they at last open them under threats; it was already too late to prepare the defence, and the brave soldiers could do no more than pass through the city, abandoning it to its sad fate.

When the news of this natural contingency reached Seville, "an inexplicable panic ensued. Already everyone expected to see Dupont at their gates at the head of his legions. This was confirmed by a threatening letter from Dupont informing them, amongst other things, that no alternative remained to the insurgent Junta in Seville between the halter or flight."

It is much to the credit of the Junta that it continued calmly to carry out its plans, making renewed efforts to assemble troops from Cadiz and Ronda to the number of 10,000 men, who were encamped on the great plain of Tablada.

It seemed only natural that Dupont should quickly fall on Seville. In expectation of his advance, a messenger was in readiness to be despatched to Puerto de Santa Maria to the English General Spencer, asking for assistance, when news of the enemy was brought by a spy which at once calmed the public mind and gave fresh confidence to the impressionable Sevillanos.

This news was not to the effect that reinforcements had unexpectedly arrived, or that the Spanish arms had achieved a success. It was the news of the horrors, the rapine, and sacrilege committed by the French in Cordova, and it sufficed



to calm the minds and stiffen the resolution of the people of Seville!

In the words of Saavedra, "We understood from that moment that we had to face an enemy who thought of self-interest before glory."

A nation which, in such critical moments, can feel contempt for an enemy is in a fair way towards overcoming him.

### III.

#### THE PRELIMINARIES BEFORE BAILÉN.

To restore confidence in Seville after the shock of Alcolea, Castaños entered the city on the 9th of June at the head of a few battalions of veterans. The Junta, in consultation with him, proceeded at once to form a plan to reorganise the army. The President of the Council, Saavedra, had served in the army, and his military knowledge added to the value of his proved statesmanship.

Briefly, the agreement come to was not to dismember the budding army of some 24,000 men, including 3,000 cavalry, but, whilst avoiding the formation of new corps, to strengthen the existing ones by enthusiastic recruits. Drill and instruction were to be proceeded with vigorously from dawn to nightfall, and skilled engineers and others were to reconnoitre ground for possible defensive positions and camps. Meanwhile, should Dupont show signs of aggression, the excellent defensive position offered by the Alcores should be availed of.

Rumours of an early advance by Dupont led to a ruse which afterwards produced excellent results. Popular exaggeration had magnified the English force of some 5,000 to 6,000 men, who had disembarked in the Port of Santa Maria, to 20,000. It was easy to convince the French that this was true, since they were already under the firm idea that the revolution in Spain was due to "English gold." As it was desirable to foster this belief, "men were employed to distribute letters, which came into the enemy's hands, in which the inhabitants were informed that in the vicinity of Seville there was already assembled a large army composed of veteran troops drawn from Cadiz and from the force which had retired from Portugal, which would at any moment be reinforced by 15,000 English; that they need have no fears, because two formidable corps were ready to fall on the French. This artifice, which was well carried out and 'supported by other devices,' was eminently successful; it delayed Dupont, intimidated him, and explains the incomprehensible line of conduct which he subsequently adopted. Moreover, these letters had a further reaching effect; they were produced at the court-martial on Dupont on his return to France to answer for his surrender, and saved him from the capital penalty."

The "other devices" referred to above were as follows: Dupont, anxious to prove the truth of the reports which came

to his ears, sent a messenger under a flag of truce to the Spanish camp under the pretext of summoning D. Nazario Reding (Colonel of Swiss in the Spanish service) to return under threat of severe penalties. Colonel Reding had been forced, when in Madrid, to pass over to the French, and had managed to return to his allegiance whilst Dupont was negotiating the passes of the Sierra Morena. It was quite clear that this was only a futile pretext to disguise Dupont's real intention to observe the Spanish forces. "It was manifest that the two *parlementaires*, nominally a corporal and a trumpeter, were men of superior birth and intelligence to those they represented themselves to be." They were received with military precautions and their eyes blindfolded, and whilst being conducted through the camp it was so arranged, by removing the bandages at convenient times, that an impression should be conveyed to them that they were in the midst of a numerous and well-organised army. "They were purposely escorted through the camp of an Irish regiment (one of three in the Spanish service), were allowed to see the scarlet uniforms, and naturally mistook them for English, thereby confirming the rumours which had reached Dupont."

A proof of the deception practised on Dupont is afforded by his letter to Murat, in which he estimates the Regular troops advancing against him at 25,000; and as it was well known in Madrid that there were only 10,000 Spanish Regulars throughout Andalusia, the numbers arrived at could only be obtained by adding the 15,000 imaginary English.

More troops now kept arriving from Ronda and Cadiz, also some cavalry; the Jerez regiment of lancers was completed, and a brilliant regiment of cavalry was formed from the body-guards and Royal Carabineers who had escaped from Madrid, under the title of the "Carabineers of Fernando VII."

The most important decision, however, and one which historians have to some extent overlooked, was that of fixing the headquarters of the army at Utrera, leaving in Carmona only 4,500 veterans under the orders of Brigadier-General the Marques de Coupigné. It required no small moral courage to do this, because by thus leaving open the road from Cordova to Seville, a sudden alarm might at any time so affect the already excitable and timorous populace as to cause them to vent their rancour on the general who was responsible for this action, in which case his life would have for a certainty paid forfeit.

General Girón thus alludes to this subject: "It was decided to show ourselves superior to the popular opinions and delusions which matter so little in time of peace but are so powerful and decisive on occasions of riots and tumult, and the measure now decided on, which would be so simple in times of tranquillity but so risky in time of danger, contributed in no small measure to the success of the campaign."

The Junta lost no means of procuring funds for the army. A considerable sum was raised by subscription in Gibraltar, but in order to pave the way for a loan it was arranged to facilitate the sale of English goods which, under the circumstances of that time, could not prejudice the Spanish factories, and by that means it succeeded in reducing smuggling.

"Seville became converted into a clothing store and workshop, in which thousands of persons of both sexes were constantly at work on uniforms for the army."

To obtain the necessary transport for the advance of the troops, "all who were able sacrificed their carriages," and in a few days horses were collected to complete the attenuated cavalry units which had been robbed of their horses and men to supply the five regiments which accompanied the Marques de Romana to Denmark, and to find 2,000 horses to replace those exacted by Napoleon for the expedition to Portugal. In June, 1808, the cavalry had less than one-third of their men mounted.

By the exertions of Brigadier-General Maturane and other officers, it was possible within a short space of time to despatch to the army three excellent companies of Horse Artillery (the only branch of the corps which in those days had its own horses, the others having to use contract drivers and animals) and also a fine train of Artillery, well provided with all stores and good artificers.

But one main necessity troubled the minds of the zealous organisers. They wanted powder, and it was neither advisable to denude Cadiz, which was badly supplied, nor to rob the navy, "which had but little, and that bad." To provide this chief essential, the Junta summoned D. Pedro Fuertes, "a clever chemist and very active," who, with the very scanty means at his disposal, manufactured a small amount of powder which was tested by the Artillery officers and found to be of good quality. Fortunately other means for obtaining powder came to hand, but this was the origin of the powder factory at Seville, which later did much valuable service.

Serious abuses were discovered in connection with the distribution of the horses which were obtained as gifts or on requisition, and this led to the Junta appointing one of its members to deal with this question, the Marques de Grañina, who was assisted later by a retired officer, "both of incorruptible integrity and great intelligence." And when at the end of 1809 they rendered an account of their work they were found to have distributed through the army 16,439 horses from Seville and its district.

Similarly, care was taken to organise transport, so as to increase the mobility of the army, and ammunition and provision columns were created. Valuable assistance was accorded to the Junta by a German called Ulman, who had much experience of military administration, having served under the Archduke Charles in several campaigns.

The expected advance of the French army was carefully guarded against from one day to another, and defensive measures perfected, until there suddenly came news from the commander of the armed peasants, who were watching the enemy, to the effect "that General Dupont, impressed by the news which he kept receiving of the great strength of the Spanish troops who were concentrating in the vicinity of Seville, and of the English who were marching to join them, considered his position very exposed, and was attempting to retire by the 'los Pedroches' road, but that, finding this road difficult for cavalry and impracticable for artillery, had retired in the direction of Jaen. This retirement was represented as a veritable flight, because Dupont had abandoned his wagons, ammunition, clothing, and other articles of value in the camp at Cordova, had destroyed the bridge of Alcolea in such a hurry that he had left on our side his guerillas, who, to the number of 200, had fallen into the hands of our skirmishers." So great and rapid was the effect produced on him by the simple ruse of the letters!

The most cordial feelings were now established between the brave army and enthusiastic people, and the recruits worked valiantly in order to qualify themselves to fight alongside of such gallant veterans.

General Castaños gratefully acknowledged these efforts, and as the day approached for marching against the immobile enemy, he weighed the progress made, which moreover impressed the English officers who had collected to witness it.

In informing the Junta of this satisfactory state of affairs, the President-energetically affirmed "that nothing must be left to chance which could be allied to prudence," and exhorted all to redouble their efforts, summoned the Artillery Commander, the Marques de Medina, to decide details referring to his branch; the Commissary, Andueza, to expedite the clothing, and so on. In fact, as General Girón writes, "The city of Seville gave me the idea of an immense arsenal, and the road to Utrera was like a fair."

The love of the people for the army at that time was made evident in many and substantial ways. For example, every effort was made to study most minutely "the means for supplying bread and other articles of food of the best quality for the army, for insuring that the troops should always be paid in metal currency, and that purveyors of provisions should receive good treatment, security, and protection."

Such were the simple measures which, during the interminable struggle about to follow, secured to the English abundant maintenance; if this was wanting to the poor Spanish soldiers in those sad years, it was not due to ignorance but to misery.

Wise sanitary precautions as to the dietary of the troops were taken by the Junta, thereby diminishing the risk of dysentery and kindred ailments—a most salutary measure which entailed beneficent results.

*(To be continued.)*

## NAVAL NOTES.

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The following are the principal appointments which have been made:—

**Home.**  
Rear-Admirals—Sir Colin R. Keppel, K.C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O., to be Rear-Admiral in Atlantic Fleet; R. N. Ommaney to be Admiral Superintendent, Chatham Dockyard. Captains—A. Moore, M.V.O., to be "Captain of the Fleet" and Chief of the Staff in the Home Fleet, with rank as Commodore, 1st Class; N. C. Palmer, M.V.O., to be Commodore, 2nd Class, in Command of H.M. Yachts; R. E. Wemyss, M.V.O., to be Commodore, 2nd Class, in Command of R.N. Barracks, Devonport; M. E. Browning, M.V.O., to "Britannia"; Hon. H. G. Brand, M.V.O., to "Drake"; C. M. De Bartolomé to "Indomitable"; W. De Salis, M.V.O., to "Russell"; J. Nicolas to "Flora"; E. W. Wemyss to "Cambrian"; W. H. Cowan, D.S.O., to "Cressy"; R. F. Phillimore to "Aboukir"; R. Y. Tyrwhitt to "Topaze," and as Captain of Destroyers of Portsmouth Destroyer Flotilla; E. H. Grafton to "Terrible"; H. Richmond to "Dreadnought." Commanders—H. J. Marshall to "Proserpine"; H. B. Montagu to "Psyche"; J. G. de O. Coke to "Sentinel"; J. Harvey to "Sphinx"; S. H. Radcliffe to "Pyramus."

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The first-class armoured cruiser *Drake*, flagship of Rear-Admiral the Hon. S. C. J. Colville, C.V.O., C.B., Commanding the First Cruiser Squadron, was paid off on the 26th ult. at Portsmouth, the flag of Rear-Admiral Colville being transferred to the new first-class armoured cruiser *Indomitable*, which becomes the flagship of the squadron. The *Drake* recommissioned on the following day as flagship of the Fifth Cruiser Squadron, Rear-Admiral F. T. Hamilton, C.V.O., Commanding the Squadron, transferring his flag to her from the *Good Hope*, which ship is to be paid off at Portsmouth and undergo a thorough refit.

Commodore E. F. B. Charlton, Commanding the First Destroyer Flotilla, has transferred his broad pennant from the third-class cruiser *Topaze* to the new third-class cruiser *Boadicea*. The *Topaze* paid off on the 9th inst. at Chatham and was recommissioned the following day by Captain R. Y. Tyrwhitt as parent ship of the Portsmouth Destroyer Flotilla.

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*Review of the Home and Atlantic Fleets by the King and the Tsar.*—The Home and Atlantic Fleets were reviewed on the 31st ult. by His Majesty the King off Cowes. The two fleets, which are practically the same as were mustered at Spithead for the visit of the Imperial Press Delegates on the 12th June, were anchored in three main lines, with the heads of the columns towards Cowes, the flagships lying almost abreast of the Royal Yacht. The destroyers and submarines were anchored in six other lines on both sides of the three main columns, as shown in the accompanying chart.





## Home.

The lines were composed as follows:—

Line A.—Battleships: *Dreadnought* (flagship of Admiral Sir W. May, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet), *Bellerophon*, *Superb*, *Téméraire*, *Lord Nelson* (flagship of Rear-Admiral C. J. Briggs), *Agamemnon*, *Irresistible*, *Bulwark*. Cruisers: *Indomitable* (flagship of Rear-Admiral the Hon. S. C. J. Colville, C.V.O., C.B., Commanding First Cruiser Squadron), *Inflexible*, *Invincible*, *Minotaur*, *Defence*, *Isis*, *Dido*.

Line B.—Battleships: *King Edward VII.* (flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir A. B. Milne, Bart., K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Second-in-Command of Home Fleet), *Britannia*, *Hindustan*, *Hibernia* (flagship of Rear-Admiral J. Startin), *New Zealand*, *Commonwealth*, *Africa*. Cruisers: *Shannon* (flagship of Rear-Admiral R. S. Lowry, Commanding Second Cruiser Squadron), *Warrior*, *Cochrane*, *Natal*, *Achilles*, *Juno*, *Talbot*.

Line C.—Battleships: *Prince of Wales* (flagship of Vice-Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., etc., Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet), *Queen*, *Implacable*, *Albion*, *Albemarle* (flagship of Rear-Admiral W. B. Fisher, C.B.), *Formidable*, *Cornwallis*, *Russell*. Cruisers: *Drake* (flagship of Rear-Admiral F. T. Hamilton, C.V.O., Commanding 5th Cruiser Squadron), *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Argyll*, *Leviathan* (flagship of Rear-Admiral A. M. Farquhar, C.V.O., Commanding 4th Cruiser Squadron), *Donegal*, *Berwick*, *Arrogant*.

Line D.—Scouts, etc.: *Boadicea* (broad pennant of Commodore E. F. B. Charlton), *Adventure*, *Pathfinder*, *Blenheim* (depôt ship), *Cyclops* (depôt ship), and eleven destroyers.

Line E.—Scouts, etc.: *Sapphire*, *Skirmisher*, *Forward*, *Blake* (depôt ship), *Assistance* (depôt ship), and fifteen destroyers.

Line F.—Submarines, etc.: *Vulcan*, *Hazard*, *Thames*, *Bonaventure*, (depôt ship), and twenty-one submarines.

North of Line D.—Eleven destroyers.

North of Line E.—Eleven destroyers.

South of Line F.—Twenty-one submarines.

Lines A, B, C, and D were moored (ships in the order named) north of Ryde Middle Shoals, the three flagships, *Dreadnought*, *King Edward VII.*, and *Prince of Wales*, being approximately north of Old Castle Point. Line A being the southern line, the lines extending to the eastward towards Stokes Bay.

Their Majesties arrived from Goodwood on the afternoon of the 30th and slept on board the Royal Yacht.

At 11.30 a.m. on the 31st, the *Victoria and Albert* left Portsmouth Harbour and anchored at the Motherbank. At 2.30 p.m. the Royal Yacht weighed again and, preceded as usual by the Trinity Yacht *Irene* and three destroyers, steamed towards the fleet, entering between the lines B and C at 2.45, under a Royal Salute, while the ships were dressed and manned. The *Victoria and Albert* was followed by the Royal Yachts *Alexandra* and *Alberta*; then came the *Enchantress*, flying the Admiralty flag; the *Fire Queen*, flying the flag of Admiral A. Fanshawe, Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth, and the *Adriatic*, with the Members of the Lords and Commons. Having arrived at the western extremity the Royal flotilla turned and steamed eastward again between the lines B and A, and then turning to the westward steamed

## Home.

between the line A and the Isle of Wight, as shown in the chart, finally anchoring abeam of the *Dreadnought*. A spectacular display by destroyers and submarines was then made by an attack on the *Dreadnought* and her sister ships, which brought the proceedings to a close, after which the Royal Yacht proceeded to her moorings in Cowes Roads.

On Monday, the 2nd inst., the fleet was reviewed by the Tsar on his arrival to visit the King. The Imperial Yacht *Standart*, which was accompanied by the smaller yacht *Polar Star* and the Russian armoured cruisers *Rurik* and *Admiral Makaroff*, with two destroyers, the *Emir Bukharske* and *Moskvitjanin*, and escorted by a French squadron, consisting of the armoured cruisers *Marseillaise* (flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Auvert, Commanding the Atlantic Division of the French Northern Squadron), *Amiral-Gueydon*, *Amiral-Aube*, and *Dupetit-Thouars*, with ten destroyers, was met in the Channel, half-way between Cherbourg and Spithead, by the armoured cruisers *Indomitable* (flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Colville), *Inflexible*, and *Invincible*, who took over the escort duty from the French ships. These, on the approach of the English squadron, altered course to return to Cherbourg, firing a Royal Salute as they did so. The British escort simultaneously altered course so as to take station ahead of the *Standart*; at the same time the ships were manned and a Royal Salute fired, which was immediately returned by the Russian cruisers astern of the Imperial Yacht, course being then shaped for the return to Spithead and Cowes.

About ten minutes to 11 the *Victoria and Albert*, with the King and Queen and other members of the Royal Family on board, slipped from her moorings and with the Trinity Yacht *Irene* preceding her, steamed towards Spithead. As she entered the lines of the battleships, between the *Dreadnought* and *King Edward VII.*, the ships were manned and a Royal Salute fired. Having passed through the lines, the yacht anchored off Ryde to await the arrival of the Tsar, which took place shortly after noon, the *Standart* anchoring in close proximity to the Royal Yacht, the other Russian ships anchoring in the vicinity. At 12.30 p.m., the King and Queen, accompanied by the Prince and Princess of Wales and other members of the Royal Family, proceeded on board the *Standart* and welcomed their Imperial Majesties to England, returning then, accompanied by the Emperor and Empress, to the *Victoria and Albert*. After luncheon, about 3.15 p.m., the *Victoria and Albert* weighed, and preceded by three destroyers and the *Irene*, and followed by the *Standart*, *Polar Star*, and the two Russian cruisers and destroyers, she passed through the lines, following the same course round the fleet as on the previous Saturday, then steering direct back to her moorings off Cowes, closely followed by the *Standart*, which made fast to a buoy prepared for her a little to the east, the *Polar Star* and the cruisers anchoring in line with the *Enchantress*, north of the fairway. During the review the King stood on the bridge of the yacht with the Tsar alongside him.

On the morning of the following day (3rd inst.) the fleet dispersed, the *Bellerophon* only remaining to act as guardship during the remainder of the King's stay at Cowes, with the three armoured cruisers *Indomitable*, *Inflexible*, and *Invincible*, on which three ships again devolved the duty of escorting the Tsar safely out of English waters when he took his departure on the afternoon of Thursday, the 5th inst. At half-past three on that

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day, after the race for the cups which the Tsar had presented was finished, the *Standart* slipped from her buoy, and under a salute from the *Bellerophon*, which was returned by the *Admiral Makaroff*, proceeded eastward through Spithead, the three English cruisers leading, followed by the *Standart*, the *Polar Star*, the *Admiral Makaroff*, and the *Rurik*, the two Russian destroyers taking up their position one on each beam of the Imperial Yacht, and by five o'clock all the vessels had disappeared from view at Spithead to the eastward.

*The Fleet in the Thames.*—On Saturday, the 17th ult., after the conclusion of the tactical exercises which followed the manoeuvres, the Home and Atlantic Fleets arrived in the Thames, where they remained until the following Friday. The battleships and large cruisers were anchored between Southend and the Nore, the 1st Division of the Home Fleet, with the ships of the 1st Cruiser Squadron, being anchored in single line, the *Dreadnought*, at the head, being off Southend pier. Farther out, in two lines, lay the 2nd Division of the Home Fleet and the Atlantic Fleet, with the armoured cruisers of the 2nd, 4th, and 5th Cruiser Squadrons. The smaller protected cruisers, the scouts, with 4 destroyers, 6 torpedo boats, and 6 submarines, were distributed up the river at different points from Gravesend as far as the Houses of Parliament, off which were moored four of the submarines; below Westminster Bridge were moored four first-class torpedo boats and two more submarines; below London Bridge lay the *Hazard*, four destroyers and the scout *Skirmisher*; between Greenwich and Woolwich came the third-class cruiser *Sapphire*, the three scouts *Forward*, *Adventure*, and *Pathfinder*, and the third-class cruiser *Topaze* in Barking Reach. Lower down the river, off Erith, was the second-class cruiser *Talbot*, and finally between Greenhithe and Gravesend came the second-class cruisers *Dido*, *Isis*, *Juno*, *Arrogant*, and *Venus*. The remaining destroyers and submarines, with their parent ships, and the two fleet repair ships *Cyclops* and *Assistance*, attached respectively to the two divisions of the Home Fleet, lay with the main body of the fleet off Southend.

On Tuesday, 20th ult., an official visit was paid to the Fleet at Southend by the Lord Mayor of London, the Lords of the Admiralty being also present in the Admiralty Yacht *Enchantress*. On Wednesday 40 officers and 1,200 men, with six field guns, proceeded to London, and after marching through some of the principal streets in the City, officers and men were entertained at lunch at the Guildhall by the Lord Mayor. On Thursday the Lord Mayor also entertained at lunch at the Guildhall Admiral Sir W. May and 500 officers of the Fleet. On Saturday, the 24th, the Fleet left the Thames.

**Austria-Hungary.**

*Naval Estimates for 1909.*—The Ordinary Budget for the coming year amounts to 58,987,310 kronen (£2,457,805), showing an increase of 5,464,200 kronen (£227,675) over 1908; and the Extraordinary Estimates amount to 4,450,550 kronen (£185,349), showing an increase of 973,660 kronen (£40,569) as compared with last year, making a grand total of 63,437,860 kronen (£2,643,244) for both Budgets, or an increase of 6,437,860 kronen (£268,244).

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The principal items of the Ordinary Budget are as follows:—

	Kronen.	£	s.
Pay of officers, etc. ... ..	5,708,420	=	(237,851 0)
Pay of petty officers and seamen, with clothing ...	5,030,000		(209,583 0)
Land service.. ... ..	2,532,590		(105,525 0)
Sea „ ... ..	6,787,010		(282,792 0)

*Establishments:—*

Hydrographical Office and Naval Library .. ..	101,850		(4,244 0)
Naval Academy ... ..	279,620		(11,651 0)
„ lower-grade schools ... ..	6,190		(258 0)
„ hospitals ... ..	320,380		(13,349 0)

*Maintenance of the Fleet:—*

Dockyards, repairs, and matériel ... ..	10,717,150		(446,548 0)
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*New Ships and Machinery:—*

Battle-ship I. <i>Radetsky</i> , 14,500 tons ... ..	6,000,000		(250,000 0)
„ II. <i>Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand</i> , 14,500 } tons ... ..	3,000,000		(125,000 0)
„ III. <i>Zrinyi</i> 14,500 tons ... ..	2,000,000		(83,333 0)
Second-class cruiser Ersatz <i>Zara</i> , 3,500 tons ...	2,000,000		(83,333 0)
12 Torpedo Boats, 100 tons ... ..	1,000,000		(41,667 0)
Ordnance ... ..	9,526,000		(396,916 0)
Miscellaneous Expenses ... ..	4,359,340		(181,640 0)

Apparent total ... ..	59,368,550		(2,473,690 0)
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Certain deductions ... ..	381,240		(15,885 0)
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Real total ... ..	58,987,310		(2,457,805 0)
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The following are the principal items of the Extraordinary Estimates:—

Shore Establishments, Provision of Charts, etc. ...	118,050		(4,919 0)
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*Extraordinary Expenditure:—*

	Kronen.	£	s.
Maintenance and Repair of Fleet, Provision for } Floating Dock, etc. ... ..	2,100,000		(87,500 0)
Guns, Small Arms, etc. ... ..	700,000		(29,166 0)
New Establishments Afloat and Ashore ... ..	1,202,500		(50,104 0)
Miscellaneous ... ..	330,000		(13,750 0)

Total ... ..	4,450,550		(185,439 0)
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—Budget der K. u. K. Kriegsmarine für das Jahr, 1909.

*New Fleet Programme.*—Count Montecuccoli, the Head of the Navy, has laid before the Delegations a new Navy Bill, covering a period of the next twenty years, with a view of making the construction of the new fleet, with the necessary credits required, independent of political parties. The base of the new law will be the provision of 16 battleships and 4 armoured cruisers of large displacement.



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The building programme for the next four years provides for the construction of four 19,000-ton battleships, three small cruisers of the *Admiral Spaun* class, one torpedo ship and a torpedo destroyer to replace the recently lost *Hussar*, with two Danube monitors and some torpedo boats, the number of which has not yet been settled. The money required for carrying through this programme and the completion of the ships now in hand amounts to 356 million marks (£17,800,000), which will be provided partly by an extraordinary Naval Credit and partly by the ordinary Naval Estimates, which will be raised from 50 million marks (£2,500,000) to 60 or 70 million marks (£3,000,000 or £3,500,000).

*Launches.*—On the 5th ult., in the presence of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the Heir Apparent, was launched from the yard of the Stabilimento Tecnico at Trieste the new first-class battleship *Radetsky*, the second of the three ships of the *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand* class to take the water. Her dimensions are as follows: Displacement, 14,500 tons; length on water-line, 451 feet; beam, 80 feet; mean draught, 26 feet 7 inches. The total weight of the armour will be about 3,070 tons. Her two engines of the vertical four-cylinder triple-expansion type are to develop 20,000 I.H.P., giving a speed of 20·5 knots, with 133 revolutions. Steam is supplied by 12 Yarrow water-tube boilers, with Howden's appliance for forced draught.

The armament will consist of four 12-inch 45-calibre guns, with a secondary battery of eight 9·4-inch guns in pairs in four turrets, twenty 3·9-inch Q.F. guns, sixteen in central battery, four in upper deck battery, six smaller Q.F. and machine guns and three submerged 18-inch torpedo tubes.

Submarine "A6," built by the Whitehead firm at Fiume, was launched on the 12th of June. "A5" and "A6" have been making diving trials since the beginning of July at Fiume. "A7" is still on the stocks. She is to have when submerged a speed of 11 knots.—*Marine Rundschau*.

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The following are the principal promotions and appointments which have been made: Vice-Admiral—L. R. G. De Marolles to be Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd *Arrondissement Maritime* (Brest). Rear-Admirals—N. Kiésel to be Vice-Admiral; L. J. Berryer to Command of the 3rd Division of the Mediterranean Squadron. Capitaines de Vaisseau—M. G. Hautefeuille, L. H. Dufaure de Lajarte to be Rear-Admirals; M. Morin to "Gaulois"; E. M. Barthes to "Tourville" and Command of Gunnery School. Capitaines de Frégate—J. B. Baude, P. L. Simon, A. J. Le Fournier to be Capitaines de Vaisseau; E. L. Martinie to "Calédonien"; P. C. Lévreux to Command of Fixed Defences at Cherbourg; M. E. Tirard to "Durandal" and Command of 2nd Torpedo and Submarine Channel Flotilla.—*Journal Officiel de la République Française*.

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Vice-Admiral Boué de Lapeyrière, Commander-in-Chief at Brest, has been appointed Minister of Marine, in which office he succeeds M. Picard. In selecting a distinguished Admiral from the Active List to fill this important appointment, M. Briand, the new Prime Minister, has reverted to the custom which formerly governed the appointment of Minister of Marine.

Vice-Admiral Kiésel has been promoted to that rank only just in time to save him from retirement. Having been born on the 8th August, 1847, he must have retired on reaching the age of 62 years, but his promotion to Vice-Admiral gives him another three years on the active list. He joined the Navy in 1864, and has only recently given up the command of the 3rd Division of the Mediterranean Fleet; he is very popular, and his promotion has given great satisfaction in the Service.

Rear-Admiral Hautefeuille had applied quite lately to be placed on the retired list, but instead of his request being granted, he was promoted to Rear-Admiral. He was born on the 1st of January, 1852, and is consequently in his 58th year. As a midshipman in 1873 he made the Tonkin campaign, under Captain Garnier, in which he much distinguished himself, and for his conduct in the taking of Nam Dinh he received the Legion of Honour. His last command as a captain was as Senior Officer in Command of the Naval Division in the Pacific.

*Launches.*—Two new destroyers have recently been launched, the *Chasseur* at Havre and the *Voltigreur* at Nantes. The dimensions of the *Voltigreur* are: displacement, 444 tons; length 65m. 60 (215 feet); breadth, 6m. 82 (20 feet); H.P., 8,000; estimated speed, 28 knots. She is to be armed with six 65-mm. (2.5-inch) Q.F. guns and two torpedo tubes, and her complement is fixed at 4 officers and 58 men. Her cost is 2,169,115 francs (£86,765). The dimensions of the *Chasseur* are as follows:—Displacement, 447 tons; length, 64 metres 20 centimetres (210 feet); beam, 6 metres 54 centimetres (21 feet); draught of water, 2 metres 36 centimetres (7 feet). She is fitted with turbine engines to develop 7,200-H.P., driving three propellers, and her estimated speed is 28 knots. Her armament consists of six 65 mm. (2.55 inches) Q.F. guns and two torpedo tubes; the complement is fixed at 4 officers and 58 men; and her total cost is 2,125,381 francs (£85,015).

*Trials of the "Ernest Renan."*—The armoured cruiser *Ernest Renan* has recently completed her trials. She carried out her first full-power trial of 10 hours' duration on 13th March. The H.P. realised was 37,100, instead of 36,000, and the speed 24 instead of 23 knots; there was also a reduction in the estimated consumption of coal of 777 grammes per H.P. This is the first time a vessel of this power has undergone a full-power trial of so long a duration. She afterwards carried out a three hours' full-power trial, using only three quarters of her boilers, the other quarter being supposed to be disabled by damage in action. On this trial she realised 36,200-H.P., which was considered very satisfactory. She was commissioned in June last for service in the Cruiser Division of the Mediterranean Fleet. Between the 21st and 25th of that month she carried out successfully her four days' sea commissioned trial, having made the run from Toulon to Brest, in spite of bad weather and a heavy sea, in 89 hours, maintaining a speed of from 21 to 18.5 knots, this last speed having been easily maintained when using only half the boilers. Her engines and boilers worked most satisfactorily, and she has proved herself the fastest cruiser in the French Navy. At full speed under natural draught, with a coal consumption from 70 to 75 kg. (154-165 lbs.) per square metre of grate surface, she can maintain a speed of 22 knots as long as her coal lasts, without any special fatigue being entailed on

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the stokers. At 10 knots speed she has a radius of action of 12,000 miles. The *Ernest Renan* was built by the *Société des Chantiers et Ateliers de Saint Nazaire*, and is the last of the five armoured cruisers of the 1900 programme to be completed. She was intended to have the same dimensions as the other four, *Jules Ferry*, *Léon Gambetta*, *Victor Hugo*, and *Jules Michelet*, but her design was afterwards altered with a view to giving her increased speed; and this places her now among a later class of very fast cruisers, of which the *Waldeck-Rousseau* and *Edgar-Quinet* are examples. Her dimensions are: displacement, 13,000 tons; length, 157 m. (515 feet); breadth, 27 m. 36 (39 feet); and she has for protection a belt of cemented steel 52 mm. (2 inches) thick, two armoured decks, and a cellular transverse bulkhead. Her main armament is four 19-cm. (7.6-inch) guns in two turrets on the middle line, one forward and aft, and she has also twelve 16-cm. (6.48-inch) guns, of which eight are in lateral turrets and four in casemates; she also carries twenty-one 47-mm. (1.85-inch) Q.F. guns, and two of 37-mm (1.45-inch), and she has two submerged torpedo tubes.

Her main engines are three in number of the 4-cylinder triple-expansion type, working three propellers, and at 136 revolutions develop 36,000-H.P., and there are 42 boilers of the Niclausse pattern. Her complement is fixed at 674 officers and men.

*Experimental Firing at the "Jena."*—A programme of experimental firing at the hull of the disabled battleship *Jena* has been approved by the Minister of Marine, and although the necessary credits have not yet been voted, the experiments will take place as soon as possible. The object is to test the power and efficiency of the service projectile as supplied to the Navy, and the experiments will be divided into two series, one of long-distance firing, to verify the power of the projectile, and the other at short ranges, to ascertain the effects on the *matériel* of the battleship, and on the *personnel* to be represented by animals. The ballistic formulæ used in France are those of Jacob de Marres, and one question to be determined is the accuracy of these formulæ. Different parts of the hull will be attacked, and the firing will be at various angles.

*The Policy of M. Picard.*—M. Picard's policy, who until the recent change of Ministry was Minister of Marine, fully appreciated as it was by many, had, nevertheless, its detractors, who opposed it because it did not appear to respond to the desire of the nation for a stronger Navy equal to that of our neighbours.

Many persons evidently concluded that M. Picard would proceed with the elaboration of a vast programme equal to that of Germany, which would definitely fix the constitution of our fleet, the number of ships to be built within a given period, the effectives to be provided by different dates, and the necessary increase to the Budget to carry it all out.

When M. Clemenceau invited M. Picard to join his Government as Minister of Marine, no one supposed that the Prime Minister expected him to play the part of a second "Colbert," but knowing M. Picard's administrative talent, his reputation for and his power of work, M. Clemenceau asked him to give all his energies to the Navy, to make it, in popular language, "*marcher*." M. Picard accepted, and set himself to work to find out the causes which have, so to speak, "hove to" the Navy,

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and he has reasoned the matter out in the simplest way. He said to himself, as the *Lutin* was not properly overhauled before her last dive, because the dock she was in was wanted for some other purpose, our docks are, therefore, not numerous enough; if the *Danton* class of battleships are too long or too wide to enter certain of our docks, the entrances must be widened, and they must be made longer; if an Admiral (Admiral Germinet) has declared that the supplies of projectiles to our ships are not sufficient for a 3-hours' fight, the supplies must be increased; if there is any danger of the old powder blowing up our ships, new powder must be bought; if cast steel shells are not strong enough to stand the strain of the great initial velocities now in use, they must be replaced by another and stronger make of shell; if in a single cruise the *Gloire* has the misfortune to lose two anchors, our stock of spare anchors must be increased, etc. Thus in estimating for these different wants the Minister was able to arrive at the sum required for providing the necessary docks, the supplies of powder, projectiles that will not burst prematurely, auxiliary vessels for the fleets, etc., to enable him to guarantee the proper working of all the different departments of the Navy, and the proposals which he laid before the Chamber, before his resignation, were drawn up with this view.—*La Vie Maritime*, *Le Moniteur de la Flotte*, and *Le Temps*.

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*Report of Bureau of Navigation.*—In his annual report Rear-Admiral John E. Pillsbury, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, lays special stress on the fact that we have no defended naval base in either the American insular possessions in the East or in the Caribbean Sea, the probable theatres of action in any war in which the Navy might be called on to engage. So important is this question believed to be, that in Admiral Pillsbury's opinion all appropriations for new improvements at naval stations or for the defence of the coast ports should give way to the establishment and defence of naval bases in the Philippines, at Pearl Harbour and at Guantanamo, for these bases, he says, are vital to success in war.

There is a renewal in this report of the previous recommendation that the grade of vice-admiral should be revived. It is proposed that five officers of this rank be authorised. Admiral Pillsbury thinks it due the Service and the country that the Commanders-in-Chief of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets should have at least this rank.

Remedy for the shortage of officers with which the Navy contends is sought in a recommendation that the law authorising the appointment of two midshipmen by each Senator, Representative, and Delegate in Congress during a period of four years be now extended for two years additional.

In order that the difficulty of having officers arrive at command of flag rank at an early age may be obviated, it is recommended that the present law be changed, and that the minimum age of candidates for Annapolis be fifteen years, the law to be effective from 1st July, 1910.

An appropriation of 5,000 dollars by Congress for prizes to be awarded under the steaming competition of the fleet is recommended. Upon the question of target practice, the report says:—"The target practice of the Atlantic Fleet in Magdalena Bay was of special interest, owing to the

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fact that many officers had been of the opinion that training in port was essential to efficiency, but it was clearly shown by the excellent records made by the main battery guns of the battle-ships that a high degree of efficiency can be obtained by sea training alone. Owing to the cruise of the battle-ship fleet, none of the men of that fleet were able to hold small-arms practice, but of the other vessels of the Navy, 6,256 officers and men completed the regular course of firing; 989 qualified as marksmen, 392 qualified as sharpshooters, and 124 as expert riflemen."

Recommendation is made that 274 acres of ground be purchased at Annapolis to be used as a rifle range for the Naval Academy. Contemplated sale will soon demand the abandonment of the present range.

Under flag and commanding officers is the following:—"The tactical and disciplinary efficiency of the fleet as a whole depends upon the Commander-in-Chief, and frequent changes in the chief command are to be discouraged. While it is desirable that officers should arrive at command and flag rank when still relatively young, youth is not everything, for it must be combined with sea experience in order to be of the greatest value to the Service and to the country."

Twelve promotions of warrant officers to the grade of ensign are authorised each year, but of the three presenting themselves during the last twelve months none was able to qualify.—*Army and Navy Journal*.

*Bids for Battleships.*—Bids were opened at the Navy Department at the end of last year for the construction of the battleship *Utah* and for supplying the machinery for the *Florida*, which is already under construction at the New York Yard. The lowest bidder for the *Utah* was the New York Shipbuilding Company, of Camden, N.J., at 3,946,000 dollars for a 20½-knot ship. A bid for the construction of a 21-knot vessel was submitted by the Fore River Company, of Quincy, Mass., at 4,440,000 dollars, the lowest bid for this class. The *Utah* is to be a sister ship of the *Florida*, and is to be of about 21,825 tons displacement. For the machinery for the *Florida*, the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company was the lowest bidder at 1,517,000 dollars.

Bids for the battle-ships were opened under three classes. Under the first class, for hull and turbine machinery, in accordance with Government plans, the bidders were: New York Shipbuilding Company, 3,946,000 dollars; the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, 4,180,000 dollars, both for a 20½-knot vessel, to be delivered in thirty-two months; William Cramp & Sons, 4,330,000 dollars, same speed, to be delivered in thirty-five months.

For class two, for hull and reciprocating machinery, Government plans, the bidders were: The Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, 4,150,000 dollars, 20½ knots speed, thirty-two months delivery; William Cramp & Sons, 4,270,000 dollars, same speed, delivery thirty-five months.

Class three, hull and equipment, Government plans; machinery certain specified type in accordance with bidder's plans. Under this class the Fore River Shipbuilding Company submitted eight bids, all for the Curtis turbine type of machinery. Four of these bids were for a 20½-knot vessel, delivery thirty-two months, the lowest being 4,393,000 dollars. The other four bids were for a 21-knot vessel, the lowest being 4,440,000 dollars. Other bids under this class were the Newport News Shipbuilding



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and Drydock Company, Parsons' turbine type of machinery 20½ knots speed, 4,100,000 dollars, and the same company for reciprocating machinery with Mosher boilers, 20½ knots speed, 4,070,000 dollars; William Cramp & Sons, Cramp-Zoelly type of machinery, 21 knots speed, 4,450,000 dollars.

Following were the bids in detail for furnishing the machinery for the *Florida*: Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, Government plans, 1,715,000 dollars, vessel to have speed of 20½ knots; same company, Parsons' turbine type machinery, Mosher boilers, 1,517,000 dollars, same speed; same company, reciprocating type machinery, bidder's plans, 1,588,000 dollars, same speed; same company, reciprocating type of machinery, Mosher boilers, 1,542,000 dollars, same speed.

The Fore River Company did not bid on this proposition, but submitted bids covering individual items of material required.

Three companies—the Midvale, the Carnegie, and the Bethlehem Steel—bid on proposals for steel armour plates for the two ships. The Midvale Company bid for Class A, 420 dollars; Class B, 405 dollars; Class C, 462 dollars, and Class D, 512 dollars. The Carnegie Company's bids for the same classes were 420 dollars, 415 dollars, 455 dollars, and 600 dollars respectively, and the Bethlehem Company's bids as follows for the respective classes: 420 dollars, 408 dollars, 470 dollars, and 508 dollars.—*Army and Navy Journal*.

*Launch of the "North Dakota" and "Delaware."*—Want of space has prevented us from noticing earlier the launch of the new first-class battleships *North Dakota* and *Delaware*. The *North Dakota*, the first turbine battleship to be built for the U.S. Navy, was launched at Quincy, Mass., on 10th November last, the huge vessel taking the water without any hitch.

The principal dimensions of the vessel are: Length, 510 feet on the water line, 518 feet 9 inches length over all; extreme beam to outside armour, 85 feet 2½ inches; trial draught, 25 feet 10 inches, with a displacement of 20,000 tons. Her armament will consist of ten 12-inch breech-loading rifles, fourteen 5-inch Q.F. guns, four 3-inch saluting guns, four 1-pounder semi-automatic guns, two 3-pounder field pieces, two machine guns, calibre .30; two submerged torpedo-tubes. The arrangement of the main battery will make it doubly effective, mounted as it will be in five huge turrets along the centre line of the ship. Because of this the big guns can be fired to either broadside. Two of the big guns being placed higher than the others will also permit firing over the other turrets.

She will be fitted with two lattice-work masts or towers in lieu of the usual masts. The armour is in three belts, the chief of them being eleven inches thick and eight feet wide; the second seven feet three inches wide and an inch thinner, and the top belt of 5-inch steel running to the main deck. The upper plate is placed ten feet above normal water line and eight or more feet above the deep-load water line.

The cost of the hull and machinery is figured at 4,337,000 dollars, and the vessel is about 60 per cent. completed. The vessel will have a bunker capacity of 2,500 tons and a complement of 55 officers and 878 men. At the fourth-hour trial trip the *North Dakota* must maintain by contract a speed of twenty-one knots an hour. The ship will have twelve Babcock &

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Wilcox water-tube boilers, with a combined force of 25,000-H.P. These boilers can be fired with both coal and oil.

The battleship *Delaware* was successfully launched at Newport News, Va., on the 6th February. The *Delaware* is 510 feet in length on load water-line, 85 feet 2 inches in breadth, and her mean draught to bottom of keel at trial displacement about 27 feet. Her coal bunker capacity is 2,500 tons, which is sufficient to send her at a 10-knot speed a distance of 6,720 knots, or twenty-eight days' steaming. Her top speed will be twenty-one knots an hour. Provision is also made for the stowage of a large amount of oil fuel. She will have triple-expansion reciprocating engines and will require 900 men to man her. Her armament will consist of a main battery of ten 12-inch breech-loading rifles, and her secondary battery will be fourteen 5-inch rapid-fire guns, four 3-pounder saluting guns, four 1-pounder semi-automatic guns, two 3-inch field pieces, and two machine guns of .30 calibre. She has two submerged torpedo-tubes.

The *Delaware* will have a displacement on trial of 20,000 tons, or 2,100 tons greater than the British Dreadnought and 750 tons greater than Great Britain's latest vessels of that type.

The hull is protected by a water-line belt of armour 8 feet in width, whose maximum thickness is 11 inches. This belt gives effective protection to the boilers, machinery and magazine spaces. The side above the main armour belt is protected by armour 7 feet 3 inches wide and of a maximum thickness of 10 inches. Above the main casemate armour amidships, the side is protected by armour of 5 inches thickness, which affords protection to the funnels, the major portion of the secondary batteries of 5-inch guns and the hull structure.

A new feature of the *Delaware* will be the two "skeleton" masts, which are to replace the present steel tube masts with fighting tops, now in use on other vessels.

The plans for the *Delaware* were prepared by the Board of Construction in competition with plans submitted by various naval architects and shipbuilding companies and submitted to a special board, under the Presidency of the former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, T. H. Newberry, and later approved by Congress. The contract for the *Delaware* was placed 6th August, 1907, at a price of 3,987,000 dollars, to be built in accordance with the Department's design for both hull and reciprocating machinery. Her keel was laid 11th November, 1907.—*United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, and *Army and Navy Journal*.

The following is the percentage of completion on 1st May, 1909, of vessels under construction for the United States Navy: Battle-ships—*South Carolina*, 90.0; *Michigan*, 97.4; *Delaware*, 77.9; *North Dakota*, 81.5; *Florida*, 11.9; *Utah*, 14.9; Torpedo boat destroyers—*Smith*, 57.5; *Lamson*, 56.2; *Preston*, 52; *Flusser*, 33; *Reid*, 31.6; *Paulding*, *Drayton*, and *Roe*, 0; *Terry*, *Perkins*, and *Sterrett*, no report; *McCall* and *Burrows*, 0; *Warrington* and *Mayrant*, no report. Submarine torpedo-boats—*Stingray*, 62.3; *Tarpon*, 60.3; *Bonita*, 57.8; *Snapper*, 56.5; *Norchal*, 52.3; *Grayling*, 52; *Salmon*, 51.3. Colliers—*Vestal*, 97.6; *Prometheus*, 87.8. Tug-boats—*Patapsco*, 81; *Patuxent*, 95.

## MILITARY NOTES.

The following are the principal appointments which have been made:—

**General**—Sir Frederick W. E. F. Forestier-Walker, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Gibraltar, to be also General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and High Commissioner in the Mediterranean (temporarily).

**Lieut.-General**—Sir Leslie Rundle, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., to be Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Malta.

**Major-Generals**—F. W. Benson, C.B., to be Colonel 21st (Empress of India's) Lancers; R. L. H. Curteis to be Colonel of the Bedfordshire Regiment; J. T. Dalyell (Hon. Lieut.-General) to be Colonel of the Royal Scots Fusiliers.

**Colonels**—N. B. Inglefield, D.S.O., to Command South Irish Coast Defences, with temporary rank of Brigadier-General; F. S. Inglefield, C.B., D.S.O., to Command 12th Infantry Brigade (Eastern Command); H. Pipon, C.B. (Hon. Major-General) to be Major of the Tower of London; J. W. Allen, C.B., to Command the troops in Ceylon, with temporary rank of Brigadier-General; Montagu C. Curry, D.S.O., to Command No. 4 District (Western Command); A. H. Morris, C.M.G., D.S.O., to be Commandant Duke of York's Military School.

**Lieut.-Colonel**—G. C. Nugent, M.V.O., to Command Irish Guards and Regimental District, with temporary rank of Colonel.

**Medical Department of the Army**.—Surgeon-General W. L. Gubbins, C.B., M.V.O., to be Director-General Army Medical Service.

**Indian Army**.—Major-General—R. L. Payne, C.B., D.S.O., to Command Nowshera Infantry Brigade, 1st (Peshawar) Division.

**Colonels**—F. W. P. Angelo to Command Nowshera Cavalry Brigade, 1st (Peshawar) Division, with temporary rank of Brigadier-General; A. F. Hogge, C.B., to be Colonel on the Staff, to Command Ferozepore Brigade, 3rd (Lahore) Division, with temporary rank of Brigadier-General.

*Review of the Lancashire Territorial Divisions and Presentation of Colours by H.M. the King.*—On the afternoon of Monday, 5th July, the King reviewed the West Lancashire Territorial Division in Lord Derby's beautiful park at Knowsley, and presented colours to the different units. The division, which was commanded by Major-General E. C. Bethune, C.B., was drawn up on the parade ground in two lines. On the right of the first line were the Lancashire Hussars Yeomanry; then came the four Royal Field Artillery brigades and the heavy brigade. Next in the alignment was the West Lancashire Royal Engineer Division; then came the North Lancashire Infantry Brigade and the Liverpool Brigade. The South Lancashire Brigade was formed at right angles to the left of the lines, as the limits of the parade ground did not permit of its forming on the same alignment as the rest of the division. The second line was formed from the right as follows: Ammunition columns, West Lancashire supply and transport columns, the West and East Lancashire Royal Garrison Artillery, the West Lancashire Royal Army Medical Corps, Lancashire and

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Cheshire Royal Garrison Artillery, the Lancashire Fortress Royal Engineers, the Western Telegraph Companies Royal Engineers, and the 1st Western General Hospital. In a third line were the Cadet Corps.

The Royal procession left Knowsley Hall at ten minutes to four, escorted by two troops of the 1st Life Guards, the guard of honour at the Hall being furnished by the Naval Volunteers. At intervals down the avenue were drawn up between the tree trunks groups of Boy Scouts, the route from the avenue to the point where the Royal carriage first came in view of the parade was lined by the Liverpool detachment of the King's Colonial Yeomanry, while the Liverpool Crimean and Mutiny veterans were also drawn up to salute His Majesty. After passing down the line their Majesties proceeded to the dais which had been erected, and the ceremony of the consecration and presentation of the Colours was proceeded with, the Consecration Service being performed by the Bishop of Liverpool, assisted by the Rev. A. Connell, Moderator of the Presbytery. The battalions which received Colours were the 4th and 5th Battalions the King's Own Royal Lancaster Regiment, the 4th and 5th Battalions the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, the 7th and 9th Battalions the King's Liverpool Regiment, the 10th (Scottish) Battalion the King's Liverpool Regiment, and the 4th Battalion the Prince of Wales's Volunteers South Lancashire Regiment. After the ceremony of the consecration and presentation was over, the West Lancashire Division marched past, which was a marked success, the troops, particularly the infantry, acquitting themselves most creditably. After the march past was over, the West Lancashire General Hospital *personnel*, complete with its higher staff and nursing sisterhood, lined up in front of the Royal dais, and the king walked along the line, stopping to speak a few words to some of the officers and nurses present. With this inspection this memorable review in the history of the new Territorial Army came to an end, their Majesties returning to Knowsley Hall for the night.

On the following day the King reviewed the East Lancashire Division in Worsley Park, and presented Colours to various units of the Division. Their Majesties arrived on the ground about four, after having lunched at Worsley Hall, the seat of the Earl of Ellesmere. The Division was drawn up in two lines under the command of Brigadier-General W. Fry. Owing to the want of breadth the cavalry and artillery could not take the right of the line. The first line was therefore formed by the three infantry brigades in line of quarter column in the following order: The Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade, the East Lancashire Brigade, and the Manchester Brigade. The second line was formed by the Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry in mass, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Brigades R.F.A., in line of quarter column at half interval, with ammunition column *personnel* in rear; the East Lancashire Divisional R.E. in quarter column, transport and supply column with wagons in rear, and the R.A.M.C. Field Ambulance in column of field ambulance. The 1st Cadet Battalion the Manchester Regiment was also in the parade. A few minutes after the appointed time the Royal procession arrived from Worsley Hall, the Royal carriage being preceded by a Sovereign's escort of the 1st Life Guards. As the Royal carriage wheeled into the saluting base, the Royal salute was given. The procession then moved towards the right of the line, where it was joined by Brigadier-General Fry and

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staff and Lieut.-General Sir C. J. Burnett, G.O.C. Western Command, and staff. The King then inspected both lines of the parade.

The picturesque ceremony of consecrating and presenting Colours to units of the division was then proceeded with. The units to receive this honour at the hands of their Sovereign were the Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry (a Guidon), the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Battalions Lancashire Fusiliers, the 4th and 5th Battalions the East Lancashire Regiment, and the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Battalions the Manchester Regiment. A new procedure in the presentation was adopted on this occasion. The colour parties consisted only of majors, and the usual colour guards were dispensed with. The parties were formed in two lines, forming a lane towards the Royal Pavilion, and the drums were piled between them. The Bishop of Manchester took his stand before the drums. The King and Queen, having completed their inspection of the line, were driven to the Pavilion, on a platform at the foot of which the King then took his position. The Bishop then proceeded with the consecration, which over, the King by touching each emblem confided it to the trust and keeping of its unit, the representative officers receiving them on bended knee.

After the Colours had been presented, the East Lancashire Division marched past, the Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry leading. They came by in column of troops. The four brigades of Field Artillery went by in battery column. The ceremony of the review was brought to a close by the presentation to their Majesties of the chairman and the members of the East Lancashire Association and the officers commanding brigades and units.

*Resignation of the Duke of Connaught.*—Field-Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught has resigned his appointment as Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief and High Commissioner in the Mediterranean.

The announcement of the Duke's resignation, foreshadowing as it does his life-long connection with the Army, will be received with genuine regret by soldiers of all ranks. His Royal Highness entered the Royal Engineers, after passing through the Military Academy at Woolwich, as long ago as 1868, being transferred some five months later to the Royal Artillery. Eighteen months after he joined the Rifle Brigade, of which to-day he is the Colonel-in-Chief, which was followed by a period of service in the 7th Hussars. He next served as Brigade Major of the Cavalry Brigade at Aldershot, and as Assistant-Adjutant-General at Gibraltar, returning to Aldershot in 1880 as a Brigadier-General.

Two years later he proceeded to Egypt in command of the 1st Brigade (Guards), serving through the war of 1882, and being present at the battle of Tel-el-Kebir. For his services he was mentioned in despatches, received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament, and was awarded the C.B. Returning to Aldershot, he was shortly afterwards appointed as a Major-General to command a division in Bengal, and three years later became Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army—an appointment he held until March, 1890. After his return to England he held the command at Portsmouth for three years, when he was transferred to the command of the troops at Aldershot, where he remained for five years. In January, 1900, he succeeded Lord Roberts as Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, it



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being found, much to his disappointment, impossible to employ him in South Africa. On the 26th of June, 1902, he was promoted to Field-Marshal, and in 1904, on the reorganisation of the War Office and Head-quarter Staff, he was selected to hold the newly-created appointment of Inspector-General of the Forces and President of the Selection Board, which he held until the winter of 1907, when he took up the post of Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief and High Commissioner in the Mediterranean, which he has now resigned, to the great regret of the residents of Malta, with whom both he and the Duchess are immensely popular.

General Sir F. W. E. F. Forestier-Walker, the Governor of Gibraltar, has been appointed to take over the duties temporarily in succession to the Duke of Connaught; but it is officially announced that the appointment has been offered to and accepted by Lord Kitchener, who is to be promoted to Field-Marshal on vacating the Chief Command in India in October next. Before taking up his new appointment, however, Lord Kitchener proceeds to Japan to represent the King and the Army at the Grand Imperial Manœuvres in November. From there, at the request of the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, he will visit the Commonwealth and Dominion to inspect their troops and to advise as to the best way of giving effect to the proposals for the development of their military forces which are being discussed at the Imperial Conference now sitting in London. Afterwards he will come home and take up his new command, to which is added a seat on the Committee of Imperial Defence. In view of new development in organisation, the Mediterranean Command assumes increased importance, and it will be taken up by Lord Kitchener with the object of giving it its proper place in the general scheme of Imperial defence. —*Précis from Times.*

**New Compass for Night Work.**—Field Service Regulations, Part I., just published, directs in Section 133 that any change of direction necessary in guiding columns by night in open country should be noted by compass bearings. Now the dial of the Service prismatic compass, Mark V., which shows the bearings perfectly by day, is not illuminated sufficiently by the luminous paint with which it is covered to enable one to read the figures and fine divisions showing the bearing by night. The "Cavalry Journal" for July, however, has apparently discovered a solution of the difficulty. Major C. W. Somerset, Indian Army, has recently invented and patented an electrically-lighted prismatic compass which can be read as accurately by night as by day. It is called the "Primus." The advantage of the instrument is that the same compass can be used both by day and night, and further, that no light is emitted from the compass box to be seen by others.

**Austria-Hungary.** *The Army Estimates for 1909.*—In last month's Notes we gave a brief résumé of the Army Estimates for the current year which showed the total Budgetary effectives as voted to be: 16,842 officers, a decrease of 29 as compared with 1908; 4,919 officials, an increase of 75; 977 subaltern employés, an increase of 29; 18,162 cadets and re-engaged non-commissioned officers, a decrease of 405 of the non-commissioned officers; non-commissioned officers and men, 271,432, an increase of 272. Horses, State, 62,279, a decrease of 584; to officers, 10,455, a decrease of 216. To these details the following must be added:—

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1. In addition must be counted 5,660 pupils at the different military schools (the same number as in 1908).

2. In addition must be counted 11,172 horses on civil service (the same number as in 1908).

3. It is necessary, in order to arrive at the total Budgetary strength of the Common Army, to add to these figures the effectives of the Bosnian troops, paid out of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Budget, which amount in round numbers to 360 officers, 34 officials, 6,700 non-commissioned officers and men, 40 State horses, and 140 officers' horses.

The numbers of the Reservists and *Ersatz*-Reservists called out for instruction are the same as for previous years :—

61,400	<i>Ersatz</i> -Reservists called out for first time for...	8 weeks.
172,000	Reservists and <i>Ersatz</i> -Reservists called out for a period of instruction of ... ..	13 days
92,250		17 "
8,400		25 "
5,150		28 "
4,900	Officers of the Reserve called out for a period of instruction of ... ..	28 "
8,400	Reserve Horses for ... ..	21 "

It will be seen that the Budgetary effectives are almost the same as those for 1908, and it could hardly be otherwise, as the annual contingent remains unchangeable.

However, one must notice :—

1. A sufficiently enough marked decrease in the number of the non-commissioned officers who re-engage, added to that which the Budget of 1908 already showed. This decrease is unfortunate at a time when, by reason of the introduction of the two-years' service, the military authorities are trying to increase the number of non-commissioned officers of this category. It proves the ineffectiveness of the measures adopted to this end up to the present.

2. Certain modifications in the distribution of the effectives of the army. Already in 1908, in order to meet the reorganisation of the artillery and the increase in the navy, it was necessary to weaken by almost 5,000 (to be exact, 4,708) men the strength of the infantry (line and chasseurs), in the proportion of 48 men per the 4th battalion of each regiment. The reorganisation of the artillery is completed, but as the strengthening of the navy is still continuing, the infantry still loses nearly a thousand men (to be exact, 930) in the proportion of 8 per each 4th battalion (Ordinary Budget). On the other hand, under the Extraordinary Budget the number of battalions with increased effective is raised to 25 instead of 20 (an increase of some 719 men in all). In fine, the round effective strength of the infantry remains almost the same as in 1908, but that of the 4th battalions of the regiments at home is appreciably weakened (14 men per company). The infantry has in addition to meet from its own resources in men the formation of new machine gun detachments, which consequently will still more weaken the companies.

The effectives of the other arms undergo no modification, save those resulting from the attachment to the field artillery of some batteries of heavy howitzers, formerly attached to the fortress artillery.

There is no essential modification in the organisation or working of the different branches and services. Out of the 16 million francs (£200,000) increase which the Ordinary Budget shows in round numbers, two millions

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(£25,000) is necessitated by the increased cost of food and other prime necessities of life, for several years past the cost of living has been steadily rising in Austria-Hungary; a further 9 millions (£1,150,000) is absorbed by an increase in the pay of officers and cadets, and 3½ millions (£40,000) in the improvement of the material condition of the soldiers.—*Revue Militaire des Armées Etrangères.*

*The Grand Manœuvres, 1909.*—According to present arrangements, the Grand Manœuvres, at which the German Emperor will be present, will take place between the 8th and 11th of September in the Trebitch-Iglau-Gross-Meseritch region (between Bohemia and Moravia, south-east of Iglau) between the 1st Army Corps (Cracow), the IInd Army Corps (Vienna), and part of the IXth Army Corps (Leitmeritz).

Owing to the 47th Division being retained at Vienna, the 1st and IInd Army Corps will have three divisions, one of which will be composed of *Landwehr* and one division of cavalry. Of the IXth Corps, one division of infantry—the 10th (Josephstadt)—takes part in the manœuvres.

There will be present altogether a total of 100 battalions of infantry, 60 squadrons of cavalry, 54 batteries of artillery, and 6 pioneer companies. The Army Headquarters will be fixed at the Chateau of Count Harrach, at Gross-Meseritch. The manœuvres will last four days, terminating on the 11th of September.

To each division will be attached a detachment of four machine guns and a cyclist detachment, and each of the two opposing forces will have a detachment of field balloonists. Mechanical traction will be used exclusively for the victualling of the troops, and the 1st Army Corps will use field-kitchens.

The strength of the companies of infantry will be raised to 130, and the squadrons of cavalry to 140 men.

The manœuvres will be directed, as last year, by the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the throne, who will have as his Chief of the Staff, General of Infantry Conrad von Höhyendorf, Chief of the General Staff of the Army.—*Bulletin de la Presse et de la Bibliographie Militaires.*

*Bosnia-Herzegovina.*—The Military Authorities have determined to transform Sarajevo into a strong fortress. The present enceinte will be retained to form a central starting point, which will be surrounded by a chain of forts to a distance of 7 kilometres (4 miles 615 yards). The new forts will be of the type employed by the Italians in their mountain fortifications. The present forts, in order to have a good field of fire, were isolated, and owing to their form of construction, were visible from afar. The new forts will be in principle and, as far as possible, excavated out of the rock.

A reduction is to be made in the effective strength of the XVth Army Corps stationed in Bosnia. From Sarajevo, the headquarters and two battalions of the infantry regiment No. 23 are to be transferred to Budapest, and one battalion to Rospovar; the 1st Battalion of the Infantry Regiment No. 7 moves from Gorazola to Grätz; the 2nd Battalion of the Infantry Regiment No. 14 from Mostar to Lienz; the 3rd Battalion of the Infantry Regiment No. 31 from Sarajevo to Trenezin; and the 4th Battalion of the Infantry Regiment No. 94 from Glidze to Reichenberg. On arrival at their garrisons these battalions will be reduced to a peace effective by the sending to their homes of the reservists. It is also

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announced that very shortly five of the new battalions with their machine guns will be also withdrawn.

In consequence of these movements the XVth Corps will only consist of 52 battalions in place of 64, half of the reinforcements which were sent last December and March of this year being withdrawn.—*Revue Militaire des Armées Etrangères.*

**Italy.** *The Third Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Army.*—In this report the Commission treats of the general organisation of the Army. It is a document which has been

favourably received by public opinion in Italy, is marked by the breadth of view shown by its authors, and it will certainly serve as the base of the coming proposals and discussions on the reorganisation of the Army. The following is a brief analysis of its principal conclusions:—

*General.*—The Commission considers that it is necessary to decentralise and above all simplify the administration of the Army, and also that retired officers should be employed as far as possible on duties where use can be made of their services (as professors, for example, in the military schools, or on duty at the Ministry of War and the military establishments as district officers, etc.), and so effect economies on their pensions.

*General Organisation of the Army.*—The Commission does not recommend any reduction in the number of army corps; such a measure would render difficult the rapid *encadrement* of the mobilised forces. It demands: 1. That all the commanders of army corps be called upon to take part in the work of the Council of the Army and the Superior Council of National Defence; 2. That the appointment of the commanding generals, instead of being sanctioned by a Royal Decree, should be simply notified by the Minister and renewed each year; 3. That the selection of the commanding generals should be recommended to the Government by a secret vote of the members of the Superior Promotion Commission; 4. That the staffs of the Army should be constituted even in time of peace.

*Infantry.*—The Commission has had under their consideration the weak effective strength of the companies during certain months of the year, when it falls to 50 or 60 men. It proposes to adopt a standing effective strength of 96 men and to introduce the following modifications into the organisation of the arm:—

<i>Present Organisation.</i>		<i>Proposed Organisation.</i>
Infantry of the Line.	48 Brigades;	50 Brigades;
	96 Regiments;	100 Regiments (with a machine-gun detachment per regiment);
	288 Battalions.	300 Battalions.
Bersaglieri	12 Regiments;	6 Regiments (with machine-gun detachments);
	36 Battalions.	18 Battalions.
Bersaglieri Cyclists.	12 Companies (comprised in the Regiments).	2 Regiments;
		6 Battalions;
		24 Companies.
Alpine Regiments.	7 Regiments;	Without modification, but each battalion to receive a machine-gun detachment.
	22 Battalions;	
	75 Companies.	

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The *Cadres* will be increased by 2 Chief Staff Officers, 400 captains (already on the list but supernumerary to establishment), and 550 lieutenants.

*Cavalry*.—It would be expedient to raise the effective strength of the squadron to 130 horses, but the number of squadrons should be reduced from 6 to 5. The number of regiments to be raised from 24 to 29, which will allow of a new division of independent cavalry being formed. The cavalry divisions should also be organised during peace.

Each regiment to be supplied with a machine gun detachment.

*Artillery*.—It is essential to separate the technical branch from the combatant artillery force. The Commission proposes the suppression of the *Artillery-Directions*, with the exception of the one at Plaisance for the maintenance of the siege artillery parks, and the separation of the field artillery train in order to make it an autonomous corps.

The field batteries ought to have on a peace footing at least 90 men, 60 horses, and 4 guns. It would be well to organise a battery in half at least of the regiments of artillery to serve as a nucleus for the constitution of the units of mobile Militia at the moment of mobilisation; and to create seven batteries which are wanting at the present time.

The Commission consider that the war strength of the battery should be six guns, and that some howitzer batteries should be substituted for gun batteries in the proportion of one to two batteries per army corps.

The horse artillery batteries to have four guns, and they could advantageously be supplied with lighter matériel.

The mountain batteries should remain with six guns, and it is advisable to increase this branch of the arm by 12 batteries forming a new regiment.

The foot artillery should be raised from 6 to 10 regiments.

The effective strength of the officers of the arm should be increased by 6 senior staff officers, 180 captains, and 140 lieutenants.

*Engineers*.—The principal modifications recommended are as follows:

1. To relieve the sappers of the bridging service and to create a pontoon regiment.
2. To transform the railway group into a regiment with three groups and a working section.
3. To render autonomous the group of specialists, which would give up the wireless telegraphy section to the telegraphists, and would take over the automobile section at present attached to the railway group.
4. To create for Sardinia an autonomous group (a company of sappers and one of telegraphists).

The Commission has also had under consideration the question of the promotion of officers; they consider that it is necessary to unify the length of grade in the rank of sub-lieutenant in all arms, to increase the number of examinations in order to develop the education of officers, and to regularise their career by establishing a single rôle for the superior officers of all the fighting arms. They ask that a fourth of the vacancies for sub-lieutenants should be kept for senior non-commissioned officers, who would receive direct promotion.

Finally, they complain that far too many men are taken away from their military duties for other accessory work.

The expense of these reforms would amount to 21 millions of francs (£840,000).—*Revue Militaire des Armées Étrangères*.



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*Italy and Austria.*—It has long been known that there is no love lost between the Dual Monarchy and Italy, its nominal ally in the Triple. The Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian throne, makes no secret of his dislike of Italy, in which country the possible outcome of this hostility is viewed with some anxiety. According to *La France Militaire*, there was held last March at Prague a series of secret Councils of War under the presidency of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, in which the eventuality of a rupture not only with Russia and Servia, but also with Italy was fully discussed. With this hypothesis in view, the Austro-Hungarian General Staff proposed that the IVth Army Corps, which is always stationed over against the Italian frontier, should be strengthened by the Ist Corps, concentrated in the Trent-Reveredo-Levico zone.

Somewhat earlier in the year certain more direct preparations were carried out in Carinthia. Orders were suddenly given for the clearing away of the snow along the southern frontier, some thousands of peasants being employed to clear those railways which, in case of mobilisation, would serve exclusively for the transport of troops and war *matériel*, not towards the Balkans or Galicia, but towards Italy, while for some time past vast quantities of stores have been accumulated in the Trentino. During the last three years the work of placing the General Staff in Vienna in telephonic communication by special cables with Trieste, Goritz, Pola, and Gervignano has also been carried out, the communication between Vienna and Gervignano having been completed last autumn, a matter of some importance, as, in case of mobilisation, Gervignano becomes the headquarters of the IIInd Austrian Army Corps.

These preparations do not give the idea that the relations between the two countries are of a very cordial nature. Moreover, for the last two or three years the Austrian military Press has occupied itself with publishing various studies on the best method of carrying out operations in Upper Italy. The Russo-Japanese war has been drawn upon for contributions, the high cultivation of the valley of the Po presenting apparently many features analogous to that of the Manchurian plains. All the writers are agreed as to the probability of the next operations being on the Isonzo, in the Groetz-Treviso region, flanked by a demonstration in the Tyrol.

Italy, on her side, during the last three years has been making all possible efforts to minimise as far as possible the inferiority in which the comparative weakness of her Army, her inferior *matériel* organisation, her insufficient railway system, the form, even, of the frontier, which seems to condemn her to submit to the offensive of the enemy on the Isonzo, all combine to place her.

Financially her efforts may be seen in the proposal to spend a sum of more than 450 million francs (£18,000,000), which may be roughly made up as follows: Extraordinary credits voted in 1906, 1907, and 1908 for the complete renewal of the *matériel* of the Army, 299,000,000 francs (£11,960,000), divided between the military budgets from 1906-07 up to 1916-17.

New expenditure, 125,000,000 francs (£5,000,000), distributed over five financial years in accordance with the Bill recently laid before Parliament.

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Disposable surpluses from previous years, money accruing from the sale of Government land and of old *matériel* belonging to the State, about 40,000,000 francs (£1,600,000).

That is a total approximate expenditure for *matériel* alone of 465 million francs (£18,600,000), appropriated as follows:—

Rifles, machine guns, etc., 22 million francs (£880,000);  
 Mobilisation supplies, 30 million francs (£1,200,000);  
 Fortifications, 186 million francs (£7,440,000);  
 Field Artillery, 146 million francs (£5,840,000);  
 Military establishments, 23 million francs (£920,000);  
 Horses and mules, 9 million francs (£360,000);  
 Contingent expenses, 50 million francs (£2,000,000).

It may be remarked that out of the sum of 186 million francs (£7,440,000) appropriated for fortifications, 160 million francs (£6,400,000) is to be devoted to defensive works on the eastern frontier, which is directly menaced by an offensive movement on the part of Austria. It is intended to form a vast entrenched camp on the Udine Plain, between Udine and the sea, defended by extensive works, consisting of long lines of trenches with narrow profiles, protected by more important defensive works supported by a formidable artillery. Eighteen armoured cupolas (not supplied by Krupp, it may be remarked) are to be provided for the frontier forts and those of Venice. The armament of the defences of this last-named city is to be strengthened by some new batteries of 12-inch guns and 11-inch mortars.

It is intended at the same time to increase the peace effective strength of the Army by an addition to the infantry of 25,000 men with 11 field batteries and four regiments of fortress artillery.

Italy is also taking steps, in view of the determination of Austria to lay down battleships of the *Dreadnought* type, to add to her naval power. A new credit of 440 million francs (£17,600,000) has been asked for from Parliament, and two new 20,000-ton battleships, the *Dante-Alighieri* and *Leonardo da Vinci*, have already been laid down, while steps are being taken to strengthen the Venice-Ancona naval base, which faces the Austrian Pola-Fiume.

In brief, both on land and sea, Italy, although outwardly faithful to the Austro-German alliance, pressed by popular sentiment, is nevertheless preparing to defend herself against a probable attack in the future, for no one speaks even of taking the offensive. On the other hand, much is written in Vienna about the supposed offensive campaign Italy is planning against Austria, which is said to be based on a landing in force at Fiume, with the view of the campaign being settled on the Hungarian plains, with the help of the numerous Slav and Magyar elements, who are not too favourably disposed towards the Dual Monarchy.

It certainly would appear, concludes *La France Militaire*, as if a war, the chances of which are being so carefully studied, which is expected by both nations whose respective interests in the Adriatic it seems impossible to reconcile, must sooner or later break out. It is necessary, therefore, for France to prepare herself actively to face the complications which such a war must bring about for the whole of Europe.—*La France Militaire*.

*The Influence of Emigration on Recruiting.*—The continued decrease in the recruit contingents is to be traced to the increased emigration which has been steadily taking place since 1898. Those neighbourhoods which show the largest number of emigrants contribute the fewest recruits. Of the class of 1886, which became liable for service in 1906, only 4,300 out of the 27,000 on the list reported themselves, or one out of every six of those registered as emigrants.

It is noteworthy that in spite of repeated amnesties, the number of deserters and absentees does not appear to diminish. Since 1895 at least eight amnesty laws have been passed without any improvement resulting. When emigration moved in certain limits it was formerly not altogether disadvantageous to the country, but it has now become a danger to its military strength. Of the class of 1886, a further 40,000 men, who live abroad, have failed to report themselves, and it is clear that to fill this leakage the military burden must fall with much greater severity upon those who remain at home.—*Danzer's Armee-Zeitung*.

*Bicentenary of the Campaign of 1859.*—The 30th of May, the anniversary of the battle of Goito (1848) was kept as a holiday by the Army, special prize meetings being held, which were arranged by the commanding officers of corps.

- a. The regiments whose colours had been decorated with the military medal for valour on the occasion of the campaign of 1859, or a unit of which had taken part, received gold and silver medals as prizes in the competitions.
- b. Other troops received silver medals.

In addition to each of the regiments under (a) a commemoration medal in silver was presented.

The same day took place at Rome a grand fencing competition and a lecture on General Eusibe Bava, the hero of the two battles of Goito (8th of April and 30th of May, 1848), of which the first inaugurated the war of Italian independence.

On the 24th of June the anniversary of the battle of Solferino-San Martino was solemnly commemorated on the field of battle.

The Army was represented, at San Martino, by a battalion of infantry, with band and colours, a squadron of cavalry, and a battery of artillery (from Brescia), and a battalion of Bersaglieri (from Desenzano); at Solferino, by a battalion of infantry, with band and colours, two squadrons of cavalry (from Mantua), and a section of artillery (from Brescia).

In addition, all the regiments which took part in the battle of San Martino sent deputations, composed of a colonel or a field officer, a captain, a colour bearer, a sergeant, and two corporals or soldiers.

On the same day in all regiments and detachments a lecture on the battle of Solferino-San Martino was delivered to the men.—*Revue Militaire des Armées Etrangères*.

#### The Netherlands

*Modifications in the Militia Law of 1901.*—In the early days of last December the Dutch First Chamber passed by 44 votes to 2 the modification in the Militia Law of 1901, brought forward by the Minister of War. These modifications had already been adopted by a large majority the previous month by the Second Chamber.

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The object of the new law is to lighten the charges imposed on both the State and the country at large by the necessity of maintaining a permanent Army, without compromising the superior interests of National Defence. It also attempts to settle the much vexed question of what is known as the *portion restante* (*blijvende gedeelte*) of the Dutch Army. The attempts to settle this question has already brought about the fall of two previous Ministers of War—Generals Staal and van Rappard.

According to the Militia Law of 24th June, 1901, and that of the *Landweer* of 27th July, 1901, every citizen is liable for personal service during 15 years, of which 8 are passed in the Militia and 7 in the *Landweer*.

The annual contingent was divided into two portions:—

1. 12,300 Militiamen serving 8 months and a half in the unmounted arms, 18 months in the mounted arms.
2. 5,200 men who served for 4 months, but who had to show that they had undergone a certain amount of preparatory military instruction.

The Militiamen are drawn by lot from among the men passed as fit for military service.

In order to assure continuity of service, the Minister could retain under arms a certain number among them, who composed this so-called *portion restante*. These men were retained for 4 months (in the unmounted arms) or 6 months (in the mounted). They were drawn by special lot in each corps, and could exchange their numbers among themselves, the cost of getting a substitute being from 60 to 150 florins. The effective strength of the *portion restante* had of late years fallen from 6,270 men to 2,180.

The main alteration brought about by the new law consists in the annual calling up of the men liable for service in the Militia in the unmounted arms taking place in two different periods of the year instead of only at one.

According to the new system, the recruits called up for 8 months' service will be divided into two groups. The first, 4,000 men, will remain under the colours from the 15th of March to the 30th of November, and will serve to constitute two companies in each battalion. The two other companies will receive on the 31st of May all the men doing 4 months' active service, and, on the 30th of September, the second group of 4,000 men, who have to put in 8 months.

Each year this division will alternate, so that the two companies which have received one year the four-months men and the autumn half-levy of the eight-months, will receive the following year the spring half-levy of eight-months men, but no four-months recruits.

Following the first instruction of each half-levy of the eight-months men, a *portion restante* will continue active service for another two months. The effective strength of this number will be about 4,000 men. The four-months men will draw lots by halves for this service, each half concurrently with one of the eight-months half-levies. The length of this period of service is lowered from four to two months.

In this way each eight-months half-levy, with the *portion restante*, overlaps the other about four months. During this time, this last is excused

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all guard and fatigue duty. This system favours, better than the old, the formation of the Training *Cadres*, and it assures a constant covering force in case of mobilisation.

The companies of each battalion will thus have an identical force and composition. The summer and winter service will be equally divided. This new organisation will allow of recruits following their instruction without interruptions caused by fatigue duties. While improving the working of the military service, these modifications will realise a reduction of two months of service for each man and 18,328 days of maintenance for the State, which means an economy of 502,833 francs (£20,113). There will also be under the colours, available for the Grand Manœuvres, a large number of men in the month of September.

The results of the trial of the new regulations in the infantry will show if they can be applied to the unmounted corps of the artillery and engineers; if the new plan works well, the law of 1901 will be definitely modified and applied to all the unmounted corps. In the meanwhile the Militiamen told off for these corps will be incorporated in March, and the service for the *portion restante* will be four months, as formerly.

In the mounted artillery and cavalry the Militiamen will be called up: for the artillery, at the same time as the spring eight-months levy, and for the cavalry at the same time as the autumn levy. They will be incorporated respectively at these levies if the number of volunteers is insufficient.

This system applies equally to the Naval Militia destined to complete the crews of the home defence ships. However, the special exigencies of this service do not render possible the calling up of the second half-levy on the 1st of October. This time of year is, as a matter of fact, the most unfavourable for training on board—training which lasts from three months and a half to four months. Called up on the 1st of August, the men of the second half-levy are able to replace those incorporated in March, when these last take their departure. There remains then an interval of twelve weeks between the time when the men of the second half-levy are set free and the men of the spring levy come in. This void would be filled up by the calling out in two classes of the men in their third year of service who have to put in a six weeks' period of training. To sum up, according to the new law the military service in Holland will be regulated as follows:—

Total length of liability for service, 15 years (20 to 35 years): eight years in the Militia, seven years in the *Landweer*.

## Active service:—

Eight months and a half in the unmounted arms;

Eighteen months in the mounted arms;

Four months for 5,200 Militiamen who can prove a certain amount of military instruction or school proficiency; or, in case of a numerical deficiency, for the Militiamen who have drawn the highest numbers;

Ten months and a half (infantry), twelve months and a half (other unmounted arms), twenty-four months (mounted arms): for the Militiamen of the *portion restante* drawn by lot in the contingent, with possibility of exchange of numbers on payment of a pecuniary indemnity.



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Date of summons to the colours:—

The 15th of March and the 1st of October for the Militiamen serving eight months and a half in the infantry;

The 1st of June for those serving four months in the infantry;

The 1st of October for the cavalry;

The 15th of March for the unmounted troops other than the infantry, and for the mounted artillery.

It does not appear that the Army officers, especially the captains, are very enthusiastic over the new measures from which the Minister expects so much. With regard to the fortress artillery, it would appear *a priori* that the winter exercises, which are of quite a different nature to those of the infantry, offer some difficulties not easily to be surmounted. In addition, it is expected that the institution of the four months' service Militiamen will disappear before long, since the new Minister at different times has shown himself opposed to it. — *Revue Militaire des Armées Etrangères*, and *Revue Militaire Suisse*.

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## NAVAL AND MILITARY CALENDAR.

JULY, 1909.

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- 5th (M.) Presentation of Colours to and Review of the West Lancashire Division (Territorial Force) by H.M. the King at Knowsley Park.
- 5th & 6th Centenary of the Battle of Wagram, when the Austrians were completely defeated by Napoleon.
- 6th (T.) Presentation of Colours to and Review of the East Lancashire Division (Territorial Force) by H.M. the King at Worsley Park.
- 8th (Th.) Inspection of the Hon. Artillery Company by H.M. the King in the grounds of Buckingham Palace.
- " " Bicentenary of the Battle of Poltava, in which Peter the Great utterly defeated Charles XII. of Sweden.
- 9th (F.) Inspection of the Boys of the Royal Hospital School, Greenwich, by H.M. the King in the grounds of Buckingham Palace.
- 11th (S.) Launch of second-class cruiser *Augsburg* from the Imperial Dockyard, Kiel, for German Navy.
- 14th (W.) Loss of submarine C11 off Cromer by collision with s.s. *Eddystone*, 13 lives lost.
- " " Resignation of Prince von Bülow as German Chancellor, and Herr von Bethman-Hollweg appointed as his successor.
- 16th (F.) Deposition of Shah of Persia, and his son, the Crown Prince, proclaimed Shah in his stead.
- 17th (Sat.) Arrival of the Home and Atlantic Fleets in the Thames.
- 20th (T.) Official visit of the Lord Mayor and Lords of the Admiralty to the Fleet off Southend.
- " " H.M.S. *Philomel* arrived at Portsmouth from East Indies.

- 21st (W.) Forty officers and 1,200 men of the Fleet entertained at Lunch at the Guildhall by the Lord Mayor and Corporation.
- 22nd (Th.) Luncheon to Admiral Sir W. May and 500 Officers of the Fleet at the Guildhall by the Lord Mayor and Corporation.
- 23rd (F.) H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught resigned his post as Commander-in-Chief and High Commissioner in the Mediterranean.
- 24th (Sat.) Fleet in the Thames dispersed.
- 26th (M.) Inspection of Australian and New Zealand Contingent of Bluejackets by H.M. the King in the grounds of Buckingham Palace.
- " " Military contingents of the four Protecting Powers (England, France, Italy and Russia) withdrawn from Crete.
- " " H.M.S. *Philomel* paid off at Portsmouth.
- 27th (T.) H.M.S. *Philomel* recommissioned at Portsmouth.
- 27th & 28th Centenary of the Battle of Talavera.
- 28th (W.) Government scheme for formation of Territorial Force Reserve announced in House of Lords.
- 30th (F.) Arrival of Home and Atlantic Fleets in Solent for Royal Review.
- 31st (Sat.) Review of Home and Atlantic Fleets by H.M. the King.

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## FOREIGN PERIODICALS

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*Revista Científico-Militar y Biblioteca Militar.* Barcelona: 10th July, 1909.—"The Crisis of the Victory." "The Armies of the Future." "On Infantry Fire." "Aerial Attack." "Japanese Lessons from the Last War." 25th July.—"Melilla." "Instruction and Education." "The Armies of the Future" (continued). "The Arabs." "Infantry Attack Formations from the Artillery Point of View."

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UNITED STATES.—*Journal of the United States Infantry Association.* Washington : July, 1909.—“The Regular Army.” “The First Battle of Bull Run.” “Our Present Drill Regulations.” “Looking Backward.” *Selection versus Seniority.* “The E 14th Infantry Pack.” “Cavalry and the Aeroplane.” “History of the 21st U.S. Infantry.”

*Journal of the U.S. Cavalry Association.* Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: July, 1909.—“Horses and Riding” (concluded). “Horse Breeding in Prussia.” “Veterinary Service of the United States; Historical Sketch.” “Principles of Fire and the Technical and Practical Use of the Present Rapid Field Artillery.” “Machine Gun Experiments.” “Individual Instruction.”

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## NOTICES OF BOOKS

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*Staff Rides and Regimental Tours.* By Colonel R. C. B. HAKING. London : Hugh Rees, Ltd., 1908.

The literature on this increasingly important branch of military education is not yet very large, and there is certainly no one better qualified to explain its methods than Colonel Haking. He has had for many years a large experience of staff rides; he has been both the instructor and the instructed; and he is universally recognised as an expert in the particular forms of these exercises of which he treats in this little book. Its scope, as he tells us in his preface, is limited to the comparatively small staff rides, held in commands, divisions, and brigades, to regimental tours, and to other regimental exercises on the ground; of the larger staff rides, such as are conducted by the higher military authorities of the Army, and of which the advantages are necessarily confined to a very limited circle, there is here but small mention. The whole matter connected with staff rides is carefully gone through from the very beginning; there is a very excellent opening chapter on the training of officers for war, and this is followed by one wherein *all* the preliminary arrangements for a staff ride are discussed, from the selection of the locality and arrangements with hotel-keepers to the best means of locomotion for the officers engaged. Five chapters are devoted to the due consideration of the preparation of the scheme—the limitations of detachments, the danger of the too-imaginative scheme, how those based on actual events, taken from real history, may be made to serve. The chapter on the method of directing a staff ride contains much that is of very real value, while the suggestions for criticising work and for the conduct of conferences, are embodied in a chapter, every word of which breathes of that tact which we all claim to possess, but which is given in fullest measure to so few. Colonel Haking writes for the regimental officers of the Regular Army, as also of the Territorial and Imperial Forces, and for these the chapters on regimental tours and on the conduct of a war course will provide something of a more personal interest. Here the scheme, of such importance in the larger operations treated of in the opening chapters of the book, becomes

of infinitely less value than the carrying out of tactical exercises on the actual ground, for which purpose the map should, whenever possible, be discarded, and those taking part should be encouraged to make their plans and state their intentions by references to the ground features in their view.

Colonel Haking impresses upon his readers throughout the need for the strictest observance at all times of the principles contained in the official manuals; the suggested exercises are admirable, and the sketches clear and helpful; while he writes throughout, not only as one who knows his subject by heart, but who really enjoys imparting to others the instruction he is so well qualified to give.

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*Notes on Staff Rides and Regimental and Tactical Tours for Beginners.*  
By Major T. E. FOWLE. London and Aldershot: Gale and Polden, Ltd., 1908.

As this little book has already run into two editions, it seems likely that it has been found useful by others than the mere beginners, for whom its pages were primarily intended. Staff rides would seem to have come upon the commissioned ranks of the Army with some suddenness, to have been almost of the nature of a surprise, to have called officers to take part in them before they had any very clear idea of the work that was expected of them. For such a book, then, as that prepared by Major Fowle, there was a real need, and his general arrangement of the subject matter seems clear and practical, while the headings being given in leaded type, the reader is assisted materially to find any particular paragraph of which he may be in search. Written mainly for officers serving in India, it should be equally useful to men soldiering in England; the orders and instructions at the end are very much to the point. The little book is of a very convenient size, and if, perhaps, not so ambitious in general scope as some other publications on the same subject, the methods advocated by Major Fowle are simple and eminently instructive. These "Notes" seem especially suitable for regimental officers in general and for Territorial officers in particular.

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PRINCIPAL ADDITIONS TO LIBRARY DURING JULY, 1909.

*Life of Field-Marshal Sir Neville Chamberlain, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.* By G. W. FORREST. 8vo. 18s. (William Blackwood & Sons.) London, 1909.

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*An Introduction to Military Geography.* By Brigadier-General E. S. MAY. 8vo. 8s. 6d. (Presented.) (Hugh Rees, Ltd.) London, 1909.

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*Lectures on the Strategy of the Franco-German War, 1870, up to the Battle of Sedan.* By Brevet-Major W. D. BIRD. 8vo. 6s. (Presented.) (Hugh Rees, Ltd.) London, 1909.

- An Introduction to Military Geography.* By J. FITZGERALD LEE. (*Civil and Military Gazette.*) 8vo. 4s. 6d. Lahore, 1908.
- 
- Handbook of the Austro-Hungarian Army.* 4th Edition. Prepared by the General Staff, War Office. 12mo. (Presented.) (Mackie & Co., Ltd.) London, 1909.
- 
- La Campagne de 1814 en France.* Par le Général Carl von Clausewitz. Traduit de l'Allemand par G. Duval de Fraville, chef d'Escadron. 8vo. 2s. 8d. (Henri Charles-Levauxelle.) Paris, 1900.
- 
- Reminiscences of a Naval Officer during the late War.* With sketches and Anecdotes of distinguished Commanders. By Captain A. CRAWFORD, R.N. 2 vols. 8vo. 9s. (Henry Colburn.) London, 1851.
- 
- Ueber Kriegsmässige Ausbildung und Verwendung unserer Kavallerie.* By RITTMESTER FREIHERR VON EDELSHEIM. 8vo. 4s. 6d. (Presented.) (R. Eisenschmidt.) Berlin, 1909.
- 
- Modern Riding, with Notes on Horse Training.* By Major NOEL BIRCH, R.H.A. Crown 8vo. 6s. (Presented.) (Hutchinson & Co.) London, 1909.
- 
- Report of a Magnetic Survey of South Africa.* By J. C. BEATTIE. 4to. (Presented.) (Cambridge University Press.) London, 1909.
- 
- Recollections of Military Service in 1813, 1814, and 1815.* By Sergeant THOMAS MORRIS, of the 2nd Bn. 73rd Regiment of Foot. 8vo. 10s. (James Madden & Co.) London, 1845.
- 
- Training and Manœuvre Regulations, 1909.* 12mo. 4d. (Presented.) (Harrison & Sons.) London, 1909.
- 
- Two Native Narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi.* Translated from the originals by the late CHARLES THEOPHILUS METCALFE. 8vo. (Presented.) (Archibald Constable & Co.) Westminster, 1898.
- 
- Administration Report on the Railways in India for the Calendar Year 1908.* By the Railway Board. Fcap fol. 2s. 8d. (Presented.) Simla, 1909.
- 
- Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War.* By Brevet-Major W. D. BIRD. 8vo. 4s. 6d. (Presented.) (Hugh Rees, Ltd.) London, 1909.



*The Army Annual*, 1909. 8vo. 7s. 6d. (Presented.) (The Army Press.) London, 1909.

*Across a Continent in a Man-of-War, being the Log of Commission of H.M.S. Pelorus*, 1906-1907. By E. E. HIGHAMS. Crown 8vo. 5s. (The Westminster Press.) London, 1909.

*Through Uganda to Mount Elgon*. By the Rev. J. B. PURVIS. 8vo. 6s. (T. Fisher Unwin.) London, 1909.

*Gunnery Drill Book for H.M.'s Fleet*, 1909. 12mo. 9d. (Eyre & Spottiswoode, Ltd.) London, 1909.

*Historical Record of the 76th "Hindustan" Regiment from its Formation in 1787 to 30th June, 1881*. Compiled and Edited by Lieut.-Colonel F. A. HAYDEN, D.S.O. 8vo. (Presented.) (A. C. Lomax.) Lichfield, 1909.

*The Engineering of Ordnance*. By A. TREVOR DAWSON. (The Gustav Canet Lecture.) 8vo. (Presented.) (Perceval Marshall & Co.) London, 1909.

*Rapid Night Marching Made Easy*. By Major W. A. TILNEY, 17th Lancers. 8vo. 2s. 6d. (Edward Stanford.) London, 1909.

*Le Champs de Bataille et le Pays de Waterloo en 1815 et Actuellement*. By LOUIE NAVEZ. 8vo. 4s. 6d. (J. Lebeque et Cie.) Brussels, 1908.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS OF MILITARY  
INTEREST.

COMPILED BY THE GENERAL STAFF, WAR OFFICE.

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PREFATORY NOTE.

This Pamphlet will be issued quarterly, in April, July, October and January. Its purpose is to draw the attention of Officers to British and Foreign publications of Military interest which are likely to assist them in their professional work. Copies of the pamphlet will be distributed to the Headquarters of Commands, Educational Establishments, Units and Reference Libraries.

PART II. SECTION I. BOOKS.

NOTE.—1. When the price is not given in Part II., Section I., it is not known.

2. In Part II., Section I., books whose titles are given in foreign languages as well as in English, are published in those languages, and are not translated.

HISTORICAL.

*The British Empire, its Past, its Present, and its Future.* Edited by A. F. Pollard, M.A. 864 pp. 8vo. London, 1909. The League of the Empire. Caxton Hall. 5/-.

This exhaustive account of the British Empire owes its origin to the generosity of Mr. Louis Spitzel and the enthusiasm of Mr. Thomas Henry Monk, though unfortunately, neither lived to see the result of their practical interest in the Empire. The work made possible by their efforts, however, was entrusted to the History Section of the League of the Empire, with Professor Bury as its chairman. The object of the volume is primarily educational and the secondary object is to make further provision for education in the Empire.

The work is divided into three sections (or books) and begins with a description of the physical features of the British Isles and a brief outline of English History from the year B.C. 55 up to the present time. It also deals with the founding of the British Colonies, commercial expansion, and other political and social problems. About one-third of the contents of the book is the result of the co-operation of men actually responsible for the government of the Empire in all quarters of the globe.

Book 2 deals with the self-governing States; their expansion, politics, natural resources, trade, &c.

Book 3 treats of the Empire of India, Crown Colonies and Dependencies.

Accounts of the wars in Canada, the American War of Independence, New Zealand wars, the several conflicts in South Africa, including the war 1899-1902, and wars in India, are included in this volume, together with the events leading up to them and the results which followed.

The chapter on "Downing Street and the Colonies" (XVI.) and the concluding chapter on "The Future Organisation of the Empire," are of interest to all students of the Imperial problem.

*Cambridge Modern History, Volume XI. The growth of Nationalities.* Edited by A. W. Ward, G. W. Prothero, and S. Leathes. 994 pp., with index. 8vo. Cambridge, 1909. University Press. 16/-.

This volume covers the period 1840-1871. From a military point of view the chief interest centres in Chapters XI., XVI., XXI., and XXVI. which deal respectively with "Great Britain and the Crimean War," "Bismarck and German Unity," "The Franco-German War," and "India and Afghanistan." The first mentioned contains a brief account of the engagements in the Crimea and deals more fully with the origin and results of that war. The second gives an interesting account of Bismarck's policy from 1862 to 1871, commencing with the reorganisation of the Army and ending with the proclamation of the Empire at Versailles.

The chapter on the Franco-German War is full of military interest. It gives an excellent account of the policy of both nations and the effect of preparation for war, or the lack of it, on that policy.

Germany had made the utmost use of the lessons she learnt in 1866 and had perfected her organisation in every detail, with the result that on the outbreak of hostilities she was able to put her machinery into working order at once and with the happiest results. She set herself the attainment of a definite object, namely, the destruction of the French armies in the field, and all subordinates worked for that object.

France, on the other hand, had been content to believe that her organisation was perfect without testing it. The result was confusion, loss of initiative and disaster at the outset, from which she never recovered. Her soldiers fought stubbornly throughout and maintained the traditions of their nation, but lacked leaders and a definite purpose.

The deep study of every detail on the part of Moltke, and his controlling hand, is well brought out and forms a striking contrast to the ill-directed and spasmodic movements of the French.

The comparative ease with which the German army was able to carry out its right wheel was in itself a triumph for Moltke's organisation.

The efforts to raise and organize huge masses of untrained men, after the siege of Paris began, although evidence of Gambetta's extraordinary energy, show clearly the hopelessness of such a task and serve as an object lesson to all nations of the folly of neglecting to prepare in peace time for what History shows is required in war.

The chapter "India and Afghanistan" traces the course of Indian history from 1815 to 1869. In the compass of the 30 pages allotted to this subject it is impossible to deal fully with any particular incident. The author has, however, succeeded in producing in this small space an excellent survey of the ever-changing vicissitudes of British rule in India, and, notwithstanding the complicated nature of the operations carried on, has presented a clear and interesting narrative of the period.

The value of the volume to the military student is increased by the addition of an excellent bibliography, which includes the chief works dealing with the campaigns of the period.

*The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World.* New Edition. By Sir E. Creasy. 504 pp., with index. 8vo. London, 1908. Harper. 5/-.

Part I. containing Creasy's 15 decisive battles is full of interest and is well-known to students of History. The accounts are concise and bring out the characteristics of the leaders and the methods of warfare adopted by them, as well as the fighting qualities of the troops. The power of organisation, the strategical and tactical plans of such men as Miltiades, Alexander, Scipio, Arminius, William the Conqueror, Marlborough, Peter the Great and Wellington are well worth careful study, while the account of Waterloo furnishes several interesting anecdotes not given in other publications on that campaign.

Part II. contains descriptions of the battles of Quebec, Yorktown, Vicksburg, Gettysburg, Sedan, Manila Bay, Santiago and Tsushima. Good as these brief sketches are, they suffer somewhat from being curtailed to an even greater extent than those contained in Part I. The accounts of Sedan, Gettysburg, and the naval battles of Manila Bay and Tsushima are of most interest.

The maps are hardly up to the standard of the work itself, especially in Part I., to which the addition of a General Map of the Ancient World would have been of value.

*The Battle of Franklin.* By Captain R. W. Banks. 88 pp. 8vo. New York and Washington, 1908. The Neale Publishing Company. 5/-.

If the author's object is to prove the truth of his description, given on the title page, of the battle of Franklin as "the bloodiest engagement of the war between the States," the method which he has adopted is somewhat primitive. He gives no statistics of the losses incurred in any other battle. It is, however, probably true that this battle was "in some parts of the line the bloodiest of the Civil War." It commenced at 4 p.m. of a November day and in some five hours fighting the Confederates lost over 8,000 men out of about 30,000 actually engaged. The author was acting during the battle as adjutant of an Alabama regiment forming part of Stewart's Corps, which was posted on the right of the Confederate attack.

He himself performed an act of notable bravery, which is described with due modesty. The account of the battle is little else than an eulogy of the splendid valour of the Mississippi regiments engaged. There is no criticism of Hood's tactics, and no connected narrative of the battle as a whole. It is stated that only four guns were engaged on the Confederate side and they but for a short time, out of regard for the women and children in the town. This statement, though originally made by Hood himself, is contradicted by the Federal General J. D. Cox, a participant in and historian of, the battle.

*The Chancellorsville Campaign.* By Charles Richardson. 124 pp. 8vo. New York and Washington, 1907. The Neale Publishing Company. 4/-.

The author, who is a Southerner, confines himself, as the title page "Fredericksburg to Salem Church" indicates, to an account of the part played by Sedgwick in the above campaign. The sketch, which he gives of the Federal general's operations, is very slight. It takes the shape of a narrative without criticism or comment, maps or plans, set forth in somewhat high-flown language, and consequently fails to throw any light upon the controversies, which have arisen in regard to the conduct both of Sedgwick and Early.

*A Campaign in Upper Tonkin.* (Une campagne dans le Haut-Tonkin.) By Captain Bernard. 177 pp., with 8 maps and plans. 8vo. Paris, 1906. Lavauzelle. 4/-.

The operations of the French troops are followed in detail from January to May, 1896, during which time they were not fighting against the hostile inhabitants of the country, but against Chinese pirates.

The author considers that the effects of these and similar operations will not have any permanent effect, and that Tonkin will always afford a career of adventure and profit for ambitious French officers.

*German Official Account of the Russo-Japanese War (Wa-fan-gou).* Authorised translation by K. von Donat. 256 pp., with 4 appendices, including 5 photographs; 11 maps in pocket. 8vo. London, 1908. Hugh Rees. 10/6. (For Yalu volume, see p. 14 of No. 8.)

This is a continuation of the history prepared by the German Great General Staff. The first portion, dealt with Fort Arthur, and of this no translation has yet been published. The second was an account of the events leading up to the war, and the operations by land and sea up to the Ya-lu, inclusive. The present volume is the third instalment, and deals with the operations after the Ya-lu and up to the evening of the 28th August, 1904, immediately preceding the battle of Liao-yang.

The work has the same defects as the translation of the second instalment, in that the names are spelt according to the German method, so that it is only by comparing dates that some of the places can be identified, and the English is at times a little hard to understand. The details are, however, worked out in a most painstaking manner and the book contains a quantity of useful information.

It is divided into six chapters, of which the first opens with a description of the situation in the south-western theatre towards the end of May, 1904. The battle of Nan-shan was described in the first part of the history, and only the briefest of references is here made to it; the earliest general action considered is that of the 2nd Japanese Army at Tê-li-su (Wa-fang-kou). The second chapter is a continuation of the first, and deals with the operations subsequent to Tê-li-su up to the beginning of August, 1904. General Kuropatkin is described as nervous lest his "southern detachment" at Kai-p'ing might be cut off, and as having lost heart after the reverse of Tê-li-su. The chapter includes an account of the battle of Ta-shih-ch'iao and of the arrival of the 4th Japanese Army, which came into position on the right of the second, ending with the occupation of Hai-ch'êng by the Japanese.

In Chapter III. the scene is shifted to the eastern theatre, and the operations are described from the time the 1st Japanese Army left Feng-huang-ch'êng until the beginning of August, 1904. It is stated that Kuropatkin, being anxious about his left flank, sent the 10th Army Corps to check any movement in that direction, and that this corps sacrificed its initiative for the sake of having an entrenched position on to which it could fall back.

Chapter IV. contains a survey of the situation immediately before the operations leading up to the battle of Liao-yang. On the whole it is disappointing, but some interesting examples are given of the Russian ignorance as to the forces to which they were opposed. The total strength of the Japanese in Manchuria at this time, i.e., the 1st, 2nd and 4th Armies, is placed at 125,000, while the number of Russians opposed to them is estimated at 185,000, of whom perhaps 140,000 were combatants. The Russians, moreover, received reinforcements during the fighting, whereas the Japanese grew steadily weaker owing to their heavy losses.

Chapter V. describes the operations resulting from the advance of the 1st Japanese Army at Liao-yang, and the fighting of the 29th to 31st August, while Chapter VI. deals with the 2nd and 4th Armies for the corresponding period, and closes with a general review of the situation on the evening of the 28th August, 1904.

The most interesting portion of the book is the chapter of comments with which it concludes. Although consisting of barely 10 pages, it is full of trenchant criticism from beginning to end. Attention is drawn to the peculiar effect which the geographical features of the country had upon the Russian strategy, by neutralising to a large extent the advantage which they possessed in acting on interior lines, but adverse comment is made on the lack of decision and initiative displayed by the Russian commanders, and on their habit of relying on entrenched positions. The slowness of the Japanese advance is attributed to the necessity for making sure of everything which they gained, and of guaranteeing themselves against any reverse, however slight, lest difficulties should arise when they required their next foreign loan.

The Appendices show the organisation of the forces on both sides.

*The Russian Army and the Japanese War.* By General Kuropatkin. Translated by Captain A. B. Lindsey, 2nd Gurkha Rifles, and edited by Major E. D. Swinton, D.S.O., R.E. In 2 volumes, with maps, illustrations and index. Fol. I., 309 pp.; Vol. II., 335 pp. 8vo. London, 1909. Murray. 28/-.

The original work consisted of four volumes, the first three of which dealt with the fighting round Liao-yang, on the Sha Ho, and at Mukden. Captain Lindsey's translation embraces only the fourth and a small portion of the third volumes.

General Kuropatkin commenced his book in Manchuria while superintending the demobilization of the Russian forces after the war, and completed it at his country seat in Russia. Its publication in Russia was immediately stopped.

The work at present under review, being well translated and carefully edited, forms a readable and instructive publication, providing much food for thought as well as useful information for the student of Russian military organisation.

As the translator aptly remarks in his preface, it is no mere *apologia*, but a protest that the war, as far as Russia was concerned, was not fought to a finish.

The following is a brief summary of the contents:

Volume I. Author's introduction.—Sources from which the material for the first three volumes were drawn. Baneful influence of the Press. The work done by the Ministry of War during the period 1898-1904.

Chapter I.—The problems with which the Russian War Department was confronted during the past two centuries. Russia's struggle to reach the Baltic and Black Seas. The problems of Poland and Finland. Causes of the failure in the Crimea, 1854-55. Defective organisation exposed by the Russo-Turkish War 1877-78.

Chapter II.—The strategical suitability of Russia's European and Asiatic frontiers. Possible results of a war with Germany or Austria.

No advantages to be gained by territorial acquisition in Persia. The possession of India would be an insupportable burden for Russia. Necessity for strengthening Russia's western frontier in preference to aggressive enterprise elsewhere.

Chapter III.—The expansion of the Russian army in the 18th and 19th centuries. The growth of neighbouring armies. Russia's isolation in 1878. Afghanistan a hostile buffer State. The inferiority of Russian strategic railways. The magnitude of the problem of the defence of the Russian Empire.

Chapter IV.—Russia's military policy in the 30th century. No need to increase her territory. Great danger on the western frontier owing to the perfect state of German and Austrian preparations. Russia, being essentially a land Power, ought not to spend large sums on a navy.

Chapter V.—The task which confronted the War Minister previous to 1904. Inadequacy of the sums voted for improving the army.

The strengthening of Russia's position in the Far East. Vladivostok and Port Arthur. The Siberian Railway. New Q.F. field guns.

Chapter VI.—Kuropatkin's efforts, as War Minister, to avert hostilities with Japan. Bobrovnikov and the Royal Timber Company.

Chapter VII.—Causes of the success of the Japanese. Their patriotism and high moral. Low estimate of their strength formed by the Russian staff.

Chapter VIII.—Reasons for the failure of the Russians. Insignificant part played by the fleet. Inadequate carrying capacity of the Siberian railway. Delay in mobilising reinforcements. Anxiety for her western frontier and internal disorders prevented Russia from sending her best troops to the Far East. The long railway journey was detrimental to efficiency and discipline. Lack of military spirit among the older reservists. Depletion of the combatant ranks. Shortage of officers. Defective technical equipment. Premature declaration of peace.

Volume II. Chapters IX. and X.—Reasons for Russian failure (continued).—

Want of uniformity in training of troops, especially in the Kiev Military District under General Dragomirov. Faulty staff work. Neglect of intercommunication. Insufficient cavalry reconnaissance. Lack of co-operation. Employment of dense formations in the attack. Waste of ammunition. Neglect of the spade. The series of instructions issued to the troops by Kuropatkin during 1904 are given. They are full of elementary platitudes, and contain frequent allusions to bad leading on the part of officers and skulking on the part of the rank and file. Ignorance and general inefficiency of the reservists. Strategical error in not concentrating at Harbin until the arrival of reinforcements. Evil influence of seditious propaganda among the troops. The Russian troops were unfamiliar with mountain warfare. Units were below strength owing to the large number of men employed on non-combatant duties, and various pretexts found for quitting the ranks. Drafts arrived too late.

Strained relations between the Commander-in-Chief and corps commanders. Disregard and wilful contravention of orders. General Gripenberg specially censured in this respect.

The defects of the officers are enumerated. Higher commanders showed lack of initiative and ignorance of tactics. Regimental officers unable to read maps. Regular officers were, as a rule, brave but ignorant. Ensigns of the reserve proved very unsatisfactory and lacked military instinct. Those promoted from the ranks for distinguished service were excellent.

General Staff officers did good work, but were not sufficiently in touch with the troops.

As regards the rank and file, those serving with the colours were thoroughly reliable, but many of the reservists, especially second category men from large towns, were difficult to handle.

The war was unpopular. Lamentable indifference of the civil population. Thousands of idle students unwilling to enlist. Hostility of the social revolutionaries.

Kuropatkin's farewell address to the officers of the 1st Manchurian Army is given at length.

Chapter XI.—Measures suggested for improving the army.



The principal reforms advocated are\*:-

- (1) The amelioration of the material position of the officers.
- (2) Inducements to N.C.O.'s to extend their service.
- (3) Means for keeping reservists in touch with the army.
- (4) Relieving the private soldier from non-military duties.
- (5) Increasing the proportion of sappers in a division.
- (6) Reducing the proportion of guns to rifles in a division to 3 per 1,000.
- (7) The formation of depot battalions for each regiment on mobilization.

As regards higher organisation, the author advocates having 3 infantry divisions in an army corps, each division consisting of 2 infantry brigades, a regiment of artillery (4 batteries of 12 guns each) a sapper battalion, a telegraph company, and 3 squadrons of cavalry besides transport company, parks, hospitals, bakeries, &c.

For the composition of a cavalry division he recommends 3 cavalry brigades and a horse artillery battery of 12 guns. Two batteries of howitzers (12 howitzers to each battery) should be allotted to each army corps as corps artillery.

The failure of the cavalry in the war was due to bad leading. The junior officers were, as a rule, good, the field officers moderate, and the generals, with few exceptions, bad.

Chapter XII.—Recapitulation of the causes of the failure of the Russians. Improvements made during the war to the Siberian railway. Carrying capacity raised from 2 to 12 pairs of military trains in 24 hours. The Russian army had reached a strength of 1,000,000 men when peace was declared, while the Japanese were then at the end of their resources.

Chapter XIII.—Introduction and conclusion to Volume III. A recapitulation. Difference of opinion between Kuropatkin and Viceroy Alexeev as to the strength of the garrison required for Port Arthur.

Disposition of the Russian troops in the Far East in March, 1904. Premature engagement with the enemy by General Zasulich on the Ya-lu in direct contravention of Kuropatkin's orders. Zasulich's excuse that he thought he could defeat the enemy. Kuropatkin advocated concentration of forces in Manchuria, and discouraged the relief of Port Arthur.

Account of the fighting at Liao-yang and on the Sha-Ho. Mishchenko's raid on Ying-k'ou. Battle of Mukden. Causes of the Russian defeat. Kuropatkin blames himself.

Appendices.—I. The Royal Timber Company. II. The breakdown of the Russian unit organisation and system of distribution.

**The Russo-Japanese War. A help to study.** (Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg, Ein Studienheft.) By Johann Meister, Captain 24th Infantry Regiment. 34 pp., with 1 general map. Vienna, 1909. Seidel. 1/7.

This pamphlet contains a *précis* of the chief events of the war. The author has endeavoured to give an uninterrupted account of the principal occurrences of the Manchurian campaign and to unite them into one picture, so that the student may possess a clear idea of its main features before proceeding to a study of more detailed works. In this he has succeeded, his style is clear and concise, and the book appears to fulfil the object for which it was written. The spelling of the place names may perhaps cause some difficulty to those who are only accustomed to that adopted in British official publications. The pamphlet closes with an excellent summary of the lessons of the war.

**The Russo-Japanese War, Second Volume** (Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg Teil II.). By General von Lignitz. 132 pp. (numbered 144-276), with 8 appendices, 18 illustrations in text, 8 maps, and a full table of contents. Svo. Berlin, 1909. Voessische Buchhandlung. 2/-.

This volume deals with the events of the war from the landing of the Japanese in Manchuria up to the eve of Liao-yang. The first few pages contain a history of the defences (existing and projected) of Port Arthur and the Chin-chou position between the date of the Russian occupation and the Russo-Japanese war. The Chin-chou position is described in detail.

After a discussion on the advisability—from the Japanese point of view—of a siege of Port Arthur as opposed to a land blockade of the Kuan-tung Peninsula, the author proceeds to describe the battle of Nan-shan. According to him the Chinese inhabitants, exasperated by the demands made by the Russian troops during their occupation of Chin-chou and neighbourhood, revenged themselves by acting as pilots to the Japanese gun-boats, whilst others, who had been forced to work on the Nan-shan defences, betrayed the positions of the mines and of the wires connecting the latter with the observation stations. The author states that not a single Russian land mine produced any effect. He further points out that if the heavier Russian ordnance had been stationed on their left wing, the Japanese gun-boats could not have intervened in the action. He calls attention to the evil effects which premature exhaustion of artillery ammunition entailed for the defenders, and of the advantages accruing to the Japanese artillery through unity of direction. The handling of the Russian artillery is contrasted with that of the Turkish guns at Pierna.

The description of the fighting at Nan-shan is followed by brief *résumés* of the operations around Torres Vedras, Vicksburg, Düppel, Plevna, and Constantinople (1878), the tactics adopted in these cases being compared. As a result of the preceding studies the author discusses (on pages 174-175) the relative value of closed works and trenches, of advanced positions, trenches without parapets, entanglements, and mines.

Pages 176-182 contain a biographical sketch of General Kuropatkin. Next follows a *précis* of the negotiations preceding the war, of the plan of operations originally

\* Most of the suggestions have since been adopted.—General Staff, W.O.

adopted, and a discussion on the relative merits of Mukden and Liao-yang as bases of operations. A brief description is given of Port Arthur and its neighbourhood, as well as of the various schemes for fortifying the town.

In discussing the battle of Wa-fang-kou the author draws attention to the evil effects entailed by the faulty drafting of orders and the defective method of distributing them, on the Russian side. He likewise comments on the fact that the opposing commanders adopted identical plans, viz.:—to attack one of the enemy's flanks whilst holding him in the centre; but, whereas the Russian centre and right maintained an entirely passive attitude, all portions of the Japanese army participated in the offensive movement, thus bringing about a success. Several historical examples from medieval and modern warfare are cited, the tactics in which resembled those of Wa-fang-kou.

Succeeding portions of the book deal with the hill fighting between the Ya-lu and Liao-yang, and in the Kuan-tung Peninsula; the naval operations, and the advance of General Oku. Following these come observations on mountain warfare, the protection of railways, and the moral of the opposing armies. The descriptions of Japanese tactics in hill warfare are clear and instructive. The section on moral is the most interesting part of the book. Anecdotes are given illustrative of the superb spirit of sacrifice pervading the Japanese army. The information which the author gives concerning the state of discipline amongst the Russian forces leads one to the conclusion that this more than anything else contributed to their overthrow. The fatal effects of unduly expanding the establishment of the Russian units on mobilisation are repeatedly referred to. Statements are quoted from Russian and other authorities which present the Russian reservists in the most unfavourable light.

There are several printers' errors in the book. On page 190 "Port Arthur" is substituted for "Port Adams." On page 182 the order of the last five lines is changed.

The book is useful for a general survey rather than for a detailed study of this portion of the campaign.

**Napoleon's Staff Officers.** (Les états-majors de Napoléon). By General Derrécaigaix. 650 pp., with 8 maps and plans. 8vo. Paris, 1906. Chapelot. 10/-.

The author points out that after the successive victories of Napoleon, the names of his great generals became household words and all the successes were rightly attributed to them. Many of the triumphs, however, could not have been gained without such men as Berthier, Andréossy, Belliard, &c.

Belliard, Murat's chief of staff, was *par excellence* a cavalry staff officer, and possessed many of the qualities in which Murat was deficient.

As staff officer of cavalry, Belliard's record of campaigns comprises the wars of the Republic, campaign in Italy, the Tyrol, Egypt, Austerlitz, Prussia, Poland, Spain, Russia, Saxony, and the war of 1814. It was only in 1815, when Murat was no longer available, that the Emperor gave him command of a corps.

**Napoleon's Marshals.** By R. P. Dunn-Pattison. 358 pp., with index. 8vo. London, 1909. Methuen. 12/6.

The careers of the 26 marshals of the First Empire contained in this volume are of more interest as a study of their characters and of the character of the Emperor than from an historical point of view. The events in which they took part are but briefly outlined in so far as they affect the subject of the biography. The character sketches are well drawn and are interesting. Portraits of 19 of the marshals add to the attraction of the book.

**The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus.** By John F. Baddeley. 518 pp., with 5 maps, 2 plans, and illustrations. London, 1908. Longmans, Green. 21/-.

The Caucasus may be described as a mountain chain 650 miles long by about 100 miles broad. In the west, a forest region stretching down to the Black Sea, the Cherkes tribes waged desultory war against Russia from the end of the 18th century till 1864. In the east, the inhabitants of the forests of Chechnia and of the mountain plateaus of Daghestan defended their country nearly as long and with a larger measure of temporary success. In the centre the local tribes never gave serious trouble, and so the Georgian road, the only line by which the Russians could move south to the help of their Georgian allies beyond the great range, remained in Russian hands and the eastern theatre of war was sharply divided by a strip of territory, some 140 miles wide from that in the west.

This book gives an interesting connected account—the first complete account to appear in either Russia or England—of the operations in the eastern theatre, "the wars of the left wing" as they are called by Russian writers.

In 1801 Georgia was annexed by Russia. The following 39 years were occupied by wars against Persia and Turkey, and it was in 1830 that the Russians first seriously applied themselves to the subjugation of the hill tribes. In 1834 Shamil, as third Imam, placed himself at the head of the movement called Muridism, which, while originally purely religious, was developed for patriotic purposes to unite the tribes against the Russian invader.

Up till 1845 the Russians confined their operations to isolated expeditions which produced no lasting impression. In 1845 Prince Vorontsov first initiated the policy of advancing the Russian lines slowly and steadily towards the centre of the disaffected district and there stifling the revolt at its heart. This policy at length succeeded, and Shamil was surrounded and taken prisoner at Gunib on the 8th September, 1864.

The resistance of the mountain tribes of the Caucasus was the most formidable obstacle that Russia has yet met in her expansion towards the Middle East. Her subsequent advance through the level plains of Trans-Caspia to the northern frontier of Afghanistan has been accomplished with comparatively little loss.

The reader cannot fail to be struck by the remarkable resemblance of these mountain tribes to the Pathans on our own North-West Frontier in India. Both are brave, proud, hospitable; both are alike in their fanaticism, passionate love of liberty, and in their harsh treatment of women. It is interesting to imagine, in the light of the difficulties in which Russia was involved in the Caucasus, what our experiences would be in India, were it decided to advance the present administrative boundary up to the Durand line and bring the border tribes under our direct rule.

The description of the various engagements is interesting. In the northerly district of Chechnia the operations consisted of wood fighting. The Russian columns moved with patrols and scouts thrown out on all sides and camped at night in square formation, with infantry and artillery on the flanks and cavalry and transport in the centre. The Chechens constantly harassed the flank guards but seldom succeeded in reaching the main column. They placed their main reliance on the beech woods of the country and were eventually conquered more by the axe than by the sword. The *auls*, or villages, of Daghestan were built on sites where they could not be commanded from more elevated points within range of the guns then in use. They could be subdued only by storming, and, as the Murids fought to the last and the houses were arranged to enfilade one another, this storming was a formidable business.

*The Rumanian Army, as constituted by King Charles.* (Die Rumanische Armee, die Schöpfung König Carlos I.) By Freiherr von Hammerstein-Gesmold (German General Staff). 116 pp., with 6 sketch maps. 8vo. Berlin, 1909. Mittler. 3/6.

The Rumanian army as now constituted owes much to the personal interest and initiative of King Charles. When the latter was elected Prince of Rumania in 1866, the army was undisciplined and untaught, the officers were "more at home in the salon than on the parade ground," while there were but 15,000 rifles in the country, only a few antiquated French bronze guns for the artillery, and empty arsenals.

The change wrought by 1877-78 is evident from the part played by the Rumanian army in the Balkan campaign of that period, including the siege of Plevna, the incidents of which are fully described in the present book, as also the constitution and organisation of the various armed forces as they now exist in the country.

*Redvers Buller.* By Lewis Butler. 115 pp., with index. 8vo. London, 1909. Smith, Elder. 3/6.

An interesting account of 43 years spent in the service of his country showing the capacity for organisation and determination of this distinguished soldier and the kindly forethought displayed at all times, which made him so universally popular with those who served under his command.

Although containing an account of Sir Redvers' work and services in India, Canada, Egypt, South Africa and other parts of the world, that portion of the work referring to the late South African campaign is of special interest and shows clearly the difficulties with which he had to contend. The admiration for, and sympathy with, his soldiers is well shown in the letter to his wife, written immediately after the relief of Ladysmith, a facsimile of which is produced.

## POLITICAL.

*Prince Bülow and the Emperor William II.* (Fürst Bülow und Kaiser Wilhelm II.) By Rudolf Martin. 287 pp. 12mo. Leipzig. 1909. Bruno Volger. 4/-.

This book is a very severe criticism on the management of German politics by Prince von Bülow, especially as regards his conduct in the affair of the famous "interview" which appeared in the "Daily Telegraph" of November, 1908.

The author asserts that it was Mr. Harold Spender who compiled the "interview" in question, that the document was submitted by the Kaiser to Prince von Bülow for a report on its contents, and that the latter was guilty of grave negligence in failing to examine it. The interview, says Herr Martin, never really took place, but is a combination of alleged conversations of the Emperor in the course of his residence at Highcliffe in 1907. The version of these conversations given in the "Daily Telegraph" "interview" is far from authentic, and Mr. Harold Spender's information was evidently not obtained at first hand, but more probably from German sources.

The first chapter, which is entitled "Bernhard von Bülow in world politics" contains an account of the Chancellor's political career.

The writer contends that, while everyone must agree that von Bülow is one of the most accomplished statesmen of the present day, yet his management of political affairs has not been remarkable for its success. The most prominent features of the Chancellor's term of office are described as the dislocation of the imperial finances, the diminution of the national wealth by the granting of large loans to Russia, the revolt in South-West Africa, and the slow progress in the development of the navy. He further states that the November events have resulted in diminishing the esteem in which the Kaiser has hitherto been held by his subjects.

The political state of Germany, before the November events, is dealt with in detail in the second chapter of the book. Herr Martin then depicts the events of the first few years of the present Emperor's reign when Prince Bismarck was Chancellor. Next follow some interesting passages regarding the Kaiser's abilities,

tendencies, opinions, his religious sentiments, and his endeavours to further the cause of art and science. He has given special attention to the development of the navy, and it is to a great extent due to him that the shipbuilding law, extending to the year 1917, was adopted in 1900.

The Kaiser, says Herr Martin, has from the beginning of his reign fully comprehended the value of Heligoland. Had Great Britain retained Heligoland in her possession she would have been able to blockade the mouth of the Elbe as well as that of the Weser, but thanks to the Kaiser's foresight, Germany will now be able to make use of that island as a point of support in time of war with England or with France. Heligoland will, he thinks, gain enormously in value with the expansion of Germany's naval fleet.

The Kaiser made the greatest mistake of his reign, according to Herr Martin, in neglecting to accept the resignation of Prince von Bülou in October, 1908.

It is this forbearance, he asserts, which has done most injury to his power and which has exposed him to most unjust criticism. From the 17th November, 1908, it appeared to the world as if public power had been transferred from the Kaiser to the shoulders of the Chancellor. But even to-day, thinks Herr Martin, if the Emperor would only consent to the dismissal of Prince von Bülou he would once again enjoy his hereditary and constitutionally guaranteed Imperial rights.

All those, he concludes, who are desirous of a constitutional government should then insist upon an immediate change in the Chancellorship.

**The Balance of Power in Europe** (*Le principe d'équilibre et le concert européen*). By Charles Dupuis. 513 pp. 8vo. Paris, 1909. Perrin. 6/3.

The author divides his book into two parts. In the first he shows how the balance of power in Europe has been for three centuries past a guiding principle in European politics. He explains how the idea evolved that forces should be so grouped as to make it impossible for one State or group of States to dictate the terms to the remainder of Europe, and draws illustrations from the situation in Europe in 1814.

The second part of the book deals with the concert of Europe. It is explained that Napoleon's conquests led to the recognition of the necessity of a concert of the European Powers, and how the initial fruitless attempt to rule Europe by a permanent international government had good results in facilitating the discussion, and the solution by mutual concessions, of international difficulties.

The following situations are then discussed in detail:—

The independence of Belgium in 1831.

The Eastern crisis in 1839-41.

Eastern question during the Second Empire.

Russo-Turkish war, and the Treaty of Berlin.

The situation in Egypt, the Congo Free State and Morocco.

**The Entente Cordiale** (*L'Entente Cordiale*). By M. Joseph Perrean, formerly Professor of Military History at Saint Cyr. 200 pp. 8vo. Lyons, 1908. Legendre & Co. -/10.

This book is really a short history of the British Empire, with special reference to its past and present relations with France. The author deals with the British system of government, religion, agriculture, commerce, navy, &c., and shows that there are no real points of serious antagonism between England and France. He traces the long course of disputes and wars between the two countries, and comes to the conclusion that they have now definitely decided to make friends and forget past grievances, in order to make common cause against the real and dangerous enemy of both, namely Germany.

**The Second Intervention of France and the Siege of Antwerp, 1832** (*La seconde intervention française et le siège d'Anvers, 1832*). By André Martinet. 300 pp. 8vo. Brussels, 1908. Société Belge de Librairie. 5/-.

The author discusses the "Treaty of 24 Articles," concluded in November, 1832, by which the Great Powers recognized the independence of Belgium, and the general European war, which had been threatening for eight months, seemed to be avoided. The remainder of the book shows to what extent these hopes were realized and events are followed until the capitulation of Antwerp.

**Turkey in Revolution**. By Charles Roden Buxton. 285 pp., with 33 illustrations and a map. 8vo. London, 1909. T. Fisher Unwin. 7/6.

The part played by the Turkish army in the revolution in Turkey as described in Mr. Buxton's book should be of interest to military readers.

**The Rise and Progress of the South American Republics**. By George W. Crichfield. (2 volumes.) 1,250 pp. 8vo. London, 1909. T. Fisher Unwin. 25/-.

This work deals with the history and present condition of the States of South and Central America. The author's verdict is unfavourable to Spanish America, and he is of opinion that the States of Central America and those of the northern portion of South America are wholly unfit to govern themselves. He goes further and urges that it is the duty of the United States to take over the government of these countries and to put an end to the chaos and anarchy which, according to his views, reign there.

There are many points of interest in the work, not one of the least of which is the author's denunciation of the Monroe doctrine. He is an American, and one who has the utmost confidence in the future of America, but he fully realises the merits and achievements of other countries, especially of England and Germany. Of the United

States, he says:—"The whole American continent, except Canada, ought to be ours, and I believe it will be. If I see aright, the finger of destiny points that way." Of Germany he says:—"Germany needs colonies, she ought to have them, she must have them. . . . It seems certain that the future holds promise of a career of imperial glory, rivalled only by that of the United States and Great Britain. The solid, dogged stability and solidity of the German, his strict discipline, industrial as well as military, the practical and technical nature of his education, his daring, enterprise and phlegmatic patience, and, above all, his freedom from the baneful influence of impractical theories regarding the alleged political rights of these semi-barbarous peoples, make him peculiarly fitted for carrying the banner of civilisation into the countries where darkness now reigns." He also says:—"Germany and the United States are young giants which have not yet arrived at a realisation of their real strength. They are fountains of energy, Atlases on whose shoulders might rest a world."

In spite, however, of the author's praise of the United States and Germany, and of the great future which he predicts for them, he reserves the highest eulogy for England. Of our country he says:—"All civilised men owe to England a debt of gratitude which is immeasurable. She has been, and is to-day, the mightiest factor in the world for good. . . . Mother of nations, home and birthplace of law and order and progress, England stands to-day a supreme factor in the development of the world. . . . Incomparable England! Since the sun commenced to shine no other nation has done the world so much good. Where the English flag flies there is peace, prosperity, safety, freedom." Such words are pleasing from the pen of an American, and still more pleasing is his praise of British rule in India, which is generous and unstinted.

Though it is not possible to agree absolutely with all the author's views, the work is of considerable interest, and a valuable contribution to the literature on the subject of the American continent.

**America as a World-Power.** By John Holladay Latané. 350 pp. and 7 maps. 8vo. New York and London, 1907. Harper and Brothers. 8/.

This volume is the last of the series entitled "The American Nation," and it deals with the history of the United States from the time when the American people began to take an absorbing interest in the Cuban insurrection.

The opening chapters are devoted to the various causes which led up to the Spanish war of 1898, and the ensuing military and naval operations are then briefly described.

In the succeeding chapters the effect of the campaign on the spirit and policy of the American people is dealt with, and the author shows how the war gave to the people of the United States new interests and new purposes.

The controversy which took place over the acquisition of the Philippines is described, including a reference to the extent to which the situation in China influenced President McKinley, and his Cabinet, in deciding to retain the islands.

American diplomacy in the Orient is next discussed, and the author points out how the rivalry of the world-powers in China, towards the end of the XIXth century, served to emphasize, more than ever before, the fact that commerce is the greatest of all political interests.

The Alaskan boundary question, the Panama Canal question, and the Monroe doctrine as affected by changed conditions, are then discussed, and in the concluding chapters the author touches briefly on the great administrative and economic questions, which, within recent years, have pressed for a solution in the United States.

**Defence of the Empire in Australia.** By Colonel Hubert Foster, R.E. 52 pp. Fo. London, 1908. Hugh Rees. 1/6.

Colonel Foster's pamphlet contains a series of eight articles which together form a most valuable exposition of the true principles of imperial defence.

The dependence of an Empire such as ours upon sea power is very clearly pictured, but Colonel Foster has been careful to show that there are limitations to the powers of a navy, and that a conclusive result can only be attained by the action on land of military forces.

The manner in which Imperial co-operation is urged and in which the advantages of the offensive over the defensive have been shown should commend the book to Imperialists and soldiers, not only in Australia but throughout the Empire.

## NAVAL.

**The Naval General Staff (Le grand Etat-Major Naval).** By Lieutenant de Vaisseau Castex. 300 pp. 8vo. Paris, 1909. Lavauzelle. 3/.

The author emphasizes the importance of the General Staff, and shows how the hours of preparatory work carried out by it in peace time will result in marshalling all the naval force of a country to the best advantage when the horizon becomes clouded.

He takes as his model the Prussian General Staff, and traces the successive steps which were necessary before it was realised that a General Staff could give irresistible momentum to a National Army, and corresponding political force to a nation. He shows how the idea had to be broken down that a general would not carry out a plan pre-arranged independently of him. The author then speaks of the institution of the first big manoeuvres in 1829, and of the first mobilisation scheme in 1830. A test of the mobilisation scheme took place in 1849 for operations in Baden and the Palatinate, and it was found to take three weeks to mobilize the army corps.



The author then deals with all the functions of the General Staff in detail, and the particular duty which falls to each of the sections into which it is divided. He comes to the conclusion that the General Staff should be left free to carry out its great rôle, and that for this purpose all administrative details should be withdrawn from it, leaving only such matters as strategy and tactics, mobilisation, operations, and movements of troops.

A General Staff is, in the opinion of the author, as essential for a navy as for an army.

### CAVALRY.

*Machine Guns with Cavalry.* Vol. I. (Mitrailleuses de Cavalerie). By J. C. Lavan, Captain Commandant of the 15th Dragoons. 657 pp. and about 100 engravings in the text. 8vo. Angers, 1908. Siraudeau. 6/7.

This book is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the period 1903-4 and is practically a verbatim reproduction of articles contributed during these years by the author to the magazine called *Revue de Cavalerie*.

The latter portion of the book is concerned with the period from 1904-1908.

The first part consists of four chapters. In the opening chapter the author discusses the position (in 1903-4) as regards machine guns with cavalry in the various foreign countries, from which it appears that at that time the German, British, Austrian, Belgian, Danish, Swedish, Norwegian and Swiss cavalry were actually in possession of machine guns or were about to receive them. The author expresses the opinion that a mistake was made by all foreign nations at this time in looking on machine guns as light artillery and in making the *personnel* of the machine gun detachments too large, whereby, he thinks, the mobility of the cavalry was seriously affected. In Chapter II. the merits of the Hotchkiss and Maxim guns are compared, and extracts from a diary relating to the march of a Hotchkiss gun detachment during the South African war are given. The third chapter contains the author's ideas regarding a suitable organisation for machine guns, which is given in the form of a proposed official regulation on the subject. The fourth chapter is by far the most interesting of the first part of the book, and, in addition to some notes as to the tactical employment of machine guns, discusses the question as to whether machine guns should be carried on an animal's back or on wheels, and enters into various other points in connection with the organisation and *personnel* of machine gun detachments. At the end of the chapter the machine gun tactics employed in America, Germany, England, Austria, and Switzerland are discussed.

In the second part of the book, which, as already mentioned, deals with the period 1904-1908, the writer once more reviews the position as regards machine guns with cavalry in various armies, and explains the state of affairs in Germany, America, England, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Denmark, Spain, France and Japan.

The general conclusions at which the author arrives are—

- (1) Cavalry must rely on the *arme blanche*, and therefore necessarily its fire power must be small.
- (2) To increase the fire power of cavalry by using them as mounted infantry is fatal to the efficiency of cavalry.
- (3) By adding to cavalry light machine guns which can be carried on a horse's back the necessary fire power is added to that arm without interfering with the mobility or the spirit of cavalry.

*Drill Regulations for the Cavalry* (Exerzier-Reglement für die Kavallerie) Official. 214 pp., with diagrams in text. 12mo. Berlin, 1909. Mittler. 1/6.

These regulations are dated 3rd April, 1909, and supersede those of 1895.

The book has been reset and almost entirely rewritten. Part I. now deals with mounted work, dismounted work being relegated to Part II.

As in the Drill Regulations for the Infantry issued in 1906, the spirit of the offensive appears to be the key-note of the manual. This is sufficiently indicated in the last paragraph of the introduction which reads as follows:—

"Cavalry must always seek to execute their task by offensive action.

"It is only when the lance can no longer be employed that the carbine is to be resorted to.

"No squadron must await an attack, but must always seek to anticipate the enemy in this respect."

From the above it would seem that shock action is still to be the chief object aimed at and that dismounted fire action is to be regarded as subsidiary to it.

The drill formations in mounted work with the exception of the introduction of "regimental double column" and "brigade double column" have undergone but little change.

A brigade may be formed of two or three regiments and may have a proportion of horse artillery and machine guns allotted to it.

The cavalry corps is recognized and may consist of two or more cavalry divisions. In dismounted fire action the squadron is the unit and one-half or three-quarters of the men may be dismounted. In the first case the led horses are termed mobile, that is, they can be moved at the trot or gallop. In the second case they are still mobile, but can only be moved at a walk, with the horse holder dismounted leading his four horses and carrying the four lances strapped together over one shoulder.

Dismounted fire action is no longer to be confined to the defensive, but, as when mounted, the offensive is enjoined. The employment of mounted and dismounted action in co-operation is recommended.

Part III. dealing with the "Combat," is entirely new and embodies the most modern German ideas on the use of cavalry in the field.

*French Cavalry Field Service Regulations* (Instruction pratique sur le service de la Cavalerie en campagne). Official publication issued by the French War Office. 313 pp. 8vo. Paris, 1908. Lavauzelle. -/10.

This is the fourth edition of this book, which is corrected up to 1st September, 1908. Since the previous edition was issued in 1902 certain changes have been introduced in the regulations for the French cavalry.

The following is the fresh matter contained in the new edition:—

Page 54.—There is a footnote calling attention to the alteration made in the Infantry Field Service Regulations by a ministerial "notification" dated 25th May, 1908, according to which the rules for the employment of cavalry with the outposts are modified. The text of the "notification" is given on page 301.

Page 58.—There is a footnote pointing out that recently a new body of men have been recruited who are known as "Infantry Mounted Ground Scouts."

Page 91.—There is a footnote to the effect that the fighting train of a cavalry division will only include a portion of an ambulance.

Page 144.—A footnote states that each cavalry soldier now carries 66 cartridges in clips (48 for cuirassiers). Each cavalryman armed with a rifle carries 30 rounds revolver ammunition (18 for telegraphists).

Page 147.—There are certain modifications in the Table of Rations. For example, salt pork, coffee tablets, and beer may now be issued, whilst neither the issue of potatoes or dripping is mentioned. There is also a difference between the quantities of several of the articles now issued as compared with the former scale.

Page 148.—A new kind of ration called a "railway ration" (*viures de chemin de fer*) is introduced which, as its name implies, is intended for the soldiers' use whilst travelling in the train.

Page 180.—The penultimate paragraph is new. This is to the effect that during a halt the gendarmerie are responsible for the sanitary condition of, and the maintenance of order in, cantonments and their outskirts.

Page 251.—A footnote states that cavalry are now provided with the material for making the Vevry bridge.

Pages 293, 300.—In these pages the text is given of the provisional regulations (dated 24th January, 1908) regarding the use of "infantry mounted ground scouts" (*déclaireurs de terrains montés d'infanterie*).

The object of this new body of men, who are recruited from the cavalry, is to afford further protection to infantry when marching, or halted, or fighting.

Pages 301 to 303.—As already stated, the text is here given of the War Office "notification" of 27th May, 1908, regarding the modification of the duties of the cavalry attached to the outposts.

*The Dutch Cavalry Training Manual for 1908* (Ontwerp-Cavalerie-Regiment 1908. II.). Official. 218 pp. 12mo. Breda, 1908.

This book, which dates from the year 1908, marks an important advance in cavalry training. The old principles have disappeared, and only what is suitable for war has been retained.

The following are the chief principles:—

- (a) Cavalry commanders must familiarize themselves with all the incidents of an engagement, in order to appreciate the importance of the different formations, and to judge the best moment for a change of formation.

The suddenness and short duration of the cavalry combat make it essential to preserve simplicity in the methods of command, since there is no time for formal movements. The necessity of deciding when the moment has come to deploy, and the right time for increasing the pace absorbs the commander's whole attention, and leaves him no time to think about details.

It is therefore laid down that the junior commanders may decide for themselves on the method by which they will carry out the prescribed change of formation.

The necessity of "surprise" dominates all cavalry tactics, and hence all changes of formation, with scarcely an exception, are carried out at an increased pace.

- (b) Forming line.—The deployment of the squadrons takes place, as a rule, on either side of the unit of direction. When a regiment is in line the squadrons do not march quite on the same alignments so as to avoid the danger, in case it is desired to deliver an attack, of irregularity in the dressing of one squadron being carried on to the other squadrons.

When larger units are deploying into line, each commander causes his own detachment to form line as soon as space is available. On the field of battle line is formed when the direction and object of the attack are known.

- (c) Initiative of subordinate commanders.—The manual endeavours to stimulate the initiative of the subordinate commanders as much as possible. This is seen in the following points:—

- (1) In column of troops the troop commanders take the interval they require without any further order from the squadron commander, if the ground allows of it.

- (2) If the intention is to outflank the enemy, or if measures are to be taken to effect this, the troop commanders act quickly and decisively on their own initiative.

- (3) The column of troops is regarded as an unsuitable formation for moving under artillery fire, or under unexpected fire of infantry, but it is well adapted for changes of direction and for avoiding difficult ground.

- (4) The attack formation in extended order is suitable for attacking against artillery, vehicles and infantry. If the groups, laid down for reconnoitring under a hostile fire, and consisting of four or five troopers under a sergeant, have been formed, this will greatly contribute towards the success of an attack.
- (5) Dismounted action is only to be used when it is quicker and more suitable for the object aimed at than mounted action.

*The Course of Training for the Remount* (Der Gang der Ausbildung des Remontepferdes). 4th edition. By General of Cavalry Freiherr von Troschke. 313 pp., with woodcuts in text. 8vo. Leipzig, 1908. Otto Lenz. 5/6.

This book has been written to supplement the Equitation Regulations for the Cavalry. The first and second editions were published in 1869 and the third in 1877. The reprint of the 1882 Equitation Regulations in 1908 was the probable incentive for the revision of the work.

The author deals with the subject in great detail and in a very comprehensive manner. In the early pages the conformation and characteristics of the various types of animal met with, and the qualifications required for the men selected for remount training are entered into. The breaking of the horses mounted and with lunging reins is then fully discussed, and the book concludes with a short chapter on the several phases of the two years' course of training of the remount and the work done in each phase.

*Sixty Years of the Austro-Hungarian Cavalry, 1848-1908* (Sechzig Jahre oesterreichisch-ungarische Kavallerie, 1848-1908). By four different authors). 59 pp., with frontispiece. 8vo. Vienna, 1908. Karl Konegen. 5/2.

1. The period from 1848 to 1908 is divided into five sections, each handled by a different author.

2. The book is not a work of military history; it describes the gradual evolution of the present Austrian cavalry from the old cuirassiers, dragoons and light cavalry.

3. First period (1848-49), by Captain von Kavelberg, 6th Dragoon. In 1848 the strength of the Austro-Hungarian army was 400,000 men, of whom some 49,000 were cavalry. It was divided into cuirassiers, dragoons, light horse, hussars and Uhlans (lancers). Each of these corps had its own drill and system of training. The heavy cavalry were intended to turn the scale of a battle by well-timed charges; the light cavalry were intended principally for reconnaissance and outpost duty. All except the lancers were armed with carbines, but fighting on foot was seldom attempted.

4. Officers were promoted by purchase. The men served for eight years. They were drawn from the lowest classes by local conscription.

5. Second period (1850-59), by Captain Kerchnawe, General Staff.

After the campaigns of 1848-49 the cavalry was re-organised even more thoroughly than the infantry. The strength of the heavy cavalry was increased, and the "light horse" converted into Uhlans. Numerous bodies of yeomanry were raised, such as the Croatian, Serbian and Rumanian Corps. In 1859 these amounted to 3,400 sabres, besides 4,000 irregulars. The strength of the regular cavalry in 1859 was about 64,000 sabres.

6. The number of patterns of sabre was reduced to two, a heavy and a light pattern, and a rifled percussion carbine was issued to all except Uhlans.

7. Third period (1860-66), by Major Anton Semek.

After the war of 1859 the first act of the newly-created Parliament was to economize by cutting down the army, and especially the cavalry. It was considered that cavalry could not face the infantrymen armed with the new rifle, and that a few mounted men per division, for reconnoitring purposes, would suffice. Thus by 1866 the cavalry had been reduced from 64,000 to 39,000 sabres, including depôts, so that on the outbreak of war in that year only 28,000 men were fit for service.

8. Carbines, which had been practically abolished and replaced by pistols, were re-introduced in 1866, but were not issued till just before the war. Pioneer troops were formed in 1866, and equipped with tools and explosives.

9. Up to the battle of Koeniggratz the heavy cavalry were held in reserve, and were brought into action only to decide the fate of a battle. After that date they were called upon to perform the same duties as light cavalry. In the campaign the reductions made by the Radical Parliament had left the cavalry too weak to be efficient as a whole, in spite of their individual excellence.

10. Fourth period (1867-81), by Major Anton Semek.

The unsuccessful campaign of 1866 led to far-reaching reforms. Liability to military service was extended to all classes. Parade and ceremonial gave place to war training. In the cavalry, the cuirassiers, which had come to be looked upon as ceremonial troops, were converted into dragoons, and the distinction between light and heavy cavalry was abolished. All regiments were organized alike, namely, with six service squadrons and a depôt. In war time a reserve squadron was added. Bands, ensigns and ensign-bearers were abolished. A central school of equitation was formed.

11. All regiments were armed with breech-loading carbines, even the Uhlans receiving 48 per squadron, and revolvers were issued to non-commissioned officers. Dismounted fire training was thoroughly carried out. The cavalry regulations of 1870 and 1873 provided for the employment of large bodies of cavalry acting independently in front of the army.

12. Fifth period (1882-1908), by Captain Kerchnawe.

Except for the abolition of the lance, no changes of importance were made between 1889 and 1891. In the latter year the reserve squadron was replaced by a pioneer

troop, telegraph troops, and remount troop. The magazine carbine was issued to all regiments, and was replaced in 1895 by an improved pattern.

13. Of late years the cavalry have been given machine guns, and a cavalry machine gun on an armoured motor car was successfully tried in 1906. But the expense of this weapon will prevent its introduction on any large scale. Cavalry bridging trains have been formed, "swimming sacks" issued in the proportion of 10 per squadron, and the field telegraph equipment has been increased and improved.

14. The formation of five cavalry divisions in peace time has enabled training, especially reconnaissance and dismounted action, to be carried out on a more extended scale. The Landwehr cavalry, which, up to 1883, hardly existed in peace time, are now a well-trained and serviceable body.

15. Conclusion.—Sixty years of progress have given us a magnificent body of cavalry. Yet it is far from perfect. A Radical Parliament has cut down its strength to the equivalent of 293 service squadrons, or 48,000 men. The horses are overweighted and the supply of ammunition insufficient.

*Letters of an Old Cavalry Officer* (Lettres d'un vieux cavalier). By General Donop. 2 volumes. 320 pp. 8vo. Paris, 1908. Berger-Levrault. 5/-.

This work is an eloquent plea for the proper treatment of cavalry and for a recognition of their true rôle in war. In France, as in other countries, there has been a tendency to interference in the training of the arm by men who have no real knowledge of its powers. General Donop shows that this policy has led to discontent and deterioration, and he vigorously condemns this ignorant meddling in his "Letters."

He points out that energy, dash and determination are the most essential qualities for cavalry; these qualities cannot be acquired by means of bookwork and indoor study alone, but are the result of long and constant practical experience, tempered by scientific and theoretical study of the history of war and of the cavalry arm in particular.

He inveighs against the absurd ideas cherished by so many non-experts, by ignorant civilians as well as by wrong-headed soldiers, that the tactical training of cavalry is a simple thing, merely a matter of ordinary common sense. He shows that such theories are wholly false and involve serious danger, especially to France, in view of the numerically superior and highly trained cavalry possessed by Germany.

General Donop was a dashing cavalry leader, but not a mere fire-eater; he believes in a happy combination of practical experience and physical energy with theoretical study and activity of mind, and endeavours to show that the cavalry officer should combine these qualities. He must not be a theoretical bookworm or a regulation-loving bureaucrat swathed in red tape, nor, on the other hand, must he be that terrible thing, a mere so-called "practical soldier," with a firm belief in his own knowledge and experience, as gained in some remote campaign against savages, and with a lordly contempt for the scientific study of his profession, for the lessons of past wars and the teachings of great soldiers.

## ARTILLERY.

*Artillery in Action* (Artillerie dans le combat.) By Captain Bourguet. 110 pp. 8vo. Paris, 1908. Chapelot. 2/2.

The author of this book is Orderly Officer to General Percin, commanding 13th French Army Corps, who has written a preface for him.

The object of the writer is partly to combat certain doctrines which are still held by French artillery officers. He finds, for example, that there are still officers who advocate the commencement of an action with an artillery duel which the author proceeds to show is useless waste of ammunition besides being tactically unsound. On the other hand, he considers that the batteries told off to keep down the enemy's fire (*contre-batteries*) must fire unceasingly at the particular objectives assigned to them. Special care must, however, be taken that these *contre-batteries* do not fire at any other objective otherwise their ammunition will not last. Another custom against which the author wishes to protest is the practice in vogue at schools of gunnery of constantly changing objectives and also of continually reducing or enlarging the front of objectives. Captain Bourguet scathingly describes the supporters of such methods as "musical conductors who wish to make the targets wait." He adds that however excellent this form of "gymnastics" may be, it is no training for war.

The most interesting and convincing part of the book is that which is devoted to an urgent appeal to artillery officers no longer to consider themselves specialists and an independent arm. The author contends that the "separatist" feeling among artillery officers leads to want of co-operation between infantry and artillery on the battlefield, and he points out that an army in which want of co-operation between these arms exists can hardly expect to be successful in war.

*Modern Field Artillery* (Die heutige Feldartillerie). By Captain von Roekoten. German Artillery. 2 volumes, 448 pp., with 130 illustrations. Berlin, 1909. Eisenschmidt. 15/-.

This book deals principally with the construction of field artillery guns, carriages and ammunition. There is no attempt to go into scientific principles, but the different constructions adopted by various States and by various makers are described in detail and fully illustrated. The author confines his descriptions to mechanism in practical use, and novel devices which are still in the theoretical or experimental stage are not discussed. The section on ammunition is very complete, and full details of the latest types of field projectiles and fuses are given.

Under the heading of "Technical Equipment," brief descriptions of rangefinders, telescopes, heliographs, and field telephones are given.

The most interesting portions are, perhaps, those dealing with the details of the Krupp buffer, and the description of the Krupp high explosive buffer on page 165.

Besides dealing with artillery equipment the book contains chapters on fire discipline, organization and tactics. The chapter on fire discipline consists principally of a comparison between French and German methods. The author prefers the latter as being less wasteful of ammunition. He is strongly in favour of time-shrapnel ranging. He considers the French method of indirect laying to be too elaborate, and less serviceable than the simpler German procedure.

The chapter on "Organisation" is a comparison between the French 4-gun battery and the German 6-gun battery, to the advantage of the latter. Captain von Roskoten defends the German system of keeping only one wagon per gun in the first line, which shortens the columns and expedites deployment.

In the chapter on tactics the author shows a marked bias in favour of German methods. He acknowledges the value of the covered position, but condemns the tendency to seek protection at the expense of efficiency. Batteries must always be ready to quit their cover at the decisive stages of the combat. Great importance is attached to the artillery reconnaissance, which is thoroughly carried out in Germany. Single batteries must accompany the attacking infantry to close range.

Captain von Roskoten's work contains an immense amount of detailed information and is a valuable book of reference for all questions of modern field artillery equipment.

*The History of the Royal Prussian Commission for Artillery Experiments* (Geschichte der königlichen preussischen Artillerie-Prüfungskommission). By Colonel von Denecke. 120 pp., with numerous portraits. 4to. Berlin, 1909. Published by the Commission for Artillery Experiments. 7/10.

This book is brought out to commemorate the centenary of the founding of the Commission for Artillery Experiments in Prussia. It contains portraits of General von Scharnhorst, who was chiefly responsible for founding the Commission, and of many other distinguished soldiers who have been connected with it during the last 100 years. The book gives a short account, without entering into details, of the experiments which the Commission has carried out during the course of its existence from the days of smooth-bore ordnance down to the introduction of the 10-cm. gun of 1904, and the experiments with apparatus for measuring the recoil of guns.

## STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL.

*Lessons from two Recent Wars.* (The Russo-Turkish and South African Wars.) By General H. Langlois. Translated for the General Staff, War Office. 145 pp., with 4 maps. 8vo. London, 1909.

Though General Langlois wrote this book five years ago, it is still of considerable value, especially as the Manchurian war has proved the soundness of many of the doctrines enunciated, without refuting any of the principles laid down. The volume was written with a view to preventing French officers from forming incorrect and dangerous conclusions as the result of the war in South Africa. The author is one of a coterie of distinguished French military writers who have been and are striving to imbue their countrymen with the spirit of the offensive, which in their opinion was the cause of the German victories in 1870-71. The effect produced by the Boer war was to create a feeling in certain circles that the frontal attack had become impossible. As a result of this it seemed likely that French military opinion would veer round to something like its condition in 1870, when so many battles were lost by a want of initiative and a passive defensive attitude. General Langlois, therefore, set himself to combat these dangerous tendencies by exposing the fallacies of lessons derived from South Africa, further illustrating his contentions by means of examples from the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78.

He wrote before the conclusion of the *entente cordiale*, so that his criticisms are not blunted by any desire to be polite to us. His tactical ideas, written before the Manchurian war, have been borne out by the success of the Japanese, who acted in accordance with his views. Throughout he lays very great stress on the value of the offensive, of initiative, of energy and of a determination to conquer; his doctrines are those of our training manuals, with special reference to certain points, which he has brought out with great clearness and ability.

The book is full of valuable criticisms and important lessons. It is divided into five parts: the first dealing with the Russo-Turkish war, the second with considerations regarding the teachings of the French drill book, the third with the Boer war, the fourth with lessons to be drawn from the latter, and the fifth with general considerations regarding present-day tactics.

The author's remarks on the Russo-Turkish war are valuable, especially in the way that they lead up to the discussion on the French drill book in Part II. of the work. This discussion deals more particularly with Skobelev's operations in the fighting about Elexna, with the development of the attack, the fire fight and the final assault; stress is laid on the importance of adequate artillery support to attacking infantry and the value of the moral factor is emphasised.

General Langlois divides the South African war into three periods:—(1) Before the arrival of Lord Roberts; (2) after his arrival; (3) after his return to England. He maintains that the actions fought by General Buller round Ladysmith, e.g., Colenso, Spion Kop, &c., and by Lord Methuen at Belmont, the Modder River and Magersfontein, were conducted in defiance of the lessons of 1877-78, and indeed of all tactical



rules; he enumerates the various mistakes committed by our leaders, and emphasises more especially the want of co-operation by the artillery, the faulty notions as to the delivery of the decisive attack, the want of mutual support, the lack of energy, and of a determination to conquer. Having demonstrated the fact that our failures were due to these mistakes and not to the increased power conferred on the defence by modern improvements in fire-arms, General Langlois goes on to make it clear that Lord Roberts' operations, though successful, have little or no bearing on the tactics of European warfare, whilst the guerilla fighting of the third period can be entirely neglected. At the same time, however, he affirms his opinion that a decisive battle, however costly, would in the long run have proved far more economical in men and money than the cautious measures adopted by the British commanders.

Part IV. deals with the lessons of the South African War, and is an extremely able discussion. The author points out the danger of drawing false conclusions from the Boer war, where the circumstances were peculiar, and quite different to those obtaining in European warfare; where one side was practically composed of irregulars, whilst the tactical methods employed by its opponents were antiquated, vicious and irresolute. He shows that there is no reason to suppose that frontal attacks will be impossible in the future, with the aid of good leadership and with efficient artillery support; he deprecates the cult of mounted infantry, which he considers to be merely a cheap and bad form of cavalry, and whilst acknowledging the frequent necessity of dismounted action, urges that the rôle of cavalry has gained in importance, and that the horsemen of the future require more careful training and must be better riders than ever before. He goes on to deal with German and British tendencies after the South African war, and comes to the conclusion that the Napoleonic system remains the best; i.e., to employ strategy to bring about a battle, during the battle to engage the enemy all along the line, but to drive home the attack at one point. Finally, he discusses our training regulations, compares them with the French regulations, and arrives at the decision that it was failure to observe the principles laid down in our training manuals that led to our checks and repulses in South Africa. He concludes with a few remarks *re* howitzers, heavy guns and pom-poms.

The final chapter, dealing with the evolution of tactics, enumerates a few important laws which have been established as the result of the improvements in modern firearms. General Langlois points out that these improvements tend to increase the value of the individual, as opposed to the power of mere numbers, and that energy, moral, and determination to conquer will play an even greater part in future wars than has been the case in the past.

*The Surprise Attack by Sea as a Preliminary to a Campaign* (Der Ueberfall über See als Feldzugseinleitung). By Lieut.-General A. von Janson. 144 pp., with 14 sketch maps and plans in the text. 8vo. Berlin, 1909. Eisenschmidt. 4/-.

The question of an invasion by sea is one of the most discussed topics of the present day. This is to some extent due to the important part played by the Japanese fleet in the recent war against Russia. In this book various overseas expeditions which have taken place in the past are dealt with and the lessons to be learnt from them are discussed.

Napoleon said: "To try and effect a landing in England without having command of the sea would be the boldest and most difficult operation that could be attempted." Nevertheless, the French expeditions to Ireland and Egypt prove that under favourable circumstances it is possible for a nation, not having command of the sea, to land troops.

The telegraph and other modern inventions prevent preparations for such expeditions being kept secret at the present day, but otherwise the author considers that the improvement in ships, armaments, &c., confer equal advantages on the assailant and defender. No modern ruler or general has given more attention to the question of invasion than Napoleon, and yet he was only successful once (Egypt). Even on this occasion, had not the French fleet been destroyed, it is questioned whether the expedition would have had any lasting results. Napoleon succeeded in transporting an army all the way to Egypt and yet hesitated to cross the Channel, because England had command of the sea. The author therefore concludes that what Napoleon, who was much more favourably situated, was incapable of doing, could not be done by anyone at the present day, and also that overseas invasion in Europe is practically out of the question. This theory appears to be confirmed by the Russo-Japanese war, when the Japanese hesitated to land on hostile territory until they had gained command of the sea, notwithstanding the fact that they had surprised their opponents both politically and strategically.

It is not considered that any Power could collect sufficient transports to carry, in one trip, an army of sufficient size to bring a war to a decision. The author considers that railways are a great safeguard against such landings, and that a country which has made the necessary preparations for its own defence in peace time has nothing to fear from overseas attacks. This he considers a much greater safeguard than international conventions.

*General Carl von Clausewitz on War.* Translated by Miss Maguire, with notes by T. M. Maguire. 161 pp., with 2 maps. 8vo. London, 1909. Clowes. 7/6.

This book consists of a series of articles published originally in the "United Service Magazine."

The selected extracts from this distinguished authority on the art of war have been freely translated, and in many instances only a *precis* of the original text is given. Interspersed throughout the articles are copious comments and notes by Mr. Maguire, who has drawn on British methods and military history, as far as possible, by way of illustration.

*The French Frontiers* (Frontières Françaises). Vol. II. By Gustave Voulquin. 80 pp., with 9 maps. 8vo. Paris, 1908. Bibliothèque Larousse. 1/-.

The book consists of three volumes. The first deals with the northern and eastern frontiers, second line position, and the defence of Paris. The second deals with the south-eastern frontier, and the third with naval bases, frontier fortresses, and the defence of the littoral of France, Algiers and Tunis.

In all cases the natural defensive capabilities are considered, next the administrative divisions, and then the artificial fortifications are dealt with in detail. Plans of the various defensive positions are given, when these are important.

*Studies of War* (Studien über den Krieg). Part III. Strategy. By General of Infantry J. von Verdy du Vernois. 99 pp., with 3 maps in text. 8vo. Berlin, 1909. Mittler. 2/6. (For Part III., 7th number, see p. 50, No. 6.)

This is the eighth number of the series and the third section of the second group dealing with strategical operations. The subject dealt with in this number is the "Strategical Concentration," with comments on von Moltke's appreciations on the question.

The author points out in the introduction that concentration must be considered under the headings of strategical and tactical, and illustrates his arguments from the campaigns of 1859, 1866 and 1870.

*Our Coast Defences* (Onze Kustverdediging). By Lieut.-General Schneider. 27 pp. 8vo. The Hague, 1908. Von Stockum. -/7.

The author's views may be briefly summarized as follows:—

The improvement of the coast defences has now become a matter of urgency. In recent years the attack has gained enormously in power, but little has been done to bring the coast defences up to modern requirements.

Holland must be in a position, whenever the political horizon of Europe is troubled, and some great Power demands to know whether she is in a position to prevent the occupation of her harbours by another Power, to answer unhesitatingly in the affirmative.

The coast defence of Holland reduces itself to the following definite points:—

The Helder, the positions at IJmuiden and at the Hook of Holland, the fort (advocated by the author) at Numansdorp, and the works at the West Schelde mouth.

The improvement of the coast defences, especially of their armament, involves a considerable outlay of money; but this expense is far below that which would be entailed by the occupation of Holland by a foreign Power. It is to be hoped, says the author, that if the improvements are decided upon, that the money may not be distributed over a number of years (which would postpone the completion of the work indefinitely) but may be voted *en bloc* by means of a short loan, as was done in 1895.

As regards the question of the manning of the coast defences, the opinion is becoming more and more prevalent in many countries that this is the function of the navy. In Germany the North Sea defences, which are the most important, are under the navy, while the defence of the Baltic coast is committed to the army. The author hopes that the whole of the Dutch coast defences may soon be handed over to the charge of the navy.

*The Coast Defences of Holland*. By Mr. F. Arondstein. A lecture delivered before the Dutch "Society for the Study of Military Science," on 27th March, 1908.

Mr. Arondstein considers that the position as regards coast defence would be most favourable if Holland were allied with Great Britain; in every other case, whether Holland were at war, or were endeavouring to remain neutral, coast defence must play an important part.

He therefore puts forward certain "minimum demands" based on the assumption that "at all times, even in a sudden emergency, any violation of our neutrality can be resisted by force of arms."

These demands take the form of the strengthening of the armament of some of the forts at the Helder, and the construction of some additional works at IJmuiden, the Hook of Holland and in the West Schelde. Special flotillas of coast defence vessels and torpedo craft are recommended for the local defence of these points, and for the other navigable waterways giving access to the interior. In addition Mr. Arondstein advocates the concentration of the *Landwehr* at certain points, with a view to resisting landings on the coast; the fleet must have an active rôle assigned to it, and must not be tied down to the fortifications.

Finally, as regards *personnel*, the lecturer recommends that the coast defences should be under the navy and that a special naval corps of militia should be raised to garrison them.

*Tactics* (Taktik). Volume III. By von Balck. 4th edition. 432 pp., with 3 maps and an index. 8vo. Berlin, 1908. Eizenschmidt. 8/6. (For Vol. I. see p. 23, No. 7.)

This volume deals with organisation, intelligence, orders, and marches.

1. The introduction treats of the influence on strategy of the geography of the country and of the seasons of the year. The author holds that these considerations may be of great tactical importance, but must be strictly subordinated to the main strategical plan of campaign. The idea of a geographical key to a country is

obsolete; wherever the enemy's fighting force is assembled, there lies the true key to possession of his country. The ground and the weather do not directly affect the result of a campaign, but they have a very marked effect on the time required to achieve the strategic objective.

2. *Organisation*.—The organisation of an army is intended principally to secure efficient control when deployed for action, and is determined by the distance over which such control is effective. Hence large armies consist of divisions of about 12,000 men, of which two or three are combined to form an army corps; smaller armies (such as the British forces) are organized purely on a divisional basis. The author gives details of the organization of the principal armies at the present day and in former campaigns. Since it is usually advisable to keep one-third of a force in reserve, he considers that each unit, from the army corps down to the troop, battery and company, should consist of three sub-units capable of independent action. The corps artillery and corps cavalry should be re-organized as divisional artillery and cavalry. Napoleon considered that one squadron of 300 sabres was sufficient for each division.

3. The organization of the train will be facilitated by the number of motor wagons now available. Thus one road train may replace 40 country carts.

4. The organization of the cavalry division in the principal armies is given in detail. The proportion of guns, namely 2.8 per 1,000 sabres, is still the same as in the Franco-German war.

5. The author considers that an army should consist of 3 to 6 army corps and 1 to 2 cavalry divisions. The "army" artillery should consist entirely of heavy howitzers.

6. *Intelligence*.—The general staff should collect, in peace time, information regarding neighbouring countries and their armies, and issue this information on mobilization. The information collected by the English Intelligence Division before the Boer war was mostly correct, but it was of little use, because there was no system of issuing it to the troops; this applied to the whole of the war.

7. Intelligence regarding a foreign country, both before and after the outbreak of war, is derived principally from our own (German) subjects residing or carrying on business in that country; it is also furnished by our diplomatic representatives in neutral States. The information published by the enemy's newspapers is of great value. Thus in the Crimean war Russell's reports to the *Times* were of great use to the Russians.

8. The tendency in war is to send in too many intelligence reports; these should be collected at intelligence centres, and only the useful ones forwarded. The author deals with the framing and forwarding of reports at considerable length, but this section is little more than a repetition of the *Felddienstordnung*.

9. *Balloons*.—For captive balloons the German cylindrical shape is preferable to the English spherical shape, being steadier. Large "rigid" dirigible balloons, starting from permanent sheds, will be used for strategical reconnaissance on the large scale. Small "semi-rigid" balloons, which can be transported in wagons, will be used for tactical reconnaissance. Balloons are safe from field guns at 2,000 feet elevation, and from special balloon guns at 5,000 feet.

10. *Orders*.—This section deals not only with the technique of orders, but with their conception. The author considers that the fog of war and the encounter battle will be normal conditions, and that the commander who waits to reconnoitre before striking will lose the advantage of the initiative. The bolder commander considers, not how the enemy will strike, but what he will do when he is struck.

11. Several historical examples of good and bad orders are given, and the section concludes with a chapter on the initiative of subordinates.

12. *Marches*.—This section takes up more than half the volume. It is in effect an expansion of the *Felddienstordnung*, with numerous historical illustrations. It deals with tactical and strategical marches, baggage and trains, and supply on the march. A chapter is devoted to night marches, and full details are given of the marching formation of various nations.

The volume concludes with a chapter giving numerous illustrations of marching performances, good and bad, mostly taken from the Franco-German war.

*Tactics (Taktik)*. Vol. IV. By von Balck. 4th edition. 335 pp., with numerous diagrams and an index. 8vo. Berlin, 1908. Eisenschmidt. 8/6. (For Vol. III. see above.)

1. The volume under review deals with transport by rail and sea, outposts, quarters, reconnaissance, and supply.

2. *Railways*.—The author gives a brief summary of the arrangements for the railway transport of the French and German armies in 1870 and the Russian army in 1904-05. He cites numerous instances of the transport of troops by rail in the former war.

3. The first operation of a war will be great cavalry raids on the enemy's railways. If artillery and train are transported by rail and they are liable to be attacked en route they must be accompanied by infantry detachments.

4. Preparations must be made in peace time for the construction of temporary railways to carry the line round in case a bridge or tunnel is destroyed.

5. The construction of the Wady Halfa line in 1896 is cited as a remarkable feat.

6. In Germany, on mobilization, the general staff takes charge of the railways, and, in the area of operations, the military time table at once comes into force. All trains run at regular intervals and at a uniform speed of 14 miles an hour. The day is divided into six periods of four hours, of which one is left clear to make up delays and interruptions. Not more than six trains are despatched in each period.

7. Details are given of the rolling-stock required for each unit and for a complete army corps, and of the order of despatch of the trains. Instances are cited from the Franco-German war.

8. The military railway organization of foreign countries is briefly described. The author considers the English system of short trains running at 30 miles an hour inferior to the German system of long and slow trains.

9. *Transport by Sea*.—The information in this section is taken almost entirely from British official sources and contains little that is new to a British officer. The author considers the secret preparation of an over-sea expedition to be impossible.
10. *Outposts*.—This section of 60 pages, is principally a repetition of the *Felddienstordnung*, with historical examples and specimens of orders. There is a useful diagram of the German outpost system on page 72.
11. A separate chapter is devoted to outposts under special conditions such as the outposts of a flying column, on a river line, and in siege warfare.
12. The outpost system of foreign nations are described, and diagrams of the Austrian, Italian, French and Russian systems are given.
13. The German system of outposts consists in establishing strong pickets on the roads, the intervening ground being guarded by patrols and a few sentries; other nations use a continuous chain of posts, each complete with its reliefs. The author considers that the latter method requires an elaborate system of control which is certain to break down in war.
14. *Quarters*.—Bivouacs are preferable for discipline and mobility, billets for comfort; village bivouacs are intermediate between the two, and will generally be used in war. The technique of quartering (accommodation, inlying pickets, alarm posts, &c.) is considered in detail, with numerous examples.
15. Diagrams of bivouacs, reproduced from the *Felddienstordnung*, are given and explained.
16. The methods of quartering used in other armies are fully described, with diagrams of camps. It is noted that the British army is the only one which uses tents other than shelter tents.
17. *Reconnaissance and Screening*.—The reconnoitring front must be three days in advance of the troops for large bodies or one day for small bodies, such as a division.
18. Screening follows automatically from the defeat of the enemy's cavalry, hence the reconnoitring force must be strong enough to assume a vigorous offensive. When this is impossible, recourse must be had to defensive screening, which means the occupation of a zone of country in advance of the army by defensive posts similar in organisation to outposts.
19. The employment of the army cavalry and divisional cavalry in reconnaissance is fully described, with historical instances.
20. The cadres of cyclist detachments must be formed in peace time; this has already been done in France and Italy. The author considers that it will be necessary in future to register every bicycle in the country with a view to military employment. Cyclist detachments will be used to support cavalry and to carry despatches. The British wisely propose to use them as mobile troops for coast defence. The employment of cyclists in the field in large bodies (such as battalions) is out of the question.
21. Details are given of the cyclist organisations of various nations.
22. Reconnaissance during an action will be carried out by the troops engaged, not by the cavalry. The artillery will use officers' patrols, the infantry will use cyclists when possible.
23. Reconnaissance in force will be carried out by the three arms. Historical illustrations are given.
24. The reconnaissance regulations of other countries are considered in detail. The author disapproves of the Russian system of forming "ride" companies in each regiment, intended specially for reconnaissance, since these companies take away the best men. The British "protective" cavalry does not fulfil the author's ideal of seeking safety in the offensive.
25. An interesting chapter is devoted to the advance of the 4th Prussian Cavalry Division in August, 1870.
26. *Supply*.—The author is unable to quote from the German supply regulations, since these are confidential. This section is based principally upon van Franco's "Supply Service in the Field." (An English translation of this book has been issued by the War Office.) The details given form rather dry reading. A comparative table of rations shows that the British issue considerably less bread and oats than any Continental nation, and rather more meat.
27. Great stress is laid upon the usefulness of the new German travelling field kitchens.
28. The author considers that motor transport, which is confined to the roads, cannot replace the regimental and supply wagons; but will be largely used on the lines of communication.
29. The supply service in the French, Austrian and Russian armies is described.
30. The concluding chapter deals with the supply of the French army in the Moscow campaign, and the supply of the 2nd German army in 1870-71.

*Some Principles of Frontier Mountain Warfare.* By Brevet-Major W. D. Bird, D.S.O. 41 pp., with 2 plans. 8vo. London, 1909. Rees. 1/-.

A brief treatise on the rules to be observed in campaigning on the North-West Frontier of India. Divided as follows:—

- (1) General considerations.
- (2) Strength and organisation of columns.
- (3) Marches and protection.
- (4) Action of advanced and rear guards.
- (5) Attack and defence.
- (6) Camps.
- (7) Protection of lines of communication.
- (8) Defence of a post.

Under the above headings the writer considers how dispositions are affected by the nature of the country and the military capabilities of the tribesmen; by space occupied by columns on narrow hill tracks, and the probabilities of resistance; the protection of columns by piqueting hills, and the disposition of troops on the line

of march and in advanced and rear guards; the precautions to be observed in posting and withdrawing picquets; the occupation of successive positions by rear guards; the importance of offensive action and flanking movements; how best to bring the tribesmen to action so as to inflict losses upon them; the importance of systematic defence in withdrawal. The part on camps deals with their form and choice of situation, picketing, the nature of entrenchments and the disposition of the three arms. The part on the protection of lines of communication discusses the relative use of defensive posts and flying columns.

**Mountain Warfare (Der Gebirgskrieg).** By Colonel Freiherr von Lütgendorf (Austrian Landwehr). 166 pp., with 6 maps. 8vo. Vienne, 1909. Seidel. 5/-.

This treatise is primarily concerned with the characteristics of the mountain regions adjoining or within the boundaries of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the methods to be adopted in carrying on warfare therein.

In the nature of things, however, much that is said in relation to the particular localities dealt with will be equally applicable to any mountainous region, and therefore several chapters will be of general interest to those desiring information about mountain warfare.

In particular the following chapters are recommended for study:—Chapter IV., Operations in mountainous country; Chapters V. and VI., Defence and frontier arrangements for security; Chapter IX., The combat; Chapter X., Communications.

**Machine Guns in Foreign Armies (Mitrailleuses à l'étranger).** By Lieutenant Boullé. 77 pp. 8vo. Paris, 1908. Berger-Levrault. 1/-.

For some years past the value of machine guns in the fire combat has been recognised in every army, both as an aid to infantry and cavalry. Shortly after the termination of the South African war the mobility of machine gun detachments was increased, and in Manchuria variously constituted companies of machine guns were employed on both sides, and, as the war progressed, the number of these detachments increased.

Successive chapters deal with the following points:—Machine guns in different armies, the general characteristics of machine guns, their action and best method of employing them, organisation of detachments, and the tactics to be employed against machine guns.

**Illustration of Tactical Details from the Russo-Japanese War (Taktische Detaildarstellungen aus dem Russisch-Japanischen Kriege).** Part II. By Colonel V. Habermann and Captain Nowak. 56 pp., with 5 appendices (maps, photographs, and details of artillery sights and directors). 8vo. Vienna, 1909. Seidel. 1/10. (For Part I. see p. 85, No. 9.)

This part deals with the cavalry action at Chu-chia-tun, the battles at Wa-fang-wo-peng on the 14th and 15th June, 1904, and the fight at Hsiao-sen on the 19th July, 1904.

The book is very clearly written and is illustrated by excellent maps. It is, however, somewhat difficult to reconcile the system of spelling the place names as used by the authors with that adopted in British official publications, thus Chu-chia-tun is spelt Jedsjatun, Hsiao-sen appears as Sjasur, &c.

**Provisional Regulations regarding the Methods of Crossing and Destroying Obstacles (Instruction provisoire sur les procédés de franchissement et de destruction de obstacles de la fortification).** Official publication issued by the French War Office. 47 pp. 8vo. Paris, 1908. Imprimerie nationale. -/10.

The object of these regulations is to indicate the technical rules to be followed, the implements to be employed, and the formations to be adopted by detachments who have to cross or destroy obstacles in the presence of the enemy.

The regulations are divided into three parts, namely:—

1st part dealing with the crossing and the destruction of the principal accessory defences.

2nd part dealing with the crossing of ditches and surmounting of stockades and railings.

3rd part dealing with the destruction of stockades and railings.

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
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